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EXTENDED ABSTRACT 
The main objective of this dissertation is to explain heterogeneity in conformity within 
multinational enterprises (MNEs). More specifically, I focus on what makes an MNE’s 
subsidiaries implement practices that are consistent with the policy designed by the MNE’s 
headquarters. Given the increasing normative pressures on MNEs, managing conformity 
within them is of strategic importance. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is an example of 
such mounting norms. This dissertation work relies on a unique set of data (including surveys, 
archival data and interviews) I collected on CSR practices in one MNE between 2012 and 
2014. The first essay (chapter 2) looks at the influence of the subsidiaries’ attention to CSR-
related demands from inside and outside the MNE on their CSR practices implementation. 
The results suggest that subsidiaries increase their level of attention to certain demands in 
response to the norm conformity of their internal peers –other subsidiaries- and external peers 
–local rivals. These different levels of attention to internal and external demands further result 
in varying implementation levels among subsidiaries. In my second essay (chapter 3), I 
propose a model of subsidiary conformity that brings together arguments related to the top-
down enforcement of the corporate policy and the pressures for conformity from intra-
organizational peers and emphasizes the role of subsidiaries’ internalization of the policy. Of 
particular interest is the finding that internalization not only fosters subsidiary conformity but 
also reduces the positive effects of headquarters’ and peers’ influence on conformity. And in 
the third essay (chapter 4), I study how the practices’ characteristics and institutionalization 
stage influence their tendency to be either coupled or decoupled from the corporate policy. I 
find that for specific practices, periods of coupling and decoupling follow each other. In 
addition, the institutionalization of an issue in both the subsidiary’s country and industry is 
necessary for coupling to last while and practices’ lack of compatibility with a subsidiary’s 
values is the main driver of sustained decoupling. Overall, the findings of my three essays 
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show that heterogeneous conformity within MNEs stems not only from diverse internal and 
external pressures exerted on subsidiaries, but also from (1) the subsidiaries’ varying levels of 
attention to normative demands that depend on peers’ behaviors, (2) their heterogeneous 
internalization of the Group policy which reduces peers’ and headquarters’ influence and (3) 
the specific characteristics and institutionalization levels of different practices. 
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RESUME 
Cette thèse se donne pour objectif principal l’explication de l’hétérogénéité que l’on 
observe en matière de conformité au sein des multinationales. En particulier, je m’intéresse à 
ce qui pousse les filiales d’une multinationale à mettre en œuvre des pratiques conformes à la 
politique définie par le siège. Compte-tenu des pressions normatives croissantes exercées sur 
les multinationales, leur gestion de la conformité interne prend une importance stratégique. Et 
la responsabilité sociale d’entreprise (RSE) compte au nombre de ces normes émergentes. 
Mon travail repose sur des données uniques (dont des enquêtes, des données d’archive et des 
entretiens) sur la mise en œuvre de pratiques RSE que j’ai collectées de 2012 à 2014 au sein 
d’une multinationale. Le premier essai (chapitre 2) étudie l’influence sur la mise en œuvre de 
pratiques RSE par les filiales de l’attention qu’elles portent aux demandes émises par le siège 
et par leurs parties prenantes locales. Ses résultats suggèrent que les filiales augmentent leur 
niveau d’attention à certaines demandes en réponse à la conformité de leurs pairs internes –
d’autres filiales- et externes –leurs compétiteurs locaux. Ces différents niveaux d’attention 
aux demandes internes et externes se traduisent alors par un niveau de mise en œuvre qui 
varie d’une filiale à l’autre. Dans le deuxième essai (chapitre 3), je modélise la conformité 
d’une filiale sur la base d’arguments relatifs à la diffusion top-down des pratiques et aux 
pressions exercées par les pairs internes, tout en mettant en exergue le rôle que joue 
l’internalisation de la politique par la filiale. Mes résultats révèlent notamment que non 
seulement l’internalisation de la politique par une filiale augmente son niveau de conformité 
mais aussi qu’elle limite les effets positifs des pressions exercées par le siège et les pairs sur 
ce même niveau de conformité. Et dans le troisième essai (chapitre 4), j’étudie comment les 
caractéristiques des pratiques ainsi que leur niveau d’institutionnalisation influencent leur 
tendance à être couplées ou découplées de la politique groupe. J’observe que, pour des 
pratiques données, les périodes de couplage et de découplage se succèdent. De plus, 
6 
 
l’institutionnalisation des thématiques RSE dans le pays et l’industrie d’une filiale sont 
nécessaires au couplage des pratiques dans la durée, tandis que le manque de compatibilité 
des pratiques avec les valeurs des filiales est la principale cause de découplage. Dans 
l’ensemble, les résultats de mes trois essais démontrent que les niveaux hétérogènes de 
conformité que l’on observe au sein des multinationales résultent certes des différentes 
pressions internes et externes exercées sur leurs filiales, mais également (1) de leurs divers 
niveaux d’attention aux demandes normatives en fonction de la conformité de leurs pairs, (2) 
du fait que les filiales internalisent plus ou moins la politique groupe, ce qui limite l’influence 
du siège et de leurs pairs et (3) des caractéristiques spécifiques et des niveaux 
d’institutionnalisation des diverses pratiques.  
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INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation aims at explaining heterogeneity in conformity within multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) and its dynamics. More specifically, I focus on what drives the 
subsidiaries’ implementation of practices that are consistent with the policy defined by the 
parent MNE. 
In fact, the topic of this dissertation was primarily inspired by my experience as a 
consultant in sustainability. As I worked with MNEs, I was struck by the lack of knowledge 
by the headquarters of (1) what their various subsidiaries actually did in terms of Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) and (2) how best to communicate their vision to their 
subsidiaries and get the CSR policy substantiated throughout the organization. 
This practical puzzle seems to lack a clear answer in both the strategy and 
international management literatures. Indeed, conformity within MNEs has been understudied 
and there is a need, from a theoretical as well as a practical standpoint, to understand what 
drives this phenomenon. As described in the following chapter of the dissertation, neo-
institutional scholars have either conceptualized decoupling and conformity as intended 
strategic responses to external normative demands or described coupling processes within 
small organizations. Neither of these two research lines permits a full depiction of the case of 
complex organizations such as MNEs. MNEs are multidivisional organizations, operating in 
several countries and several industries, with many hierarchic levels of decision, varying 
levels of ownership and autonomy of the subsidiaries, different legal structures, etc. As a 
result, within such complex organizations, decoupling can emerge between the policy 
designed by the headquarters and the practices implemented by the subsidiaries (Kostova & 
Roth, 2002; Crilly, Zollo, & Hansen, 2012). In addition, beyond local differences, the 
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antecedents of subsidiary conformity to corporate policies still need to be identified, so that 
we can understand intra-organizational heterogeneity. 
In this dissertation, based on three complementary essays, I explain intra-
organizational conformity based on subsidiary-level institutional and behavioral arguments. I 
focus on the case of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) practices within one large MNE 
(over 200,000 employees in 2012) operating in gas and energy production, energy services 
and environmental services. I rely on a rich set of data (3 rounds of survey, interviews, and 
archival data) on the implementation of CSR practices by up to 101 of the MNE’s subsidiaries 
located in 30 countries. 
Overall, the findings of my three essays show that heterogeneous conformity within 
MNEs stems not only from diverse internal and external pressures exerted on subsidiaries, but 
also from (1) the subsidiaries’ varying levels of attention to normative demands that depend 
on peers’ behaviors, (2) their heterogeneous internalization of the Group policy which reduces 
peers’ and headquarters’ influence and (3) the specific characteristics and institutionalization 
levels of different practices. 
Thus, my dissertation speaks to international strategy research by focusing on the 
subsidiaries’ conforming behavior and its antecedents inside and outside the MNE, nuancing a 
more top-down view of MNEs’ strategy and practices diffusion. It also contributes to the neo-
institutional literature by further adapting its arguments to the MNE context and advancing 
the understanding of subsidiary conformity. Previous works at the organizational level tend to 
reify organizational conformity and study its consequences for organizations. In this 
dissertation, I focus on intra-organizational processes that explain heterogeneous levels of 
conformity and conformity dynamics within complex organizations such as MNEs. By using 
behavioral explanations for the conformity of MNEs’ subsidiaries, this dissertation also casts 
a new light on the conceptualization and underlying mechanisms of organizational attention 
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(Ocasio, 1997) and policy internalization. And while focusing on CSR allows uncovering 
novel mechanisms explaining conformity, it also provides a specific contribution to the CSR 
literature by articulating complementary motives for CSR implementation (e.g. Bansal & 
Roth, 2000; Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, & Ganapathi, 2007). 
Finally, this work also has implications for practice as it proposes explanations for 
intra-organizational conformity in a way that can inform the design of strategy at both 
headquarters’ and subsidiaries’ management levels. 
This document is organized as follows. In Chapter 1, I introduce the main concepts, 
the overarching research question, the literature gaps and the thesis developed in the 
following three chapters. In Chapter 2, I focus (1) on the influence of the subsidiaries’ 
attention to CSR-related demands from inside and outside the MNE on their CSR practices 
implementation and (2) on the impact of the conformity of their internal and external peers. In 
Chapter 3, I propose a model for subsidiary conformity at the intra-organizational level, 
related to the pressures the subsidiary undergoes within the MNE as well as its internalization 
of the CSR policy. In Chapter 4, I look at the practices themselves and study how their 
perceived characteristics and institutionalization stage influence their tendency to be coupled 
and decoupled from the corporate policy over time. And in the concluding chapter, I 
summarize the main findings and contributions of the dissertation, I acknowledge its 
limitations and I present ideas for a future research agenda. 
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CHAPTER 1: MOTIVATION AND OVERVIEW 
In this first chapter, I describe the theoretical background against which my thesis is 
written, I highlight theoretical gaps and show how my three dissertation essays offer to fill 
them in complementary ways. The primary theoretical lens I use throughout my thesis is the 
neo-institutional theory, applied at the organizational unit level – MNE’s subsidiaries in my 
case. 
Although some works have begun adapting the neo-institutional arguments to the 
MNE context (e.g. Delmas & Toffel, 2008; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Kostova, Roth & Dacin, 
2008; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999), some intra-organizational mechanisms still lack a complete 
understanding. In particular, while it has been shown that the external and internal 
environments in which subsidiaries are embedded –the MNE, the country, the industry- 
highly influence their implementation of practices, little is known about the subsidiaries’ 
characteristics and behaviors that might mediate or interact with those effects. In addition, 
most works focus on a specific practice, which does not allow studying how the practices’ 
characteristics and varying institutionalization levels influence their varying (de)coupling 
levels within MNEs. 
I further detail below the main arguments I use in my dissertation, the main puzzles I 
wish to tackle and the way my three essays are articulated. 
Stumbling blocks in the literature 
In the three paragraphs below, I review the literature on organizational conformity, 
decoupling and coupling and suggest that its arguments need to be adapted to the complex 
case of MNEs. 
 
Conformity: opening the black box 
22 
 
Neo-institutional theory points to the need to consider the environment in which 
organizations are embedded in order to understand their strategic choices. Indeed, early neo-
institutional scholars argued that organizations undergo normative, coercive and mimetic 
pressures that lead to isomorphism among members of a given institutional field (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983). As a result, within a field, organizations implement similar practices 
because they are faced with common institutional prescriptions enforced by field members 
with coercive power, or because they mimic their peers when experiencing uncertainty in 
their environment (Rao, Greve & Davis, 2001) or because the practices are considered as a 
norm in the industry or in certain professional cohorts. Organizations adopt structures and 
practices that reflect the “myths” in their institutional environments (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
More recent developments of the neo-institutional theory have looked at situations in 
which institutional change occurred. In particular, new normative prescriptions can put 
organizations in a situation of conflict between logics (Dunn & Jones, 2010; Lounsbury, 
2007; Thornton & Ocasio, 1999) or institutional complexity (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, 
Micelotta & Lounsbury, 2011) and be promoted by field advocates, movements of activists 
(Rao, Monin & Durand, 2003) or institutional entrepreneurs (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; 
Leca, Battilana & Boxenbaum, 2008; Maguire, Hardy & Lawrence, 2004). In such cases, the 
changing nature of institutional pressures and the institutional work (Lawrence & Suddaby, 
2006) of specific field members lead to the implementation of new organizational practices. 
Organizations can also strategically conform to a new logic in order to counterbalance the 
influence of dominant advocates of the main logic (Durand & Jourdan, 2012). All these works 
suggest that organizations can respond to institutional pressures or even manipulate them in a 
strategic manner. 
Among these organizational responses to institutional pressures, conformity was 
considered as strategic only recently. Most conformity studies focus on situations in which 
23 
 
organizations are confronted with two different logics, rather than the introduction of a new 
norm, and conform more or less to one or the other. For instance, Thornton (2002) looks at 
the influence of conformity to editorial vs. market logic on the adoption of the multidivisional 
organizational form by higher education publishing. Dunn and Jones (2010) find that 
conformity to the care logic as opposed to the science logic in American medical schools 
depends on some changes in the profession (increased competition with public health schools, 
proportion of women entering the schools, calls for change) as well as increased demands 
from the public. In those papers, organizations seem to give in to logics rather than 
strategically conform to either of them. 
By contrast, the work of Durand and colleagues stresses the strategic dimension of 
conformity. For instance, in the context of French cuisine, Durand, Rao and Monin (2007) 
study the impact of changes in chefs’ signature dishes on Michelin ratings. They find that 
changes that maintain conformity to the prescriptions of either the classical or the nouvelle 
cuisine –“code preserving” changes- and changes that violate these prescriptions –“code 
violating” changes- both improve external evaluation. Durand and Jourdan (2012) show that 
filmmakers conform to the minority logic of market finance promoted by minority resource-
holders, the soficas investment funds, in order to reduce the relative power of their main 
resource providers. Philippe and Durand (2011) study conformity to the environmental 
transparency norm and argue that it can be strategic, although it does not result from a choice 
between two logics. They propose that firms can conform to the norm’s goals and/or commit 
to its prescribed procedures, following four distinct strategies: “abiding behaviors, 
strengthening behaviors, targeting behaviors, and finessing behaviors” (Philippe & Durand, 
2011: 972). They find that goal conforming behaviors associated with either procedure 
conformity (“strengthening” strategy) or procedure non-conformity (“abiding” strategy) have 
a positive impact on reputation and that firms that conform to the norm’s goal and procedure 
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simultaneously have a greater reputation. Their results also suggest that the absence of goal 
compliance can have a positive impact on reputation when associated with procedure 
conformity (“targeting” strategy), although not in sensitive industries. 
What we know from previous work is therefore that (1) conformity involves actual 
changes in behaviors and the implementation of new practice (e.g. Joseph, Ocasio & 
McDonnell, 2014; Thornton, 2002), (2) conformity is strategic as it can enhance reputation 
(Philippe & Durand, 2011) and provide access to resources (Durand & Jourdan, 2012) and (3) 
it depends on organizations’ and top managers’ strategic intent (Joseph et al., 2014) and 
statuses (Durand & Kremp, 2014).  
But all these works consider conformity as a homogeneous organizational 
concept, while it might not always be the case: within MNEs, there is heterogeneity in 
practice implementation across subsidiaries. Explaining this heterogeneity is the first 
gap I wish to tackle, as detailed in the next section of this chapter. 
In addition, as suggested by the review above, studies of the drivers of conformity are 
still limited –exceptions include Joseph and colleagues’ study of conformity to the 
shareholder value logic (Joseph et al., 2014). To better understand what fosters conformity in 
organizations, I draw on the decoupling literature that explains why organizations adopt 
facade conformity rather than actually conforming to norms in their concrete activities. 
Decoupling: sources and motivations 
First introduced by Meyer and Rowan (1977), decoupling is a process taking place 
within formal organizations which consists in favoring delegation of technical activities from 
management to professionals, implementing informal coordination, and minimizing control 
over and communication about these technical activities. Through decoupling, “the 
assumption that formal structures are really working is buffered from the inconsistencies and 
anomalies involved in technical activities […]. Thus, decoupling enables organizations to 
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maintain standardized, legitimating, formal structures while their activities vary in response to 
practical considerations.” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977: 357) However, organizations can maintain 
legitimacy thanks to the “confidence and good faith” of internal and external stakeholders 
which is made possible by avoidance, discretion and overlooking. (Meyer & Rowan, 1977: 
357-358). Similarly, in Oliver’s work (1991), one of the avoidance tactics is concealment, 
which echoes Meyer and Rowan’s definition of decoupling (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). 
Indeed, Oliver explains that “concealment tactics involve disguising nonconformity behind a 
facade of acquiescence. […] Organizations may, additionally, engage in "window dressing"; 
ritualism; ceremonial pretense; or symbolic acceptance of institutional norms, rules, or 
requirements […]. Concealment can therefore be distinguished from the acquiescent strategy 
of compliance by the degree to which conformity is apparent or real.” (Oliver; 1991: 154-155) 
Using the example of equal employment opportunity and affirmative action, Edelman 
(1992) shows that, when norms are “ambiguous, procedural in emphasis and difficult to 
enforce”, that is to say when there is no “specific substantive requirements”, organizational 
responses can be merely symbolic (Edelman, 1992: 1542-1543). Organizations then create a 
visible commitment, through the establishment of a formal structure (Affirmative Action 
offices or EEO policies in their case) without the implementation of change in practices. 
Thus, Edelman introduces the idea that the nature of the norms influences the ability to 
implement strategic decoupling. 
Westphal and Zajac have also devoted extensive work to decoupling as an 
organizational strategy to obtain legitimacy without implementing substantive change, 
studying its antecedents and consequences. Looking at the decoupling of long term incentive 
plan (LTIPs) adoption they showed that decoupling results from “micro-political and macro-
institutional forces” (Westphal & Zajac, 1994:367). They found that firms with strong CEOs 
trying to avoid actual implementation and firms with poor past performance were more 
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inclined to recourse to decoupling. The propensity to decouple increased as LTIPs became 
institutionalized and was more prevalent among late adopters than early adopters of LTIPs. In 
a later paper, Westphal and Zajac (1998) looked at the consequences not only of structural 
decoupling, but also of symbolic language, and found that the symbolic adoption of LTIPs 
could generate positive stockholder reactions and deter more substantive governance reforms. 
Next to the focus on the consequences of decoupling, an interesting addition of their work to 
the above cited papers is thus the recognition that language and discourse are important 
vectors of decoupling. In this paper, Westphal and Zajac move away from the opposition 
between formal structure and practices to observe policy-practice decoupling. In their 2001 
piece, they focus on the implementation of stock buyback programs and demonstrate that 
decoupling by connected firms and prior decoupling also influenced decoupling. Thus, 
isomorphic pressures play a role in the decoupling process. 
Fiss and Zajac (2004; 2006) applied the same kind of definition of policy-practice 
decoupling to their studies of the adoption of shareholder value orientation by German 
companies. They highlighted the role of powerful and committed actors in reducing the 
likelihood of decoupling (Fiss & Zajac 2004) and showed that, while the companies that 
really implemented the change in orientation towards shareholder value tended to use a 
“balancing framing” to “soften the blow”, decoupling companies rather used an 
“acquiescence framing” (Fiss & Zajac, 2006). Again, decoupling is presented as an intended 
strategy at the corporate level that involves a framing tactic based on discourse. 
In sum, most recent works on decoupling have explained policy-practice decoupling at 
the organizational level and highlighted the importance of discourse for conformity. They thus 
echo the works of Vaara and colleagues on the strategic legitimizing role of discourses: in the 
global context of mergers and acquisitions, they show that discourse allows framing success 
or failure, change and decisions as legitimate or illegitimate, and organizational members as 
27 
 
responsible or not, while reshaping organizational identities (Vaara, 2002; Vaara & Tienari, 
2011; Vaara, Tienari & Laurila, 2006). 
But in the case of complex organizations such as MNEs, decoupling occurs between 
the discourse and policies defined by the headquarters and the practices implemented by the 
subsidiaries, because MNEs have loosely coupled structures (Weick, 1976; Orton & Weick, 
1990; Ocasio & Joseph, 2005; Ocasio, 2012) which allow managers at all levels of the 
organization certain levels of discretion over the actual implementation of practices (Crilly, 
Zollo & Hansen, 2012, 2012). There is thus a need to acknowledge that conformity is an 
intra-organizational matter in MNEs and focus on its intra-organizational antecedents. 
This is the second gap this dissertation aims at filling, as explained in the next section of 
this first chapter. 
Coupling
1
 as a micro-process 
As detailed in the previous section, research on decoupling has not paid much 
attention to the intra-organizational processes at play. This gap has partially been addressed 
by coupling studies, although in settings that differ a lot from the MNE context. 
Coupling studies primarily looked at the role of individuals in the coupling of small 
organizations’ practices with external norms. In his ethnography on the implementation of 
accountability in an elementary school, Hallet defines “recoupling” as “processes through 
which institutional myths and organizational practices that were once loosely connected 
become tightly linked” (Hallet, 2010: 53) and as “the process of creating tight couplings 
where loose couplings were once in place” (Hallet, 2010: 54). He finds that the hiring of a 
new principal allowed for coupling of the school’s practices to the accountability logic 
                                                          
1
 Some researchers use the word recoupling, others coupling. For the sake of simplicity, I consistently write 
about coupling, because recoupling seems to suggest that some initial tight coupling of practices once existed, 
that they were decoupled, and then coupled again. Actually, the cases where such renewed coupling occurs 
should be rare in reality. This work will thus keep the more generic concept of coupling processes, reflecting the 
move from loose to tighter coupling, regardless of potential previous tight coupling. 
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through the implementation of reforms and monitoring of individual behaviors. However, this 
coupling process proved harmful for the atmosphere of the school, with the emergence of 
“turmoil”, and for the educational outcome, with a drop in reading scores. In this case, the 
coupling mechanism at play corresponds to the expression of coercive power from the 
management of the organization and is guided by an efficiency motivation. Spillane, Parise 
and Sherer (2011) studied coupling to governmental regulation in classroom teaching, and 
found that organizational routines were the designed mechanisms allowing the selective 
coupling of the formal structure and of the technical core to the government regulation. 
Indeed, according to the authors, thanks to the introduction of new routines, school leaders 
changed the formal structure (ostensive aspect of routines) as well as the administrative 
practice (performative aspect of routines) (Spillane et al., 2011). The coupling mechanisms at 
stake were standardization of practices, monitoring and transparency, consistent with Hallet’s 
observations (2010). 
These two contributions focus on coupling processes that rely on enforcement by the 
management of the organization. However, other mechanisms linked to internalization can 
foster coupling within organizations as shown by Sauder and Espeland’s work (2009). In the 
context of the compliance of law schools with USN rankings’ evaluation methods, the authors 
borrow Foucault’s concept of discipline to explain why tight couplings are promoted in a case 
“where buffering would be desirable” (Sauder & Espeland, 2009:64). According to them, 
disciplinary practices stem from a continuous and diffuse disciplinary power. In particular, 
they find that two of Foucault’s disciplinary techniques, surveillance and normalization, apply 
to their case. They further show that three interpretations of rankings –“as sources of anxiety, 
as objects to resist, as pressures that become, for some, peculiarly seductive” (Sauder & 
Espeland, 2009:74) - generate internalization of norms and reinterpretation of practices that 
prevent buffering and facilitate tight coupling. Thus, they depart from the study of the 
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coercive effects of measures and look at internalization mechanisms that-is-to-say 
mechanisms that increase the extent to which actors are committed to given practices. 
Finally, Tilcsik (2010) presents coupling and decoupling as dynamic processes since 
he focuses on what happens in organizations before and after the decision to decouple is 
made. He looks at coupling processes between the formal public fund allocation policy of a 
Governmental Agency (algorithmic system) and the allocation practices that are mostly 
discretionary. He observed that the main driver of the coupling process was the recruitment of 
new employees who saw the policy as economically beneficent and allowing them to enact 
their identities (Tilcsik, 2010). Like in the cases studied by Hallet (2010) and Spillane, Parise 
and Sherer (2011), the coupling process is engaged by the arrival of new actors who question 
the traditional way of operating. But, contrary to these works, the coupling mechanisms do 
not rely on the enforcement of the implementation in a coercive manner, but rather on the 
spread of a new ideology. 
In short, the coupling literature improves our understanding of the micro-level 
coupling processes and point to explanations at the individual level. Adapting its arguments to 
the MNE will help me address the gap in the decoupling literature identified above. However, 
coupling studies do not explore the dynamic potential of coupling and decoupling processes 
as they present them as unidirectional: organizations move from a state of decoupling to a 
situation of conformity through a coupling process. In the case of MNEs, practices might 
display heterogeneous conformity levels, and coupling and decoupling periods might follow 
each other in varying ways depending on the practices considered. Understanding the 
dynamics of coupling and decoupling over time in a complex organization is the third 
gap this dissertation is addressing, as described in the next section of this chapter. 
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The case of MNEs and research question 
This review of the existing literature related to decoupling, coupling and conformity 
suggests, as Kostova, Roth and Dacin explain, that the concepts at the basis of neo-
institutional theory “have limited validity and require serious theoretical reconsideration for 
the [MNE]” (Kostova et al., 2008: 1001). In particular, conformity or decoupling in MNEs is 
not a fully intended and coordinated strategic response (Crilly, Zollo & Hansen, 2012) as the 
ones described so far. Indeed, conformity levels are neither homogeneous across the MNE’s 
entities nor stable over time. As described in the introduction to this document, MNEs are 
seen as multidivisional organizations made of more or less heterogeneous and independent 
entities. Thus, the implementation level and coupling state of policies will vary across the 
MNE. Indeed, the different subsidiaries are distinct from the headquarters and from each other 
in terms of activity, location, size, etc, so that they are bound to be loosely coupled (Weick, 
1976; Orton and Weick, 1990; Ocasio 1997). In addition, this implies that the more 
independent and disconnected the subsidiaries are, the more they tend to decouple their 
activities from the headquarters’ discourse. But most neo-institutional works concerned with 
conformity and decoupling tend to present the organization as monolithic. 
The main gap in the literature I wish to address in this dissertation is the lack of an 
explanation for heterogeneity in conformity levels (policy-practice coupling or substantive 
implementation of corporate policy) within complex organizations. Some works in 
international strategy have looked at institutional demands influencing subsidiaries’ decisions 
but they have paid rather limited attention to the dynamic dimension of conformity processes 
and to the strategic role of subsidiaries whose behavior is often reduced to mere isomorphism. 
Therefore, the main research question of my dissertation is the following: 
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Why do the subsidiaries of an MNE display heterogeneity in their conformity to the 
corporate policy? 
In order to address this question, the conceptualization of conformity needs to be 
adapted to the complex case of MNEs, as described below: (1) within an MNE, conformity is 
heterogeneous because pressures on subsidiaries vary; (2) subsidiary conformity is an intra-
organizational matter; and (3) coupling and decoupling are dynamic processes. 
Heterogeneous conformity pressures on subsidiaries 
Since the MNE is not monolithic, the right level of analysis to study institutional 
pressures is not the organization’s field, but rather the entities’ fields that differ from each 
other. As Kostova, Roth and Dacin suggest, the definition of fields at the “meso” level, linked 
to countries and industries, does not apply as such to MNEs as wholes (Kostova et al. 2008). 
In fact, on top of their industry, the subsidiaries are embedded in two other different types of 
fields: the local institutional field on the one hand, and the intra-organizational institutional 
field on the other hand. This typology of institutional fields is consistent with international 
strategy literature according to which MNEs need to address both global integration and local 
responsiveness. Each subsidiary is torn between pressures for consistency within the MNE 
(“mirror effect”) and isomorphic pressures of the differentiated local environments (Doz & 
Prahalad, 1991; Rosenzweig & Sinh, 1991; Westney, 1993; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). 
Several international strategy scholars extended institutional arguments to the case of 
MNEs’ subsidiaries. These works include studies of “legitimacy spillovers” within MNEs 
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999) and “institutional duality” (Hillman & Wan, 2005; Kostova & 
Roth, 2002). Kostova and Zaheer (1999) show that obtaining legitimacy is more difficult for 
MNEs than for organizations operating in a single country. Indeed, according to them, MNEs 
make the sources of legitimacy more complex: the legitimating environment, the organization, 
and the process of legitimation. In addition, they propose that the legitimacy of an 
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organization is linked to the legitimacy of its sub-entities because some internal spillovers 
exist. Thus “MNE subunits will face a greater challenge in establishing and maintaining 
legitimacy when the MNE as a whole or any of its other subunits experiences legitimacy 
problems; similarly, the MNE as a whole will also face a greater challenge in maintaining 
legitimacy if any of its subunits experiences legitimacy problems.” (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999: 
75-76) Kostova & Roth (2002) introduce the idea of “institutional duality” to suggest that an 
MNE’s subsidiaries face institutional pressures from their host country as well as from their 
parent MNE. They study the diffusion of quality management, a practice at its semi-
institutionalization stage, measuring the impact on internalization and implementation of the 
favorability of the host country and the relationship with the parent firm. Testing their 
hypotheses thanks to two surveys addressed to managers and employees of 104 subsidiaries of 
a US MNE, they find support for the influence of the cognitive institutional profile but not for 
regulatory and normative profiles of the host country. Regarding the relations with the parent 
firm, they find support for the influence of trust and identification, but not for dependence.  
Hillman and Wan (2005) build on Kostova & Roth’s work (2002) and look at the influence of 
the “institutional duality” the subsidiaries of MNEs have to face on their strategies targeting 
political decision-makers. The authors focus on the influence of internal and external 
legitimacy pressures on the type of political strategies implemented by the subsidiaries: 
information, financial incentive and constituency-building strategies. They test their 
hypotheses using a hierarchical linear model that allows them to include several levels of 
analysis. They obtain mixed results but find that the size and tenure of the subsidiary in its 
host country, the characteristics of the host country (pluralistic vs. corporatist) and the parent 
firm’s diversification significantly influence the tendency of the subsidiaries to recourse to 
certain types of political strategies. According to Delmas & Toffel (2008), the actual 
environmental pressures are prioritized differently by the different facilities of a company, 
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whose receptivity to external pressures varies. The environment includes market (customers, 
suppliers, competitors) and non-market constituents (local communities, environmental 
organizations, regulators, and the media). The authors expected and confirmed that the 
adoption of ISO 14001 was positively related to the receptivity to pressures from market 
constituents to improve environmental performance and negatively related to the receptivity 
to pressures from non-market constituents, while the adoption of government-initiated 
voluntary programs was positively related to the receptivity to pressures from non-market 
constituents to improve environmental performance. 
Thus, institutional arguments have been applied to the MNE context, but with an 
emphasis on the isomorphic pressures subsidiaries undergo and are receptive to. I argue that 
an MNE’s subsidiaries can react strategically to new normative demands and go beyond 
passive isomorphism. In particular, subsidiaries can devote more or less attention (Ocasio, 
1997) to their internal and local constituents’ demands, which results in varying 
implementation levels (GAP 1). There is a need to better conceptualize subsidiaries’ 
attention and to understand why attention levels vary within MNEs. The research question of 
my first essay is thus: 
When implementing new practices, how much attention do an MNE’s subsidiaries pay 
to the demands of their external constituents and the demands of the MNE’s 
headquarters and why? 
Conformity as an intra-organizational matter 
Works on decoupling or conformity within MNEs remain very scarce. However the 
potential for decoupling practices from discourse within MNEs is particularly high as MNEs 
produce a lot of legitimizing discourse at the corporate level (Vaara & Tienari, 2008, 2011), . 
A noticeable exception is the article by Crilly, Zollo and Hansen who conclude that 
decoupling is not necessarily a “calculated deception” from the headquarters because  
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managers have discretion at all levels of the organization (Crilly et al., 2012) and make the 
case for an “emergent” type of decoupling (Crilly et al., 2012: 1441). In MNEs, decoupling is 
the misalignment between the discourse or commitments of the headquarters on the one hand, 
and the actions of the subsidiaries on the other hand. It is an intra-organizational, but inter-
entity phenomenon. Hence, decoupling occurs between various entities of the organization 
and there is variety in conformity levels across entities, which departs from the monolithic 
view of neo-institutional theorists. Therefore, we need to understand the subsidiaries’ 
conformity motivations to better explain intra-organizational heterogeneity.
2
 
Consistent with the findings of Crilly and colleagues (2012), in this dissertation, I 
conceptualize conformity as an intra-organizational matter. To improve our understanding 
of subsidiary conformity, there is a need to better articulate the role of the headquarters, 
the role of other subsidiaries and the role of the perception the subsidiaries have of the 
policy considered. (GAP 2) 
The research question of my second essay is the following: 
Controlling for external influences, what are the intra-organizational mechanisms that 
foster conformity within an MNE? 
 
 
Coupling and decoupling as dynamic processes 
In the MNE context, I argue that coupling and decoupling are dynamic processes, so 
that a given subsidiary couples a specific practice to the corporate policy at times, and 
                                                          
2 Regarding coupling processes, a recent piece by Egels-Zandén (2014) looks at the coupling of an MNE’s 
suppliers’ practices with its code of conduct. While studying coupling processes in an international and 
varying context, this paper departs from the coupling literature in that it moves away from the intra-
organizational analysis. Therefore, it does not really study conformity processes or levers within MNEs 
and focuses on external demands rather than intra-organizational dynamics. 
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decouples it at other times. In addition, coupling and decoupling processes vary from one 
subsidiary to the next and from one practice to the next. 
Again, an MNE’s subsidiaries are embedded in several fields simultaneously: the 
parent organization, the industry and the country. As a result, a given subsidiary is pressed to 
implement practices that each are diversely institutionalized in its various fields. We do not 
know much about how this complex institutional setting influences (de)coupling mechanisms 
within MNEs. 
In addition, empirical research on decoupling and coupling mechanisms has focused 
on single practices (e.g. TQM, LTIP, accountability, etc) although previous studies have 
suggested that observing and comparing several practices in one community might produce 
more nuanced understanding of the diffusion processes at play (Strang &Soule, 1998; Delmas 
& Toffel, 2008). As a result, research on conformity has overlooked the role of the practices’ 
idiosyncratic differences in explaining varying and evolving levels of (de)coupling. Ansari, 
Fiss and Zajac (2010) specifically recommend that we study the influence of practices’ 
characteristics on their adaptation extent and point to the technology diffusion literature as a 
promising source of ideas. 
In sum, we need to understand the way in which the complex piling up of institutional 
pressures influences the (de)coupling level of different practices and about coupling and 
decoupling patterns (GAP 3). 
 
 
Accordingly, the research question of my third essay is: 
Under what conditions are practices coupled to or decoupled from the policy over time 
in an MNE? 
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CSR practices in an MNE 
This section exposes how corporate social responsibility (CSR) is defined and why it is a 
relevant setting to study the subsidiary-level conforming mechanisms I wish to uncover. 
In an early conceptualization, Carroll (1979) defined CSR as being of four types: 
economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary and covering a large set of issues such as 
consumerism, the environment, discrimination, product safety, occupational safety, and 
stakeholders’ management. He further described firms’ social responsiveness as covering a 
continuum from no response to a proactive response. A few decades later, the main elements 
that are commonly considered by scholars and practitioners attempting to define CSR are the 
types of issues addressed, the forms of the actions and the relationship with social and 
environmental legislation. 
Regarding the type of issues addressed, the borders of CSR are quite blurred. Matten 
and Moon (2008) see CSR as “an umbrella term overlapping with some, and being 
synonymous with other, conceptions of business-society relations” (Matten & Moon, 
2008:405). It seems to be better defined by what it is not: “business fulfillment of core profit-
making responsibility and […] the social responsibilities of government” (Matten & Moon, 
2008:405). And to make the definition of CSR even more complex, the authors notice that it 
varies across countries because of the varying national business systems. Rather than CSR, 
Marquis, Glynn and Davis (2007) focus on corporate social actions which include behaviors 
and practices, to avoid debating whether corporations actually have a responsibility to 
implement such actions. According to the authors, these actions can deal with “the arts, 
housing, the physical environment, education and schooling, human welfare, poverty, disease, 
wellness, and general improvement in the quality of life” (Marquis et al., 2007:926). On the 
practitioners’ side, CSR is defined by the triple bottom line: increasing economic, 
environmental and social benefits, while minimizing environmental and social impacts. This 
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categorization is also used by CSR researchers (e.g. Aguilera et al., 2007; Bansal, 2005). In 
terms of issues CSR should address, two main references are the Global compact and the ISO 
26000. The Global compact is concerned about human rights, labor, environment and anti-
corruption. And the ISO 26000 is structured around seven axes: governance, customer-related 
questions, environment, social involvement, human rights, working conditions and 
relationships. In this dissertation, I consider CSR in a wide sense, although I focus on specific 
practices in my empirical analysis, related to one environmental issue (biodiversity), one 
social issue (gender equality) and safety which is also very relevant to the industries I study. 
Marquis and colleagues define the forms taken by CSR actions: “cash contributions, 
investments in social initiatives or programs, employee volunteer efforts, and in-kind 
donations of products or services” (Marquis et al., 2007:926), with varying levels of monetary 
and time commitment. These forms mainly reflect a posteriori compensating measures, so that 
more upstream practices might be missing. Going back to the triple bottom line suggests that 
investments in eco-friendly equipments and installations, product innovation and design as 
well as responsible procurement are additional forms of CSR. 
As far as the relationship to the law is concerned, the question is whether CSR only 
occurs when companies go beyond legal requirements. In their model of CSR supply and 
demand, McWilliams and Siegel (2001) limit CSR to “actions that appear to further some 
social good, beyond the interests of the firm and that which is required by law.” (McWilliams 
& Siegel, 2001:117). Matten and Moon (2008)’s standpoint differs from this approach, since 
they consider European companies’ CSR as a form of CSR, although it is more legally 
enforced than US companies’ CSR. Here, I include both legally enforced and voluntary 
practices in my research, since the level of legal requirements and enforcement varies across 
countries, as further discussed below. 
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In sum, I define CSR as the collection of practices implemented by companies to 
maximize their positive environmental and social impact, in line with or above the most 
demanding legal environment they face throughout their facilities. These practices include the 
consideration of environmental and social impacts and benefits throughout the activities of the 
company -operations, research and development, procurement, marketing and sales, human 
resources-, as well as partnerships and donations in money, time or kind. Thus, CSR is not 
limited to stakeholder engagement but means actual changes in the way organizations operate 
(Zollo et al., 2009). 
CSR is a fruitful field to apply the neo-institutional perspective as is shown by 
previous research. For instance, Marquis, Glynn and Davis (2007) looked at local institutional 
pressures and found that community-level isomorphism influenced the “nature” (“focus” and 
form”) and the “level’ of corporate social action. According to them, this happens because of 
“cultural cognitive”, “social normative” and “regulative” community forces. 
But why is CSR well suited to observe the coupling and conformity mechanisms I 
wish to study? A discourse supporting sustainability at large and CSR in particular is very 
present in the media, as well as in the political world and among NGOs. It contributes to the 
institutionalization of CSR practices (Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2004). We can for 
instance take the examples of climate change and CO2 emissions for the environment or child 
labor for social issues. This discourse, by stressing do’s and don’ts, fosters the 
institutionalization of practices considered as sustainable by external constituents. Within 
organizations, the institutionalization process of CSR is reinforced by the recourse to 
additional supporting texts: the CSR policy, internal communications and trainings related to 
CSR issues, the CSR report, CSR action plans, etc. These elements are part of what Green, Li 
and Nohria (2009) name the linguistic institutionalization in their study of TQM adoption. 
They show how a change in the structure of the arguments supporting practices reflects their 
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institutionalization. These different works emphasize the importance of the rhetoric and 
symbolic aspects of institutionalized practices. This prevalence of discourse and symbols, 
observable in the CSR context, does not necessarily reflect the actual practices of the 
organization, so that it might leave room for decoupling. Indeed, the existence of a CSR 
governance structure or of a CSR action plan does not guarantee the actual implementation of 
CSR practices or the improvement of the corporate social performance. In other words, the 
CSR policy is an “easily decoupled structure” (Weaver, Trevino and Cochran, 1999). The 
work of Philippe and Durand (2011) further illustrates the importance of communication in 
the CSR context as well as the potential disconnect between its procedural implementation 
and organizations’ internalization of its goals. 
CSR demands on MNEs are particularly pressing. Global stakeholders gain 
importance (Devinney, McGahan & Zollo, 2013) and MNEs must respond to rising demands 
regarding their “triple bottom line”: increasing economic, environmental and social benefits, 
while minimizing environmental and social impacts at the global level (Aguilera et al., 2007; 
Bansal, 2005). And subsidiaries have to deal with CSR-related demands from the MNE’s 
headquarters as well as their local environments, in which the CSR legal requirements vary 
greatly for each CSR issue. Examples of the high discrepancies that exist between national 
regulations on health and safety, gender equality and biodiversity are given in the next 
chapters. Next to legal requirements, the countries in which the subsidiaries are embedded 
have diverse cultures, which influences the subsidiaries’ social performance (Ringov & Zollo, 
2007). 
CSR also includes a very wide set of issues, that need to be prioritized, and that might 
sometimes be conflicting. And the outcomes of the implementation of practices in terms of 
economic and social gain (Kennedy & Fiss, 2009) can prove uncertain as well. As a result, the 
subsidiaries have a different understanding of CSR (Crilly et al., 2012), a different 
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interpretation, and a different translation into practice (Jennings & Zandbergen, 1995; 
Sharma, 2000). 
Setting: CSR at XYZ 
My field of inquiry is the XYZ Group, a multinational corporation headquartered in 
country A and operating in gas and electricity production and supply, as well as infrastructure 
development and energy and environmental services
3
.  
The Group only has a recent history, since it is the result of the merger of two 
companies, XY and Z, in 2008. 
XY was a public organization exploiting, producing, importing and stocking gas and 
delivering it to professionals and households in country A. It was founded in the middle of the 
20
th
 century together with a sister company producing and delivering electricity. The two 
companies shared common services, in particular a joint distributor until 2008, when two 
distinct distributors were created, respectively 100% owned by each of the two sister 
companies. XY was partially floated in 2005, but the State of country A remained the main 
shareholder with an 80% stake in the company. Starting in May 2008, when the energy sector 
got liberalized in Europe, XY developed its electricity production activities and combined 
natural gas-electricity offerings. 
The status of XY as a public utility operator in country A invested it with a specific 
role and provided it with specific responsibilities, which will continue to be endorsed by XYZ 
after 2008. According to a 2004 law related to public service of electricity and gas, the 
obligations of electricity and gas producers have to be formalized in a public service contract. 
This contract is regularly revised and includes items related to security of supply, service 
                                                          
3 The Group divested from its environmental services activities in late 2013, after most of the data was collected. 
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quality, service accessibility, tariff evolution, research and development policy and 
environment protection policy. 
Z on the other hand was an MNE headquartered in country A operating in water, 
electricity and natural gas production and supply, as well as waste management services. It 
was created in 1997 as a result from the merger between Z1 and W. Z1 was initially created in 
1858. Z1 entered the capital of W, a leading water company in country A in 1967 and became 
its main shareholder.  
The merger of XY and Z was put on the political agenda of country A at the beginning 
of 2006. But because of the public status of XY, some legal adjustments had to be made first. 
Thus, a law authorizing the privatization of XY was passed in late 2006. In 2007, the two 
Groups agreed on the absorption of Z by XY, with the exchange of 21 XY shares for 22 Z 
shares. The merged company, XYZ was created on July 22nd, 2008, with 35% of its shares 
held by the State of country A. 
In 2013, XYZ was present in 70 countries and employed over 200,000 people. It is a 
leading actor of the utilities sector, ranked first worldwide in its industry by Forbes Global 
2000. 
The State of country A is still the main shareholder of XYZ (36% of the shares at the 
end of 2010). It is represented by 6 out of 21 directors at the board and, for the activities in 
country A (41% of the Group’s 2009 EBITDA) the public services contracts initiated with 
XY are still regularly renewed. 
The activities of the Group, linked to environmental domains, its large production 
plants representing environmental and safety risks, as well as the location of its installations 
and activities, in part situated in developing countries, put CSR at the heart of XYZ’s strategic 
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concerns. Moreover, in country A, the public service contract inherited from XY has a strong 
focus on social and environmental impacts of the Group’s operations. 
However, since XY and Z only merged their activities in 2008, the Group’s common 
CSR approach is very recent. Thus, it defined and released group-wide quantitative and 
qualitative CSR objectives in 2011. These objectives cover HR (recruitment, training, 
proportion of female managers, employee shares) safety (frequency rate) and the environment 
(biodiversity and shares of renewable energies in the production)
4
. 
The different issues covered by these objectives are more or less mature. For instance, 
health and safety concerns have long been central both to XYZ’s activities and to labor 
regulations, whereas biodiversity has gained increasing visibility recently, with 2010-2020 
being the United Nations’ international decade for biodiversity. Thus, looking at different 
CSR issues tackled by XYZ gives the opportunity to test the diffusion of practices at different 
institutional stages: pre-, semi- and full institutionalization (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996). 
This dissertation focuses on the objectives regarding the proportion of female 
managers, safety and biodiversity. Indeed, these topics are of particular interest because (1) 
they cover all facilities of the Group, regardless of their activity or location (unlike the shares 
of renewable energies in the production for example), (2) they can be easily translated into 
concrete actions in the operating units, (3) they are linked to three different domains: social, 
safety and environmental issues and possess varying characteristics (e.g. complexity, 
institutionalization stage, etc). 
Dissertation structure 
This dissertation consists of three essays that each attempts to fill one of the three gaps 
described in the previous section of this chapter. Figure 1 below shows how, using different 
                                                          
4 An objective related to CO2 emission was later added to the initial list. 
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levels of analysis and different dependent variables, and with a starting point in neo-
institutional theory and the behavioral theory of the firm, the three essays provide 
complementary explanations for heterogeneous conformity within MNEs. 
Figure 1: Visual presentation of the three dissertation essays 
 
Legend: Lozenge boxes represent the outcomes I study in the three essays and round boxes represent the 
explanatory variable. Some explanations relate to institutional pressures on subsidiaries, they are placed in the 
light grey area, some to the subsidiaries’ behavior, in the left white area and some to the practices’ specificities, 
in the right white area. All outcomes relate to conformity, so that they appear in the dark grey area. 
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Figure 2 below provides a visual summary of the three essays of this dissertation. It is 
followed by the abstracts of the essays. 
Figure 2: Visual summary of the dissertation 
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Peer conformity, attention, and heterogeneous implementation of practices in MNEs 
This first essay, written in collaboration with Rodolphe Durand, improves our 
understanding of why MNEs’ subsidiaries heterogeneously implement practices. It reveals the 
strategic nature of subsidiaries’ responses to institutional demands, both by shedding light on 
the role of subsidiaries’ attention to the demands of their internal and external constituents 
and by showing that peers’ norm-conforming behavior influences the level of attention these 
demands receive. We study the implementation of 25 practices associated with 3 CSR issues 
in 101 worldwide subsidiaries of an MNE. We find that while the conformity of external 
peers to the relevant norm directs the attention of the subsidiaries towards the demands of 
external constituents at the expense of those from the MNE headquarters, internal peers’ 
conformity increases subsidiaries’ attention to both external constituents’ and headquarters’ 
demands, resulting in varying levels of practice implementation. Our results suggest the need 
to rethink the influence of both subsidiary’s attention and peer conformity on practice 
implementation. 
Implementation of CSR in an MNE: a model of intra-organizational conformity 
This second essay proposes a model for subsidiary conformity through which formal 
policies are implemented into concrete practices in multinational enterprises (MNEs). I argue 
that subsidiary conformity results from the combination of compliance, internal mimicry and 
internalization mechanisms. More specifically, the pressures from the headquarters related to 
a given Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) issue as well as the conformity of other 
subsidiaries increase a subsidiary’s level of conformity. And the consistency of the policy 
with the subsidiary’s values, because it triggers policy internalization, increases the 
subsidiary's level of conformity but reduces the positive effects of both peers' conformity and 
pressures from the headquarters. The results of my study on the implementation of practices 
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on 3 CSR issues by 99 subsidiaries of an MNE support my predictions and point to the need 
to better articulate compliance, conformity and internalization within complex organizations. 
CSR policy-practices (de)coupling within MNEs: Paths to walking the talk 
The third essay explains the policy-practice coupling and decoupling processes that 
unfold in MNEs over time given the practices’ specific characteristics. I propose that three 
attributes of the practices –complexity, compatibility with subsidiaries’ values and 
performance advantage- as well as the various levels of institutionalization of the practices 
influence the coupling and decoupling paths they follow. The results of a fuzzy set qualitative 
comparative analysis of 25 practices on 3 CSR issues in 48 subsidiaries of an MNE show that 
(1) coupling and decoupling periods more often alternate than endure, (2) the 
institutionalization of an issue in both the subsidiary’s country and its industry is key for 
sustained coupling, and (3) practices’ lack of compatibility with subsidiaries’ values is the 
main driver of enduring decoupling. 
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 CHAPTER 2: ESSAY 1 - PEER CONFORMITY, ATTENTION, AND 
HETEROGENEOUS IMPLEMENTATION OF PRACTICES IN MNES
5
 
When pondering whether to implement new practices, how do an MNE’s subsidiaries 
resolve the tensions between the demands from their external constituents (customers, 
national authorities, and so on) and internal demands from the MNE’s headquarters? 
Answering this question is of fundamental importance for international business research 
since practitioners await responses (Birkinshaw & Hood, 2001; Hong & Doz, 2013), and two 
theoretical perspectives confront their views. Some studies suggest that subsidiaries 
implement legitimate practices first (Hoffman, 1999; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991), 
although implementation varies depending on the local pressures subsidiaries undergo 
(Ferner, Almond & Colling, 2004; Hillman & Wan, 2005; Kostova & Roth, 2002). Other 
studies show that subsidiaries preempt headquarters’ expectations and build their influence 
within the corporation bytaking initiatives that they developed locally (Ambos, Andersson, & 
Birkinshaw, 2010; Birkinshaw, 1997). In this paper, we integrate the two perspectives and 
study the subsidiaries’ level of attention to the demands of their external constituents and the 
MNE’s headquarters and the resulting actions (Ocasio, 1997, 2011). More precisely, using the 
case of a new norm (Corporate Social Responsibility), we argue that the norm-conforming 
behaviors of a subsidiary’s internal peers (comparable subsidiaries of the MNE) and external 
peers (local industry rivals) influence its level of attention to normative demands and its 
subsequent adoption of corresponding practices. The subsidiaries’ varying attention levels 
lead to heterogeneous implementation of practices related to this norm at the corporate level.  
 
 
Attention to the demands of the headquarters and to the demands of external 
                                                          
5
 This paper is coauthored with Rodolphe Durand. 
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constituents relative to specific norms varies from one subsidiary to the next (Crilly & Sloan, 
2012) and depends on what external and internal peers do (Delmas & Toffel, 2008; Hoffman 
& Ocasio, 2001). If these peers conform more to a given norm, the focal subsidiary is likely to 
devote more attention to the demands of its constituents that relay that norm. In turn, it will 
implement more practices that enhance its own conformity. In addition, attention is limited 
and hence selective (Ocasio, 1997, 2011; Ocasio & Joseph, 2005, 2008). We therefore 
propose that the conformity to a norm of either type of peers (external vs. internal) represents 
a threat, and will increase a subsidiary’s level of attention to the demands of the 
corresponding constituents in a selective way (external constituents vs. the headquarters).  
For instance, let us consider the subsidiary of Toyota in the north of France, Toyota 
Motor Manufacturing France (T.M.M.F.) that opened in 2001. Both Toyota’s headquarters 
and the French external constituents of T.M.M.F. have high expectations regarding its 
management of waste water. Indeed, Toyota Europe has set demanding waste water standards 
that all its sites should meet. And French environmental NGOs –some external constituents- 
are also concerned about the quality of T.M.M.F.’s water discharges. If the subsidiary pays 
more attention to the demands of French NGOs as regards environmental preservation, it will 
implement more practices to reduce the quantity of water it uses and improve the quality of its 
water discharges. Similarly, paying more attention to the demands of Toyota’s headquarters 
will lead T.M.M.F. to implement the Group policy regarding waste water. And the level of 
attention T.M.M.F. grants to demands related waste water from NGOs depends on the 
urgency to address them, given what other car manufacturers do regarding waste water 
management in France. If competitors in France match NGOs’ expectations in terms of water 
discharges more fully, then T.M.M.F. will need to be very attentive to their demands because 
it does not want to be outperformed by its competitors. And at the same time, strong 
conformity of local rivals will reduce attention to internal policy relative to waste water, as 
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T.M.M.F.’s environmental managers will be primarily addressing NGOs’ demands. 
Conversely, when other subsidiaries of Toyota are conforming to internal standards and 
procedures regarding the management of waste water, T.M.M.F. will increase its attention to 
these internal waste water requirements to keep up with its peers. Then, the standards set by 
Toyota’s headquarters become prevalent, so that attention to demands of external constituents, 
including NGOs, decreases. 
In sum, we expect that external peers’ conformity will divert a subsidiary’s attention 
away from the headquarters’ demands, and vice versa — that internal peers’ conformity will 
decrease a subsidiary’s level of attention to external constituents’ demands — resulting in a 
lowering of the implementation of corresponding practices. To test our predictions, we 
studied the implementation of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) practices in a large 
MNE (with over 200,000 employees in 70 countries). We designed a survey about the 
implementation of 25 practices related to three issues (occupational safety, women in 
management, and environmental biodiversity) and administered it to multiple respondents 
across 101 worldwide subsidiaries. Employing simultaneous equation models (3SLS), we 
found robust support for all but one of our hypotheses. Additionally, we performed a 
mediation analysis whose results were consistent with our simultaneous equation models.  
Our findings show that higher attention to the demands of internal and external 
constituents leads to greater implementation of corresponding practices and that a subsidiary’s 
attention depends on the level of conformity of its internal and external peers. In particular, 
when external peers conform to a norm to a greater extent, subsidiaries’ attention to the 
demands of external constituents increases, and their attention to the demands of the 
headquarters decreases. Contrary to our predictions, however, our findings suggest that the 
conformity of internal peers increases subsidiaries’ attention not only to headquarters’ 
demands but also to those of external constituents. This result is consistent with the subsidiary 
50 
 
initiative view (Birkinshaw, 1997; Birkinshaw, Hood & Jonsson, 1998), according to which 
subsidiaries balance their internal embeddedness and their uniqueness in order to gain 
headquarters’ attention (Ambos et al., 2010; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Garcia‐Pont, 
Canales & Noboa, 2009). It further suggests that subsidiaries can increase their level of 
attention when searching for the best possible ways to respond to normative demands. 
Attention to the demands of the headquarters and attention to the demands of external 
constituents do not necessarily substitute for each other in explaining practice implementation 
but can be complementary levers when the conformity of internal peers is high. 
Overall, our findings explain not only the heterogeneity in implementation levels across 
subsidiaries but also why uniform programs launched by headquarters are likely to fail when 
they ignore the dynamics of intra-organizational conformity. By showing how peer 
conformity influences a subsidiary’s attention to external constituents and headquarters’ 
demands, we contribute to the study of practices’ heterogeneous implementation. We stress 
the role of attention in MNEs, and nurture the debate regarding subsidiary agency in 
international strategy research. Our paper enriches our understanding of peers’ influence on 
practices’ heterogeneous implementation by showing that peers’ conformity does not only 
trigger a mimicking mechanism based on legitimacy but also and simultaneously a strategic 
response in terms of how subsidiaries attend to external or internal constituents’ demands. 
Theory background and hypotheses 
MNEs are multidivisional organizations comprising heterogeneous sub-entities that enjoy 
greater or lesser autonomy and operate in diverse local environments. As a result, keeping up 
with normative demands is more difficult for MNEs than for firms operating in single 
countries, as the variety of institutional and competitive environments in which their 
subsidiaries operate causes considerable complexity. In addition, because of internal upward 
and downward spillovers, an MNE’s overall legitimacy is linked to that of its sub-entities 
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(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999).  
At the sub-entity level, each MNE’s subsidiary faces an “institutional duality” of 
demands from both its host country and its parent company (Hillman & Wan, 2005; Kostova 
& Roth, 2002). When implementing operational practices, subsidiaries are torn between 
pressures for consistency within the MNE (the mirror effect) and demands from their diverse 
local environments (Doz & Prahalad, 1991; Ferner, Almond, & Colling, 2004; Hillman & 
Wan, 2005; Rosenzweig & Singh, 1991). Further, the competitive benefits of practices differ 
from industry to industry, and from country to country. In particular, the direct coercive 
pressure exerted by national authorities on an MNE’s subsidiaries through formal legislation 
varies across countries (Björkman, Fey, & Park, 2007; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Kostova & 
Zaheer, 1999). After having controlled for this local, legal and business heterogeneity, it is 
crucial to understand how subsidiaries process the many demands emanating from both within 
and beyond their parent MNEs to better explain the high variance in subsidiaries’ practice 
implementation within MNEs. 
In this paper, we focus on a situation in which companies and their various business 
units face new imperatives originating from an emerging social norm. Social norms “are 
powerful standards of behavior that are rooted in widely shared beliefs about how actors 
should behave” (Philippe & Durand, 2011: 969). Industry members display conformity to 
such norms as financial transparency, accounting standards, CSR, and ethics by implementing 
new practices — which may be of more or less substance (Meyer & Rowan, 1997; Philippe & 
Durand, 2011). A subsidiary’s behavior relative to a social norm is influenced by (1) the 
internal and external peers with which it competes and (2) its internal and external 
constituents (Delmas & Toffel, 2008), as shown in Figure 3. We define external peers as the 
local subsidiaries of other MNEs that are in the same industry and serve the same national 
market as the focal subsidiary, and internal peers as other subsidiaries of the same MNE that 
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operate in the same industry. 
Figure 3: Essay 1 - Internal and external environmental influences on a subsidiary’s 
behavior 
 
Note: the shape of the subsidiary (oval, like its internal peers) symbolizes its embeddedness in the MNE, and its 
color (grey like its external peers) its embededness in its local external environment. 
 
Subsidiaries’ constituents, meanwhile, are parties that affect the subsidiaries’ behavior 
in more or less coercive ways: external constituents include market constituents (clients, 
suppliers) and non-market constituents (local communities and neighbors, local authorities, 
NGOs, the media and shareholders), while the main internal constituent we consider is the 
MNE’s headquarters. Constituents’ demands echo the prescriptions of the norm under 
consideration. For instance, clients ask their suppliers to display conformity to an 
environmental norm, or react positively to those who have implemented an ISO 14001 
certified management system (e.g., King, Lenox, & Terlaak, 2005). MNEs’ headquarters 
introduce formal policies in an attempt to display conformity to such norms at the corporate 
level: thus, subsidiaries need to deal with new norm-related demands emanating 
simultaneously from their headquarters and their external constituents. 
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We study the subsidiaries’ implementation of practices, rather than, as have been 
considered in previous works, the top-down diffusion of those practices (e.g., Kostova & 
Roth, 2002), their adaptation (e.g., Ansari, Fiss, & Zajac, 2010; Jensen & Szulanski, 2004), or 
their emergence in response to local imperatives (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1988; Phene & 
Almeida, 2008; Tippmann, Scott, & Mangematin, 2012; Venaik, Midgley, & Devinney, 
2005). Our core objective is to understand how and why MNE subsidiaries articulate and 
prioritize the different types of normative demands placed on them to affect their levels of 
practice implementation. 
The role of attention to demands 
According to the neo-institutional theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991; Pache 
& Santos, 2010), firms respond to the normative demands they face. And to elaborate their 
responses, they need to process these demands. In particular, subsidiaries’ attention to their 
constituents’ demands influences their implementation of corresponding practices, as pointed 
out by recent studies. For instance, Delmas and Toffel (2008) show that receptivity to the 
demands of specific constituents favors the implementation of certain practices over others 
(e.g., ISO 14001 vs. voluntary governmental environmental programs). Crilly and Sloan 
(2012: 1174) also suggest that the effect of normative demands on firms’ behaviors is better 
explained “from the inside-out” through understanding their attention mechanisms. Our study 
extends this investigation of the role of subsidiaries’ attention in their practice 
implementation. To respond to normative demands, subsidiaries need to first identify them, 
evaluate their legitimacy, and then, following an attention process, decide on the most 
appropriate response (Ocasio, 1997). 
Ocasio defined attention as the process of “noticing, encoding, interpreting and focusing 
of time and effort by decision-makers on both (a) issues […] and (b) answers” (Ocasio, 1997: 
189). In the context of MNEs, the original concept of attention has been slightly modified to 
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acknowledge the importance of attention to normative demands. For instance, Bouquet and 
colleagues introduced the concept of international attention (Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; 
Bouquet, Morrison, & Birkinshaw, 2009), defined as “the extent to which [MNEs’ 
executives] invest time and effort in activities, communications, and discussions aimed at 
improving their understanding of the global marketplace” (Bouquet et al., 2009: 108). This 
notion of attention has been applied both to organizational units and to individual decision-
makers (Ambos et al., 2010; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008; Bouquet et al. 2009), underscoring 
the central importance of MNEs’ subsidiaries’ attention for their implementation of practices.  
Building on past research, we define a subsidiary’s attention to the demands of both its 
headquarters and its external constituents as comprising their noticing of these demands, their 
focusing of time and effort on understanding these demands, and their elaborating a response 
strategy. The level of attention varies across demands that are given more or less priority, 
depending on the subsidiaries’ context. For example, in some situations, subsidiaries may 
only notice the demands, but not expend time and effort in understanding and deciding how to 
address them; however, in contrast to this passive kind of attention, which Delmas and Toffel 
(2008) term receptivity, we consider a more complete attentional process. Following Hoffman 
and Ocasio (2001) and Ocasio (2011), in our view, attention is granted through a process of 
attentional selectivity that extends beyond receptivity, as demands are not equally salient. The 
attention-based view holds that an organization’s sub-entities may not share the priorities of 
the MNE’s headquarters or those of their peer subsidiaries (Ocasio, 1997). The level of 
attention of subsidiaries’ decision-makers to certain demands depends both on the context that 
surrounds them (i.e., situated attention) and on various structural organizational characteristics 
(i.e., structural distribution of attention), such as incentive systems, communication structures, 
or resource distributions (Joseph & Ocasio, 2012; Ocasio, 1997). Consistent with neo-
institutional arguments, the attention-based view thus acknowledges the key role of the 
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subsidiaries’ environment but allows us to depict environmental demands as stimuli that 
receive more or less attention, depending on each subsidiary’s context. 
Peer conformity drives attention 
Institutional scholars have long argued that when organizations face new norms and 
new demands, they will imitate industry peers (Burns & Wholey, 1993; Davis & Greve, 1997; 
Rosenzweig & Singh, 1991) because one option for addressing uncertainty is to imitate one’s 
peers (Rao, Greve, & Davis, 2001). In international contexts, subsidiaries also implement 
similar practices as their external peers to reduce their liability of foreignness, in an attempt to 
avoid being at a competitive disadvantage (Zaheer, 1995). And an MNE itself constitutes an 
institutional field, within which some subsidiaries mimic the actions of others (Kostova, Roth, 
& Dacin, 2008). We argue that this peer influence is in part explained by the reinforcement of 
subsidiaries’ attention to the demands of its external and internal constituents. When external 
and internal peers conform strongly to a norm, subsidiaries are pressed to follow suit, in ways 
that satisfy their external and internal constituents. In other words, the conformity of a 
subsidiary’s external and internal peers triggers its attention to the demands emanating from, 
respectively, its external constituents and its headquarters (see Figure 3).  
External peers’ implementation of practices represents not only mimetic inspiration for 
adopting practices but also local competitive threats to MNE subsidiaries (e.g., Gladstein & 
Reilly, 1985; Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981), as local constituents value their peers’ 
increased conformity to a norm. Thus, when local external peers display strong conformity, 
the need to make sense of the demands of the external constituents relative to the norm, and to 
identify the best ways to satisfy them, becomes reinforced in a subsidiary. As a result, the 
MNE’s subsidiaries will increase their attention to the demands of external constituents 
(clients, customers, local authorities, local communities, the media, NGOs, and external 
shareholders).  
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Hence: 
Hypothesis 1a. The greater the conformity of its external peers to a norm, the more 
attention an MNE’s subsidiary will give to the demands of external constituents 
relative to the norm.  
Similarly, within the MNE, when peer subsidiaries implement practices consistent with 
a norm, the need intensifies for the focal subsidiary to attend to the demands of the 
headquarters (as the main internal constituent) corresponding to this norm. While industry 
peers compete for market resources, peer subsidiaries compete for limited organizational 
resources (Ambos et al., 2010; Burgelman, 1991: 240; Crilly, 2010; Mudambi & Navarra, 
2004) and for headquarters’ attention (Ambos et al., 2010; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008). 
Indeed, the more the headquarters pays heed to a subsidiary, the more resources, autonomy, 
and influence that subsidiary will gain (Andersson, Forsgren, & Holm, 2002; Mäkelä, 
Björkman, Ehrnrooth, Smale, & Sumelius, 2013). Therefore, subsidiaries influence each 
other’s conformity to norms (Davis, Desai, & Francis, 2000), and the conformity of peer 
subsidiaries to a norm endorsed by the headquarters threatens a focal unit’s internal visibility 
and relative importance within the MNE (Andersson et al., 2002; Mundambi & Navarra, 
2004). To preserve or even improve their position in the MNE’s attention structure (Garcia-
Pont, Canales, & Noboa, 2009), subsidiaries recourse to “profile building” strategies (Bouquet 
& Birkinshaw, 2008): they internalize headquarters’ demands related to the norm, and 
implement corresponding practices.  
Hypothesis 1b. The greater the conformity of its internal peers to a  norm, the more 
attention an MNE’s subsidiary will give to the demands of the headquarters relative 
to the norm. 
MNE subsidiaries’ attention is limited and hence selective (Ocasio, 1997, 2011; Ocasio 
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& Joseph, 2005, 2008).
6
 Therefore, when subsidiaries increase their attention to certain 
demands, they necessarily decrease their attention to other demands, because attention implies 
efforts and time, both in scarce supply. In particular, subsidiaries can give more or less 
priority to external or internal demands, depending on the model or threat their internal or 
external peers represent.  
As the level of external peers’ conformity to a social norm increases, understanding and 
addressing the demands of the headquarters’ appears relatively less imperative and urgent for 
subsidiaries than dealing with the demands emerging from their external constituents. And 
subsidiaries’ attention capacities can be saturated by the level of attention they pay to external 
constituents’ demands. In other words, the threat represented by external peers’ extensive 
implementation of norm-conforming practices diverts subsidiaries’ attention from their 
headquarters’ demands. We therefore expect a negative relationship between external peers’ 
conformity and the level of attention the subsidiaries pay to their headquarters’ demands:  
Hypothesis 2a. The greater the conformity of its external peers to a norm, the less 
attention an MNE’s subsidiary will pay to headquarters’ demands relative to the 
norm. 
Following this logic, as a subsidiary’s internal peers’ conformity increases, the 
demands of the headquarters gains priority over the demands of external constituents as the 
subsidiary primarily wants to stand out as a model student within the MNE. It therefore 
allocates its limited attention to the demands from headquarters, at the expense of the 
demands of external constituents. External constituents’ demands are given lower priority 
                                                          
6
 One of our reviewers rightly pointed out that limited attention in organizations can be addressed, for instance, 
through structural separation (Crilly & Sloan, 2014; Jansen, Tempelaar, Van den Bosch & Volberda, 2009). 
While this option is clearly a possible method for managing limited attention, in our case, we focus on only a 
limited set of issues, related to specific normative demands (i.e., CSR), which pervade whole firms and are 
usually handled by a limited number of decision-makers. We therefore do not believe that structural separation 
applies as an actionable situation here. 
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because the threat related to internal competition for intra-MNE importance overtakes the 
external threat related to market competition. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 2b. The greater the conformity of its internal peers to a norm, the less 
attention an MNE’s subsidiary will pay to demands of external constituents relative 
to the norm. 
Attention increases practice implementation 
In sum, when the conformity of external peers to a norm increases, we argue that 
subsidiaries’ attention will be directed towards the demands of external constituents relative 
to this norm, at the expense of the demands from headquarters, and vice versa. The resulting 
level of attention to demands will further influence the level of their implementation of 
practices. Previous work has shown that MNEs’ responses to normative demands display 
varying levels of commitment, including within the same organization (e.g., Cantwell, 
Dunning, & Lundan, 2010; Ferner, Almond, & Colling, 2004). In particular, we expect that 
higher levels of attention will trigger responses that are more aligned with external and 
internal constituents’ demands. Therefore, the more heed a subsidiary pays to its constituents’ 
demands, the more it aims to satisfy those demands and the more it selects and implements 
practices corresponding to the expectations underlying the associated norms. Thus, our final 
hypotheses are: 
Hypothesis 3a. The more an MNE’s subsidiary pays attention to the demands of 
external constituents relative to a norm, the more it will implement related practices. 
Hypothesis 3b. The more an MNE’s subsidiary pays attention to the demands of the 
headquarters relative to a norm, the more it will implement related practices. 
Figure 4 summarizes our model. 
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Figure 4: Essay 1 - Summary of the research hypotheses 
 
Methods 
Data and Sample 
The setting of our inquiry is an MNE — to which we refer as “the Group” — that is a 
worldwide leader in the gas and electricity production and supply industries, also operating in 
infrastructure development and energy and environmental services. The MNE has a presence 
in 70 countries: while the MNE is comparable with many large MNEs, the diversity of its 
industries and geographic locations makes it a particularly interesting case setting in which to 
study the dynamics of internal and external competition and demands. Some of its 
subsidiaries have been part of the group for decades, while others have been acquired more 
recently, and the percentage of the group’s ownership varies across these units. We expect 
this diversity to represent a wide set of varied situations for our study, and to produce 
different subsidiary-level competitive and conforming strategies. 
We focus on CSR practices because CSR is a critical topic for a worldwide MNE 
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operating in energy and utilities businesses, as such firms face many social and environmental 
challenges: the environmental impact of polluting activities, the carbon emissions from power 
production, the working conditions of its employees around the globe, the promotion of 
gender diversity, etc. CSR covers a continuum of responses from no action to proactive 
actions, so we expect to observe considerable diversity in different subsidiaries’ 
implementation of CSR practices, depending on the internal and external pressures they face 
(Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, & Ganapathi, 2007; Bansal & Roth, 2005; Delmas & Toffel, 
2008; Jennings & Zandbergen, 1995; Sharma, Pablo, & Vredenburg, 1999). CSR practices 
also leave considerable room for interpretation, innovative behaviors, and strategic responses 
from different sub-entities (Jennings & Zandbergen, 1995; Sharma, 2000). 
The Group defined and released ten group-wide quantitative and qualitative CSR 
objectives in 2011, covering human resources, safety, and the environment. To test our 
hypotheses, we focused on those objectives related to safety, the proportion of female 
managers, and biodiversity, which were clearly stated in the Group’s CSR policy, and 
communicated to all its entities via their activity “branch” structures. In accordance with the 
Group, we selected these three topics because they represent three different domains of the 
Group’s objectives, and applied to all subsidiaries, regardless of their activity, whereas other 
specific objectives targeted specific activities – e.g., the percentage of renewables in energy 
production. We conducted an on-line survey among the MNE’s subsidiaries in October 2012, 
which we had pre-validated in interviews with 10 experts from the Group’s CSR department, 
and then pretested at two subsidiaries in June and July 2012. In particular, one of the authors 
elaborated an exhaustive list of practices relating to the three topics based on her prior 
experience as a CSR consultant. This list was then further refined at meetings with Group 
experts: the main modifications that followed the pretest were mostly clarifications and a 
slight reduction in the questionnaire’s overall length. 
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We randomly selected 104 subsidiaries from a full list of the Group’s entities via 
systematic cluster sampling, and we asked six managers with functional responsibilities at 
each unit (e.g., general directors, finance directors, operating directors, human resource 
managers, communication directors, and sales directors) to complete the on-line 
questionnaires. Overall (due to some functional overlaps), the on-line survey was sent to 475 
potential respondents and, after several reminders, we received complete answers from 314 (a 
66% response rate) located in 101 subsidiaries in 35 countries (55 subsidiaries in 12 European 
countries, 10 in 8 Asian countries, 13 in 6 South American countries, 7 in 5 Maghreb and 
Middle East countries, 9 in 3 North American countries, and 7 in Australia), which, among 
them, represented about 101,000 employees, 46% of the Group’s workforce. Despite this 
satisfying response rate, we checked whether non-respondents’ functional responsibilities 
differed from those of the respondents and, therefore, might bias our results. We found the 
distribution of respondents and non-respondents across functions to be extremely similar: the 
only minor differences concerned CEOs and HR managers — both categories that had a 
higher response rate than the average (71% response rate for both categories) — while 
marketing and sales managers had a slightly lower level of response (63% response rate). We 
noted considerable variance in respondents’ gradings of practice implementation levels 
between — and even within —
 
the three topics, and 90% of the questionnaires included some 
low implementation scores (i.e., 0, 1 or 2 on a scale of 6); thus, social desirability does not 
seem to have been an issue, as respondents confessed low levels of implementation. Inter-
respondent consistency was also very satisfactory, as described in the next section. 
All data about levels of practice implementation and attention were collected via this 
single survey, suggesting the possibility of a common method variance in the results, although 
the other independent variables data were collected separately. We took steps to minimize the 
risk of common method bias in the design of our instrument, and performed some statistical 
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tests to assess the risk of such bias, following the guidance of Chang, van Witteloostuijn, and 
Eden (2010). First, we guaranteed the study’s anonymity and confidentiality, while 
encouraging respondents to provide genuine answers and giving them the opportunity to 
comment on their answers. Second, we constructed the survey to minimize common method 
bias: the items related to the dependent variable appeared before items related to the 
independent variables; items for each question were randomized; and the survey was long and 
complex, with many questions separating the two sets of variables, thereby reducing the 
likelihood of implicit theorizing. The format of the scales also differed (for instance, the 
implementation scale included a neutral mid-point at 3, but no neutral score was offered for 
the attention scales). Third, we ensured the maximum validity of the data, through our use of 
multiple respondents with good inter-respondent agreement, and thanks to the dependent 
variable following objective performance items related to the CSR issues in question in the 
survey. Common method variance is less likely with a fact-based variable than when both sets 
of variables are fully perceptual (Chang et al., 2010). Fourth, to further confirm the low 
probability of common method bias, we performed Harman’s one-factor tests and applied a 
marker-variable technique. The two Harman tests confirmed that the dependent variable and 
each of the two attention variables loaded on two factors. The marker-variable technique 
consists of, first, introducing to the survey an item that is theoretically unrelated to at least one 
of the two variables (Craighead, Ketchen, Dunn, & Hult, 2011), and then verifying the 
unrelated variable’s low correlation with this item. We used the complexity of the practices as 
our marker variable because we expected it to be unrelated to the attention paid by the 
subsidiaries to the demands of their headquarters and of their external constituents. Thus, we 
looked at the correlations between the reported attention levels and complexity per topic at the 
respondent level and found rather low correlation levels (in the range of 0.11 and 0.35 in 
absolute value), again suggesting the risk of common method bias was limited. 
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Measures 
Level of CSR practices implementation. The levels of implementation of CSR practices are 
captured through survey measures reflecting the extent of subsidiary-level actions associated 
with implementing practices regarding occupational health and safety, the employment of 
female managers, and biodiversity. In cooperation with MNE experts, we developed eight or 
nine items for each of the three domains (as presented in Appendix A), using a 7-point Likert 
scale that ranged from 0 = “not at all” to 6 = “to a very great extent”. The level of agreement 
among respondent’s answers was sufficient (Kappa of 0.79) for us to aggregate the answers at 
the entity level by averaging the scores for each practice, leaving us with 2,525 observations 
(25 practices × 101 subsidiaries). 
Subsidiary’s attention. The attention to the demands of external constituents and the attention 
to the demands of the headquarters are captured through various survey items. To assess 
attention to the demands of external constituents, the survey posed three questions: 
“Regarding its health and safety results/the percentage of female managers/its performance as 
regards the preservation of biodiversity, to what extent is your entity supportive of the 
demands of these external actors?”  Respondents were asked to answer using a 7 -point Likert 
scale, and the seven types of external actors proposed here were “Local authorities”, “the 
media”, “NGOs”, “Clients”, “Suppliers”, “Local communities and neighbors”, and “Other 
shareholders”.  
To assess attention to headquarters’ demands, the survey posed three questions: 
“Regarding its health and safety results/the percentage of female managers/its performance as 
regards the preservation of biodiversity, to what extent is your entity supportive of the 
demands of these internal actors?” Again, respondents were asked to answer using a 7-point 
Likert scale, and the two actors specified were “Group Sustainable Development Direction” 
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and “Branch Sustainable Development or Environmental Correspondent”.
7
 
The responses of each subsidiary’s survey participants were averaged to obtain 
subsidiary-level measures on each of the 27 survey items (3 topics × (7 + 2 items)), given a 
very high level of agreement among respondents (Kappa = 0.85 for attention to either type of 
demands). The final attention variables were obtained by averaging all subsidiary-level scores 
on each topic for attention to external demands (3 averages of 7 items in each subsidiary) and 
attention to headquarters’ demands (3 averages of 2 items in each subsidiary).
8
 For both 
variables, we thus had 303 observations at the topic × subsidiary level (3 topics × 101 
subsidiaries).  
Internal peers’ conformity. The MNE is organized into 6 operating “branches”, all related to 
core Group businesses (Environmental Services, Gas, Energy, etc.). The variable conformity 
of internal peers corresponds to the extent of a practice implementation in other subsidiaries 
of the same branch across countries, as reported through the survey instrument. For each of 
the 25 practices in each subsidiary, we averaged the scores obtained for the same practice in 
all the other subsidiaries of the branch (hence 25 × 101 = 2,525 observations).  
External peers’ conformity. The conformity of external peers is measured as the performance 
of national competitors on the three topics (safety, gender diversity, and biodiversity) as rated 
in Thomson Reuters ASSET4, the world’s largest Environmental, Social & Governance rating 
database (Cheng, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2014). We used the grading for 2011, the most recent 
available before the year of our data collection. We retained only those companies that sorted 
                                                          
7
 Our reviewers expressed concern that our operationalization of attention, because of its reference to 
support, would include some kind of action and thus be too close to our dependent variable. However, 
we believe supporting some demands does not necessarily lead to implementing practices; demands 
can be addressed in ways other than implementing practices (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991), let 
alone implementing them all in a consistent manner. Moreover, as we expected given our hypotheses, 
the correlations are high, but still below 0.5, which tends to confirm that the measures capture two 
different concepts. 
8
 We do not report consistency across items for each variable because the items are formative of the 
construct, not reflective. 
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as “utilities” in gas, electricity, water, or “multiline” or as “industrial services” in waste, 
water, environment, or energy and that employed more than 1,000 people, yielding a 
worldwide pool of 125 competitors.
9
 We used ASSET4’s grading for six items related to 
safety, seven items related to gender diversity, and twelve items related to environmental 
biodiversity (these 25 items are detailed in Appendix B). We generated unique measures of 
peer conformity per topic per country, by averaging the competitors’ scores on each topic in 
each country, weighted by the competitors’ size in the country captured by their local 
headcounts.
10
 
Controls. First, we expect that the various legal environments the subsidiaries face will affect 
their implementation of CSR practices and their attention to the demands placed on them. 
Where national laws are more stringent, the subsidiaries face stronger government pressures 
that condition their practice implementation (Björkman et al., 2007; Kostova & Roth, 2002; 
Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). Such legal CSR contexts are country specific: for instance, the 
legal framework related to health and safety is very advanced in some countries (e.g., both 
France and the United States have approximately 500 relevant legal regulations), but much 
less developed in others (fewer than 10 regulations each in many countries in Africa, South 
America, the Middle East, and Asia). For safety practices and gender diversity, we used the 
number of laws related to health and safety and workplace non-discrimination in place in the 
focal country in 2012, as provided by the International Labor Organization. For biodiversity, 
we are aware of no database listing the laws related to biodiversity worldwide, and even at the 
                                                          
9
 Ideally, we would have relied on data on the CSR performance of the subsidiaries of competing MNEs in each 
country covered by our study; however, as data at this level of disaggregation were unavailable, we could not use 
a direct measure of the performance of the MNE’s local subsidiaries, and so relied on a distribution of the 
MNE’s performance, according to the size of its subsidiaries. Our measures are imperfect because our 
performance ratings are at the global level, and we cannot guarantee that local subsidiaries’ performances are 
consistent with these global MNE measures. However, we can expect some global patterns to be reproduced 
locally — in particular, in the biggest subsidiaries, which are those that receive greater weight in our 
operationalization. 
10
 Missing data for Oman, Bahrain, and Pakistan were handled by using the United Arab Emirates’ 
score for the first two, and the Indian score for Pakistan. 
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national level most countries do not communicate this information. We therefore used the 
national percentages of each country’s terrestrial and marine areas that were protected in 
2010, as provided by the World Bank. Since this protection is defined and declared by each 
country’s government, we considered that these figures reflect the importance each 
government attaches to biodiversity. Therefore, the national legal variables are the obtained 
and standardized topic values per country. Hence, for each country, we report the 
corresponding “national legal context” value depending on the topic under consideration (i.e., 
safety legislation value is associated with safety practices, gender diversity legislation with 
diversity practices, and so on). 
Second, biodiversity and safety practices were set as two binary variables, taking the 
value of 1 when the topic is, respectively, biodiversity or safety, and 0 otherwise. We 
introduced these controls as we expected subsidiaries’ CSR practices to display different 
levels of implementation and demands to receive varying attention across the three topics 
(i.e., safety, employment of female managers, and biodiversity).  
Third, given the subsidiaries are part of different industries, we used industry dummies 
to control for presences in the environmental services and infrastructure industries.
11
 As the 
other subsidiaries belonged to the energy sector at large, that sector was used as the reference 
category. 
Finally, when testing for one type of attention (to external or internal constituents), we 
controlled for the other type of attention. 
Empirical approach 
Given the structure of our model, before deciding on the most appropriate approach to our 
data, we first checked whether attention to the demands of the MNE headquarters and 
                                                          
11
 We excluded these controls from equation (4) as the operationalization of attention to internal 
demands already takes the influence of the industry into account through its “branch” component.  
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attention to the demands of external constituents were endogenous to our model by 
performing the Durbin Wu Hausman augmented regression test (Kumar, 2009). For each type 
of attention, we regressed the attention variable as a function of all the exogenous variables of 
our model, and then introduced the residuals in our regression model for implementation. In 
both cases, we rejected the null hypothesis, in which the residuals would be equal to zero, and 
thus attention would be exogenous (p < 0.001 for attention to the demands of external 
constituents and p < 0.05 for attention to the demands of the headquarters). 
Given the endogeneity of attention to the demands of the MNE headquarters and 
attention to the demands external constituents, we used simultaneous equation models to test 
our hypotheses. Our hypotheses can be expressed according to the two systems of equations 
below: 
System (1) consists of equations (1) and (2): 
AE = f(IC, EC, identifying variables, control variables)    (1) 
Implementation = g(AE, identifying variables, control variables)   (2) 
where AE corresponds to attention to the demands of external constituents, and IC and 
EC correspond, respectively, to the conformity of internal and external peers to the norm. 
Note that Equation (1) serves to test hypotheses 1a and 2b, and equation (2) serves to test 
hypothesis 3a. 
System (2) consists of equation (3) and (4): 
AH = h(IC, EC, identifying variables, control variables)   (3) 
Implementation = i(AH, identifying variables, control variables)   (4)   
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where AH corresponds to attention to the demands of the MNE headquarters, and IC 
and EC, correspond, respectively, to the conformity of internal and external peers to the norm. 
Here, equation (3) serves to test hypotheses 1b and 2a, and equation (4) to test hypothesis 3b.  
To properly identify the two systems, we need to include in each of their equations at 
least one variable that is not in the system’s other equation (Banalieva & Dhanaraj, 2013; 
Kumar, 2009). To identify equation (1), we used subsidiary size, as larger organizations tend 
to adopt practices more quickly (e.g., Burns & Wholey, 1993); thus, we expect size to 
influence implementation, but not to influence attention in any predictable direction. To 
identify equation (2), we used autonomy, level of ownership, and the subsidiary’s Group 
history (i.e., time spent within the Group), as we expect these factors to affect attention, but to 
have little direct impact on implementation. In the same way, we used size to identify 
equation (3), and used autonomy, level of integration, and Group history to identify equation 
(4) (for our operationalization of the identifying variables, see Appendix C). 
We checked that our systems of equations were identified (Banalieva & Dhanaraj, 
2013), using the checkreg3 command in Stata (Baum, 2007). Indeed, while the order 
condition is necessary (but not sufficient) and the rank condition is sufficient to infer the 
identification of single equations, together they do not allow us to conclude that a system of 
equations is fully identified because they do not check that a unique relationship exists 
between the matrices of structural coefficients and the reduced form of the system. The test 
confirmed that our instruments properly identified the two systems of equations. We 
estimated our structural equation models using both 2SLS and 3SLS, and found consistent 
results across both methods. Given that 3SLS estimates are more efficient than 2SLS 
estimates (Banalieva, & Dhanaraj, 2013; Kumar, 2009), we chose to report only those 
estimates in our results. 
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Results 
Simultaneous equation modeling 
The correlation matrix presented in Table 1 suggests that the data have no 
multicollinearity issues — that is, the absolute value of the correlation between the main 
dependent and independent variables in each equation is below 0.5. The high correlation 
between the implementation level and safety practices (0.64) is not surprising: since safety is 
the most institutionalized topic of the three, safety practices are more likely than other 
practices to score higher in terms of the dependent variables. We also find a high correlation 
(0.73) between the levels of attention to the two types of demands (i.e., from the headquarters 
and external constituents), which is further explained below.
12 
In addition, the
 
variance 
inflation factors are all below 5, as shown by Table 2. 
                                                          
12
 We can suggest two alternative explanations for this high correlation: either our data have a common 
method bias or our description of attention as being selective is challenged by our data. The potential 
for common method bias is examined in our methods section and in the limitations at the end of the 
discussion section; and although we cannot completely exclude common method bias, we took all 
available measures to reduce it as much as possible. The high correlation is more likely due to the high 
influence of external peers’ conformity on both types of attention, an effect that we did not entirely 
expect but that we find very interesting and discuss further in our results section. 
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Table 1: Essay 1 - Descriptive statistics and zero-order correlations 
  Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. Implementation level 4.75 1.79 1 7 1.00 
         
  
  
2. Attention to external demands 4.06 1.29 1 6.78 0.49 1.00 
    
      
  
3. Attention to HQs’ demands 3.77 1.25 1 7 0.45 0.73 1.00 
       
  
  
4. Conformity of external peers 0.73 0.18 0 1 0.12 0.13 -0.05 1.00           
5. Conformity of internal peers 0.35 0.27 0 1 -0.2313 -0.20 -0.14 -0.12 1.00 
     
  
  
6. Subsidiary size 5.64 1.57 3.00 9.64 0.01 -0.12 -0.08 0.09 -0.18 1.00 
    
  
  
7. Autonomy 3.94 0.35 2.6 5 -0.12 -0.14 -0.26 0.20 -0.09 0.13 1.00 
   
  
  
8. Ownership 73.16 28.77 0 100 -0.10 -0.13 -0,14 0.11 -0.22 0.05 0.23 1.00 
  
  
  
9. Group history 12.59 13.61 0 107 -0.01 -0.07 -0.09 0.10 -0.06 0.39 -0.10 0.04 1.00 
 
  
  
10. National legal context 0.45 0.28 0 1 0.17 0.13 0.04 0.17 -0.09 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.12 1.00   
  
11. Biodiversity 0.36 0.48 0 1 -0.35 0.06 -0.07 -0.02 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.16 1.00    
12. Safety 0.32 0.47 0 1 0.64 0.46 0.37 0.16 -0.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 -0.51 1.00   
13. Environmental services 0.20 0.40 0 1 0.04 0.04 0.00 -0.03 0.15 -0,01 -0.26 -0.67 0.21 0.08 0.00 0.00 1.00  
14. Infrastructure 0.05 0.22 0 1 0.04 -0.11 -0.20 0.09 0.19 0,04 0.22 0.17 -0.09 0.11 0.00 0.00 -0.11 1.00 
 
                                                          
13
 The difference in operationalization between internal peers’ conformity (standardized by topic) and implementation (uncentered) is the reason for the 
negative correlation we found. Internal peers tend to implement health and safety practices more than practices related to the other two topics (gender equality 
and environmental biodiversity), so that we chose to standardize the variable in order to disentangle the effect of peers’ conformity from the effect of the CSR 
topic. By standardizing this variable to neutralize the effect of the topic, we pulled the observations of health and safety practices down relative to other 
practices — while they were still very high for practice implementation. These relatively low scores of internal peers’ conformity for health and safety 
practices explain the negative correlation we obtained but an uncentered variable provides similar results. 
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Table 2: Essay 1 - Variance inflation factors 
Variables VIF 1/VIF 
Attention to external demands 3.03 0.33 
Attention to HQs’ demands 2.57 0.39 
Conformity of external peers 1.15 0.87 
Conformity of internal peers 1.74 0.58 
Subsidiary size 1.31 0.77 
Autonomy 1.27 0.79 
Ownership 2.25 0.45 
Group history 1.39 0.72 
National legal context 1.18 0.85 
Biodiversity 1.73 0.58 
Safety 2.89 0.35 
Environmental services 2.20 0.45 
Infrastructure 1.24 0.81 
Mean VIF 1.84   
 
  
72 
 
Table 3: Essay 1 - 3SLS models estimating simultaneously the effect of attention on practices’ implementation and the effect of peers’ 
conformity on supportive attention 
 Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 Model 4 
Dependent Variable: 
Attention to external 
demands 
Equation (1) in System (1) 
Implementation  
 
Equation (2) in System (1) 
 Attention to HQs' demands 
 
Equation (3) in System (2) 
Implementation 
 
Equation (4) in System (2) 
Supportive attention to external 
demands 
0.81*** (0.18)           0.21* (0.08)       
Supportive attention to HQs’ demands 0.04 (0.12)           0.54*** (0.11)       
Conformity of external peers       0.58*** (0.12)           -0.24* (0.12) 
Conformity of internal peers       0.50*** (0.09)           0.22* (0.10) 
Subsidiary size 0.08*** (0.02)           0.06*** (0.02)       
Autonomy       -0.51*** (0.06)           -0.89*** (0.07) 
Ownership       -0.01*** (0.00)           -0.00*** (0.00) 
Group history       -0.01*** (0.00)           -0.01*** (0.00) 
National legal context -0.22* (0.11)   0.22** (0.08)     -0.04 (0.10)   -0.12 (0.08) 
Biodiversity -1.03*** (0.16)   1.12*** (0.05)     -0.59*** (0.08)   0.46*** (0.05) 
Safety 0.88*** (0.20)   1.95*** (0.06)     1.35*** (0.08)   1.34*** (0.07) 
Environmental services 0.14* (0.07)   -0.35*** (0.07)     0.13* (0.07)       
Infrastructure 0.94*** (0.13)   -0.60*** (0.10)     0.92*** (0.14)       
(Constant) 0.97*** (0.26)   5.02*** (0.27)     1.21*** (0.18)   7.18*** (0.27) 
Chi2 2590.21   1662.58     2600.10   846.49 
Observations 2,525  2,525   2,525  2,525 
Standard errors in parentheses. † if p < 0.10, * if p < 0.05; ** if p < 0.01; *** if p < 0.001  
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Table 3 presents the results of the 3SLS analyses. Hypotheses 1a and 2b were tested in 
Model 1. Hypothesis 1a predicted that external peers’ conformity would positively influence 
subsidiaries’ attention to the demands of external constituents, and Hypothesis 2b predicted 
that internal peers’ conformity would reduce their attention to the demands of external 
constituents. In fact, the results of our analysis suggest that conformity of both types of peers 
significantly increases subsidiaries’ attention to the demands of external constituents. Thus, 
while Hypothesis 1a is supported by our data, we find the effect of internal peers’ conformity 
is opposite to the effect proposed in Hypothesis 2b. This incongruity might be due to the fact 
that, to increase their internal visibility, subsidiaries follow up on initiatives inspired not only 
by headquarters’ demands but also by their local environments (Birkinshaw, 1997; 
Birkinshaw, Hood, & Jonsson, 1998; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008). They would pay heed to 
external demands (Andersson et al., 2002) in an attempt to maintain or increase their 
importance within the MNE (Andersson, Forsgren, & Holm, 2007; Mundambi & Navarra, 
2004). 
Hypotheses 1b and 2a were tested in Model 3. We expected that attention to the 
demands of the headquarters would increase as internal peers’ conformity increased 
(Hypothesis 1b) and decrease as external peers’ conformity increased (Hypothesis 2a). The 
positive and significant coefficient of internal peers’ conformity and the negative and 
significant coefficient of external peers’ conformity show support for both these predictions.  
In Model 2, we tested Hypothesis 3a, which predicted a positive impact of attention to 
the demands of external constituents on the implementation of CSR practices. Our regression 
analysis supports this hypothesis, as shown by the positive and significant coefficient of 
attention to the demands of external constituents. Similarly, Hypothesis 3b was tested in 
Model 4 and was again supported by our data, as suggested by the positive and significant 
coefficient of attention to the demands of the headquarters. 
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The range and significance of the coefficients of our control and identifying variables 
are also of interest in the four models. In Models 1 and 2, we can see the influence of the 
control and identifying variables on the levels of attention to external demands and demands 
from the MNE headquarters. The impact of autonomy is negative and significant in both 
models, suggesting that subsidiaries with more leeway attend less to either type of demands. 
Greater levels of Group ownership and a longer history as part of the Group do not lead to 
more implementation — if anything, the effect is contrary (negative and significant 
coefficients). These results can be interpreted as resulting from the resistance of both highly 
controlled and more autonomous entities against both central Group recommendations and 
local demands. Understandably, the national legal context increases attention to external 
constituents’ demands, but has no significant impact on attention to headquarters’ demands. 
Regarding the nature of the practices, both safety and biodiversity practices tend to drive 
attention to both internal and external constituents’ demands to a greater extent than practices 
related to employing women in management roles. And subsidiaries in either the 
environmental services or infrastructure industries are significantly less attentive to the 
demands of external constituents than are subsidiaries in the energy industry. 
In Models 2 and 4, we can observe the impact of the control and identifying variables 
on the level of practice implementation. The coefficient of subsidiaries’ size in Models 1 and 
3 is positive and significant, suggesting that larger subsidiaries tend to implement CSR 
practices more extensively. The influence of the national legal context on practices’ 
implementation is limited, if not slightly negative. Safety practices tend to be implemented 
more thoroughly than other types of practices, and biodiversity practices less so. In fact, the 
mean of the dependent variable for safety practices is 6.48 (standard deviation of 0.98), 
compared with 4.03 for practices that favor the employment of female managers (standard 
deviation of 2.04), and 3.93 for biodiversity practices (standard deviation of 2.00). We further 
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find that subsidiaries in both the environmental services and infrastructure industries tend to 
implement practices to a greater extent than do the other subsidiaries from the energy sector.  
Robustness tests 
We performed additional analyses to confirm the robustness of our results. First, we 
reran our models by using a respondent × practice unit of analysis, and including some 
respondent-level controls (i.e., time spent in the company, tenure in the current position, and 
involvement in CSR activities). Although less consistent with our arguments at the subsidiary 
level of analysis, this analysis involves fewer assumptions since we do not need to aggregate 
the data per subsidiary. As a result, the number of observations was 7,850 instead of the 2,525 
reported in our models. Interestingly, this test gave very similar results to our entity-level 
analysis. We were also interested in the results per topic, and in particular, in the subsample 
of observations related to biodiversity practices since biodiversity represents the most recent 
normative demand. Overall, the structure of the results remained similar, although the 
significance of some coefficients for female management and safety practices decreased: for 
operational safety, the coefficient of internal peers’ conformity in Model 3; and for the 
employment of female managers, the coefficient of attention to the demands of external 
constituents in Model 2. For biodiversity, we found similar and significant results as for the 
whole sample, comforting the fit between our data and our theoretical explanations. 
Finally, we performed a mediation analysis to try to articulate our findings with 
previous works that have established that subsidiaries implement practices in a mimetic way 
following their implementation by internal and external peers (Burns & Wholey, 1993; Davis 
& Greve, 1997; Davis, Desai & Francis, 2000; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Rosenzweig & Singh, 
1991). Our goal was to verify whether the role of attention explains some of peers’ influence, 
and thereby complements the direct mimetic explanation: if our theory is true, we should 
observe that the positive direct effect of peer’s conformity on subsidiaries’ practice 
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implementation is partially mediated by its attention to the demands of its constituents. 
According to our analysis reported in Appendix D, the relationship between the conformity of 
the subsidiaries’ internal and external peers and practices’ implementation is indeed partially 
mediated by the subsidiaries’ level on attention. The influence of internal peers is partly due 
both to the increased attention to the demands of the headquarters and to the increased 
attention to the demands of external constituents; and the influence of external peers 
comprehends two countervailing effects, the increased attention to the demands of external 
constituents and the decreased attention to the demands of the headquarters (see Appendix D 
for the detailed results). The results of the mediation analysis are thus consistent with our 
simultaneous equation modeling results. The influence of peers on subsidiaries’ 
implementation of practices is in part due to their increasing attention to the demands of the 
headquarters and external constituents. Thus, our model indeed improves our understanding 
of the mechanisms underlying peers’ influence, by showing that subsidiaries’ responses 
extend beyond mimicry and appeals to their attention. Peer conformity can represent a threat 
that obliges subsidiaries to make attentive responses; otherwise, we would not find that the 
direct effect of peers’ conformity was mediated by attention. 
Discussion and conclusion 
This paper shows that the attention subsidiaries pay to the demands of their 
headquarters and their external constituents plays a crucial role in their implementation of 
practices in response to the high norm conformity of their internal and external peers. We 
proposed that, as attention is limited (Ocasio, 1997), MNE subsidiaries increase their attention 
to the demands of either their external constituents or the headquarters, depending on whether 
external peers or internal peers represent the greater threat. Our results support our view that 
peers’ influence leads to certain demands prevailing over others so that the effects of the two 
types of attention on practice implementation substitute for each other. More specifically, 
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when its local external peers display high norm conformity, an MNE’s subsidiary increases its 
their attention to the demands of its external constituents and reduce its attention to the 
demands from headquarters. However, internal peers’ conformity increases a subsidiary’s 
attention not only to the demands of the headquarters but also to demands from its external 
constituents. Echoing the view of subsidiaries as initiative-takers (Birkinshaw, 1997; 
Birkinshaw, Hood, & Jonsson, 1998; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008), this interesting finding 
suggests that attention to the demands of the headquarters and attention to the demands of 
external constituents have complementary rather than substitute effects on practice 
implementation when internal peers highly conform to the norm. Subsidiaries seek the best 
way to improve their importance and visibility within the MNE by increasing their level of 
attention toward the headquarters and external constituents simultaneously, resulting in 
greater practice implementation.  
This paper contributes to international management literature as it develops a 
conceptualization of subsidiaries’ attention and advances our understanding of the role it 
plays in practice implementation within MNEs. In so doing, it moves away from the 
traditional focus on headquarters’ attention and reveals how the threat represented by internal 
and external peers’ conformity affects subsidiaries’ attention in diverse ways. In addition, this 
paper helps our understanding of how the subsidiaries of an MNE address the tension between 
the simultaneous demands from their internal and external environments by integrating two 
complementary views: the vision of subsidiaries as conforming to internal or external 
demands (as per the institutional theory tenets) and the depiction of subsidiaries as initiative-
takers within MNEs.  
Building on previous works (Delmas & Toffel, 2008; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Kostova, 
Roth, & Dacin, 2008; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999), we also contribute to institutional theory in 
the MNE context. We underline the interplay between the behavior of a subsidiary’s peers 
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and the demands of its constituents, and show that internal and external peers’ conformity 
influence a subsidiary’s implementation of practices, not only through a passive mimetic 
process but also through a selective attention to the demands of the headquarters and the 
demands of its external constituents. More precisely, our findings show that the influence of 
normative demands on a subsidiary depends on the conforming behavior of its peers that 
orientates its attention towards addressing certain demands at the expense of others.  
Finally, our findings contribute to the attention-based view of the firm by demonstrating 
how organizational attention to environmental demands can influence the implementation of 
practices. Past studies have investigated the intra-organizational antecedents of attention to 
demands: the incentive system and the allocation of resources (Joseph & Ocasio, 2012; 
Ocasio, 1997), the representation of the constituents and their demands within organizations 
(Delmas & Toffel, 2008; Pache & Santos, 2010), and managers’ “enterprise logic” (Crilly & 
Sloan, 2012). We complement these views by showing how peers’ conformity drives 
attention, confirming that attention is “situated” (Ocasio, 1997), and that subsidiaries’ 
attention levels can be low or high, depending on whether the threat they face is internal or 
external. The internal threat represented by conformity of its peer subsidiaries triggers a 
subsidiary’s search for solutions both within and outside the MNE, so that the subsidiary can 
expand their attention capacity. We believe future research within MNEs and beyond should 
better acknowledge this dynamic and strategic nature of attention. 
This paper’s results speak directly to MNEs’ top management. First, we found that 
conformity of internal peers tends to increase the attention level within subsidiaries, and 
results in greater implementation of practices. In other words, the internal competition for 
resources and importance does not only increase subsidiaries’ attention to headquarters’ 
demands that promote conformity, but also and simultaneously increases attention to the local 
environment that fosters local responsiveness and initiative taking. These two outcomes are 
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extremely valuable for the MNE as a whole so that headquarters’ managers should support 
this internal emulation mechanism by strategically allocating resources to subsidiaries 
depending on their conformity level. Second, our results suggest that, when external peers’ 
norm-conforming behavior represents a threat, attention can be directed away from the 
headquarters’ demands. In such situations, MNEs’ top managers should check whether the 
demands of external constituents are consistent with the Group policy: if not, conformity to 
Group objectives can be restored by pulling attention back to headquarters’ demands — for 
instance, through internal competitive dynamics or the nomination of managers who support 
Group policies. As far as subsidiaries’ managers are concerned, if they want to maintain 
internal conformity, they should beware of substituting external demands for internal 
demands. They should seek a balance between internal and external demands, even when 
external peers’ conformity represents a greater threat, as deviating from internal demands 
exposes them to sanctions from the headquarters, for instance in terms of autonomy or access 
to resources. 
Limitations and directions for future research 
We acknowledge that this study suffers from several limitations, mostly related to our setting, 
the operationalization of some of the variables and the empirical testing of our hypotheses.  
First, our study is based on only a single case of a multidivisional organization with 
multiple industrial and regional presences. While our model might not apply to all MNEs, we 
believe it can be extended way beyond our single case as the MNE operates in quite different 
industries (waste services vs. energy production for instance) and we look at CSR practices 
that are not really industry-specific. However, generalization should thus be approached with 
caution, in particular when discussing global industries, in which the interplay between the 
internal and the external environments is likely to differ. The MNE we studied operates in a 
multi-domestic industry, so that local demands are particularly prevalent for its subsidiaries. 
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By contrast, in global industries, MNEs’ subsidiaries might be less embedded in their local 
environment and the role of local demands might be more limited, in particular in the case of 
high conformity of internal peers. Also, while we considered the demands of the headquarters 
were stable across the organization, in other contexts, they might appear less homogeneous.  
Second, the fact that several variables were collected from the same survey source 
might introduce some bias, although we minimized the risk of common method variance and 
performed statistical tests that ruled it out as much as possible. 
Third, we do not measure the constituents’ normative demands directly. Although the 
impact of the strength of each of the demands on both implementation and attention is not the 
focus of our study per se, measuring it could have been a nice addition to our model. But we 
do not omit the direct influence of demands altogether in our analysis: we control for the 
national legal environment and we hold the headquarters’ demands consistent by focusing on 
a single organization with common CSR objectives at the corporate level. 
Fourth, our operationalization of external peers’ conformity does not allow us to capture 
the behavior of each local subsidiary of the MNE’s competitors with perfect precision, as our 
methods’ section explains. 
Fifth, we have studied a situation in which the demands of the headquarters and external 
constituents point to the same direction — toward enhanced CSR performance — although 
they might prescribe the implementation of different practices. Finding a substitution effect, 
as we do in a case of alignment between external and internal demands, makes our study 
conservative, which might constitute a boundary condition to our work; thus, future studies 
could look at cases where internal and external demands are conflicting, with one demand 
operating in support of and another operating against the same norm. In such cases, the 
substitutive and complementary effects observed in our case may revert to the outcome we 
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originally expected -substitutive effects only-, as the subsidiary might have to choose whose 
demands to satisfy. But we could also imagine that subsidiaries try to find alternative ways to 
accommodate conflicting internal and external demands, as they can recourse to a whole 
range of responses beyond implementation of practices: ,compromise, avoidance, defiance or 
manipulation (Pache & Santos, 2010). 
This paper points to the need for future research to consider the role of attention more 
carefully when looking at pressures for practice implementation. Bringing together previously 
identified intra-organizational antecedents of attention and (external and internal) peers’ 
conformity could allow for a more complete depiction of the attention processes and their 
resulting outcomes. Future works could also introduce more systematic measures of the 
internal and external normative demands that subsidiaries face. Finally, we have observed that 
practices of different nature were implemented to diverse extents, which encourages future 
research to examine whether our model will apply to other normative demands beyond CSR 
and its social and environmental consequences (e.g,. R&D, accounting and reporting, 
governance principles, and so forth) that may result in more immediate impacts on efficiency 
and performance. 
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CHAPTER 3: ESSAY 2 - IMPLEMENTATION OF CSR IN AN MNE: A MODEL OF 
SUBSIDIARY CONFORMITY 
“Leading employers may be keen to have a common culture across their 
subsidiaries, but the focus is on harmonization of HR policies and employee 
conditions rather than standardization, says David Plink, chief executive of the 
Netherlands-based Top Employers Institute Corporate. […] HQs want to 
harmonize CSR and diversity programs, but “local flavors” are still coming 
through, says Mr. Plink” 
- Tim Smedley in a Financial Times article (Smedley, 2014) 
Firms, in particular multinational enterprises (MNEs), face mounting pressures for 
from their environment regarding their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) practices. Such 
practices integrate consideration for environmental and social impacts within a company’s 
many activities - its operations, research and development, procurement, marketing and sales, 
human resources - in line with or above the most demanding legal environment they face 
across their facilities (Aguilera, Rupp, Williams & Ganapathi, 2007; Gao & Bansal, 2013; 
Matten & Moon, 2008; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). At the global level, MNEs must respond 
to increasing demands regarding their ‘triple bottom line’: increasing their economic, 
environmental and social benefits, while minimizing their environmental and social impacts 
(Aguilera et al., 2007; Bansal, 2005). Managing CSR conformity is therefore of strategic 
importance of MNEs. 
In order to explain heterogeneity in the implementation of practices such as CSR by 
MNEs’ subsidiaries, international business scholars have looked at the influence of their 
external environment through an institutional lens (Björkman, Fey & Park, 2007; Kostova & 
Roth, 2002; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Delmas & Toffel, 2010) and a focus on local 
competitors (Burns & Wholey, 1993; Davis & Greve, 1997; Salomon & Wu, 2012). For 
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instance, Kostova and Roth (2002) point to the influence of institutional profiles of host 
countries in the implementation of quality management in MNEs. Delmas and Toffel (2008) 
also show that pressures from external constituents influence the adoption of ISO14001 and 
voluntary environmental programs by MNEs’ facilities. Thus, varying local demands generate 
some heterogeneity in the way subsidiaries implement CSR practices. However, these local 
differences might be overruled by intra-organizational dynamics as MNEs’ internal field is a 
major source of influences (Kostova, Roth & Dacin, 2008) but still quite understudied 
(Garcia-Pont, Canales & Noboa, 2009). 
More specifically, we wish to explain subsidiaries’ conformity to corporate policies 
such as CSR. We define a subsidiary’s conformity as the extent to which it increases its level 
of implementation of practices that are consistent with the corporate policy. A policy is a set 
of objectives defined by the headquarters for the corporation as a whole. Some policies might 
only state qualitative objectives and suggesting some actions to be undertaken but remain 
quite ambiguous, while others will set precise quantitative goals for each subsidiary, design a 
concrete action plan and formalize a procedure, in which case they are far less ambiguous. 
While we believe the model we propose can apply to the implementation of corporate 
policies more broadly, we also contend that CSR is a striking example because conformity 
relative to CSR is often questioned. Indeed, to respond to rising demands related to CSR, 
specific communication develops (Philippe & Durand, 2011), but the prevalence of such 
discourse and symbols which can be observed in the CSR context, is not necessarily reflected 
in the organization’s actual practices, which may be decoupled from its policies (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977). The existence of a CSR governance structure or a CSR action plan does not 
guarantee the actual implementation of CSR practices across all an MNE’s subsidiaries or the 
improvement of its corporate social performance. The nature of CSR is also complex in that it 
has no single definition that is applicable to all industrial, national, social or environmental 
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contexts, so there is room for organizations to interpret the norm. While global policies may 
set objectives in MNEs, they still have to be translated into concrete practices in their 
subsidiaries. CSR includes a very wide set of issues that need to be prioritized, and that 
sometimes conflict with each other - and the outcomes of practice implementation in terms of 
economic and social gains (Kennedy & Fiss, 2009) can prove uncertain. The extent of 
formalization of CSR policies can also vary tremendously from one issue to the next within 
the same organization, so that CSR policies might be more or less ambiguous. As a result, 
subsidiaries understand and interpret CSR policies and objectives differently (Crilly, Zollo & 
Hansen, 2012 ; Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006), and also differ in how they translate them into 
practice, generating a “emergent” type of policy-practice decoupling (Crilly et al., 
2012:1441). At the same time, MNEs seek to achieve a certain level of standardization of 
their CSR practices to respond to global demands in a consistent manner (Christmann, 2004) 
and limit such decoupling as it represents a reputational threat (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; 
MacLean & Behnam, 2010). It is therefore crucial to understand the antecedents of subsidiary 
conformity to the corporate CSR policy. Controlling for external influences, what are the 
intra-organizational mechanisms that foster subsidiary conformity within an MNE?  
To address this question, we propose a model of subsidiary conformity that integrates 
two different views in the management literature: the notion of compliance put forward by 
international management scholars (Kim & Mauborgne, 1993; Kostova & Roth, 2002) and the 
notion of conformity developed by neo-institutional scholars (Durand & Jourdan, 2012; 
Hewlin, 2003; Philippe & Durand, 2011; Raffaelli & Glynn, 2014). We believe neither of 
these allows for a comprehensive depiction of the mechanisms at play in subsidiary 
conformity. On the one hand, international management studies stress the tensions between 
the pressures from the headquarters and the pressures from the subsidiaries’ local constituents 
(Hillman & Wan, 2005; Kostova & Roth, 2002). But they do not sufficiently consider the role 
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that peer subsidiaries play in conformity to corporate policies. On the other hand, works on 
conformity define it as a homogeneous organizational level concept (e.g. Durand & Jourdan, 
2012; Joseph, Ocasio & McDonnell, 2014; Kremp & Durand, 2015; Philippe & Durand, 
2011) and their arguments need to be adapted to the complex context of MNEs. Bringing 
together these two sets of arguments, we hypothesize that headquarters’ pressure and 
implementation by peers will increase a subsidiary’s level of conformity. But we further 
propose that subsidiaries are not just recipients of pressures from the headquarters and 
imitators of their peers, as their internalization of the policy also plays a central role in their 
conformity. We define policy internalization as that state in which managers see the policy as 
appropriate for their subsidiary given its consistency with the subsidiary’s shared values and 
are committed to it (e.g. Björkman, Ehrnrooth, Smale & John, 2011; Kostova & Roth, 2002). 
The extent to which the subsidiaries perceive the policy as being consistent with their values 
has significant influence on whether they adopt the corresponding practices (Ansari, Fiss & 
Zajac, 2010; Klein & Sorra, 1996) and it not only increases conformity but also influences the 
role of the headquarters and peers. Indeed, we expect that internalization reduces the influence 
of headquarters since enforcement become less needed when the policy is perceived as highly 
consistent with the subsidiary’s values. And we also propose that internalization will limit the 
influence of peers as the ambiguity reducing role of peer conformity matters less when the 
policy is highly internalized. This approach at the intra-organizational level allows us to 
design a model of conformity with three mechanisms: headquarters’ pressure, implementation 
by peers and policy internalization. 
For example, following the accident in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, British Petroleum 
(BP) launched in 2011 a corporate program to improve safety and risk-management in all its 
facilities. BP’s subsidiaries started implementing the program, some sooner than others, in 
order to comply with the policy designed by the headquarters. Next to this top-down pressure 
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from BP’s headquarters, subsidiaries also implemented the program because other BP 
subsidiaries similar to themselves –their peers- had already done so, in a cascading way. But 
the importance of this dual influence from BP’s headquarters and other subsidiaries actually 
depended on the focal subsidiary’s perception about the program: if it was perceived as 
consistent with the subsidiary’s values, then BP’s headquarters and peers were less 
instrumental in the implementation process. 
We test our predictions in a diversified MNE thanks to two surveys covering the same 
99 subsidiaries and distanced by a year as well as archival data gathered at the MNE’s 
headquarters. The results of our regression models show strong support for our hypotheses 
and hold across a series of robustness tests. Additionally, testing our hypotheses for three 
different CSR issues – occupational health and safety, the employment of female managers 
and environmental biodiversity- allows us to observe that the influence of internalization 
relative to headquarters and peers depends on the CSR issue considered. 
Thus, we contribute to management theory in three ways: to neo-institutional theory 
by proposing a model of subsidiary conformity that depends on the headquarters’ pressure as 
well as the implementation of conform practices by intra-organizational peers and suggesting 
that the strength of headquarters’ and peers’ influences varies according to the subsidiary’s 
internalization of the policy; to research on subsidiaries’ strategies by showing that the 
subsidiaries’ internalization of the policy influences their conformity both directly, and 
through a reduction of headquarters’ and peers’ influence; and to the CSR literature by 
advancing the articulation of motives for CSR implementation (Aguilera, Rupp, Williams & 
Ganapathi, 2007; Bansal & Roth, 2000) in the MNE context, and stressing the need to 
acknowledge the heterogeneity of CSR issues. 
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Theory and hypotheses 
Conformity has been used to describe the general alignment of an organization’s 
practices with the prescriptions of a norm or a logic (Durand & Jourdan, 2012; Joseph et al., 
2014; Love & Kraatz, 2009; Philippe & Durand, 2011; Thornton, 2002; Weaver, Trevino & 
Cochran, 1999) and the extent to which its behavior resembles the standard behavior adopted 
by its industry peers in a mimetic way (Deephouse, 1996; Durand & Kremp, 2015; Raffaelli 
& Glynn, 2014), echoing the notion of isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Here, we 
draw more from the first and more general definition, as we contend that peers’ behavior is 
one of its drivers, but not the only one and that conformity can be a strategic behavior (e.g. 
Durand & Jourdan, 2012; Philippe & Durand, 2011). More specifically, we call subsidiary 
conformity the extent to which the subsidiary increases its level of implementation of 
practices that are consistent with the corporate policy. The corporate policy acts as an intra-
organizational norm to which the subsidiaries conform to a varying degree. And there are 
strong pressures for subsidiary conformity that emanate from the MNE’s headquarters. 
Intra-organizational influences on a subsidiary’s conformity 
Because of MNEs’ ownership structure, headquarters are bond to have a say in the 
subsidiaries’ strategic decisions, in particular when it comes to implementing corporate 
policies. Headquarter-subsidiaries relationships have therefore long been a central focus of 
international management research (Hoenen & Kostova, 2014; Noriah & Ghoshal, 1994; 
Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1994; Kim & Mauborgne, 1993) describing how MNE’s headquarters can 
enforce or influence the adoption of the policies that were defined at the corporate level and 
the implementation of practices in the MNE’s subsidiaries. Following Ambos, Andersson and 
Birkinshaw (2010:1101), headquarters simultaneously play “a ‘‘monitoring’’ role that is 
concerned with ensuring that the subsidiary remains compliant with corporate directives, and 
[…] an ‘‘attention-providing’’ role […] that helps to build up the visibility of the subsidiary 
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within the corporate network”. In other words, headquarters influence the implementation of 
practices in their subsidiaries both directly, through communication, monitoring, control and 
incentives and indirectly through the distribution of their attention. 
Many international strategy scholars put forward the importance of control, incentives, 
and information processing in the implementation of the policy designed by an MNE’s 
headquarters in its subsidiaries. Formal enforcement processes are a key means to ensure 
internal compliance (e.g.: Burgelman, 1991; Egelhoff, 1982; Hedlund, 1986; Ouchi, 1978; 
Ouchi & Maguire, 1975) and to ascertain that the subsidiaries endorse the “role” or “charter” 
they were assigned by the headquarters (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1986; Galunic & Eisenhardt, 
2001; Ghoshal & Nohria, 1993). Planning, control and rewards as well as the communication 
structure or the distribution of resources are perceived as key drivers for the subisidiaries’ 
managers’ “attention” (Ocasio, 1997; Ocasio and Joseph, 2005) and implementation 
decisions. 
Overall, the headquarters typically set CSR objectives and demand results to their 
subsidiaries. As subsidiaries seek internal legitimacy and are under scrutiny, they will 
implement practices in response to pressures and demands from the MNE’s headquarters 
(Hillman & Wan, 2005; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999)
14
 through a 
compliance mechanism (Kim & Mauborgne, 1993). Thus, consistent with prior work in 
international management, our first baseline hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1. The greater the headquarters’ pressure for performance improvement 
on a given CSR issue, the higher the subsidiary’s conformity regarding that issue. 
 
Next to the pressure from the MNE’s headquarters, a subsidiary’s conformity also 
                                                          
14
 These articles refer to local external pressures as well, as they study “institutional duality”. Here, again, we 
chose to focus on the intra-organizational field and to control for external pressures. 
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depends on the behavior of its peers. Observing practices implemented by peers and imitating 
them is a way for the MNE’s subsidiaries to tackle the uncertainty about the policy’s value 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Fligstein, 1985; Greve, 2008; Lieberman & Asaba, 2006; Rao, 
Greve & Davis, 2001). Rao et al. (2001) argue that peers’ behaviors constitute a social proof 
that allows organizations to infer the value of certain actions - according to them, “Social 
proof is most influential when decision makers are uncertain about the value of a course of 
action and when they are able to observe the actions of similar others” (Rao et al., 2001: 504), 
and it is responsible for cascading adoption by closely related decision-makers. In an MNE 
context, the reference group (when it comes to conformity to the corporate policy) is 
comprised of internal peers, i.e. other Group subsidiaries. Each subsidiary observes the 
behavior of other units so as to reduce any uncertainties it may have about the CSR policy’s 
value (Bansal & Roth, 2000; Gardberg & Fombrun, 2006). The fact that other Group units 
implemented the policy provides a proof of its value and points to concrete corresponding 
practices. Therefore, as subsidiaries tend to imitate their peers, our second baseline hypothesis 
is: 
Hypothesis 2. The more its internal peers implement practices related to a CSR 
issue, the higher the subsidiary’s conformity regarding that issue. 
Policy internalization as central to conformity 
Looking at the pressures subsidiaries undergo within the MNE does not allow a 
complete understanding of the processes at play in subsidiaries’ conformity. Indeed, MNEs’ 
subsidiaries are neither passive recipients of pressures for conformity from the headquarters, 
nor blind imitators of their peers. We need to consider how the policy is perceived in the 
subsidiaries, and in particular how it is internalized. In the intra-MNE context, we define 
policy internalization as that mechanism through which the subsidiaries get committed to it 
(Björkman, Ehrnrooth, Smale & John, 2011; Kostova & Roth, 2002). Internalization of the 
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policy by organizational members results in intra-organizational consensus about the policy 
(Crilly et al., 2012) and conformity (Sauder & Espeland, 2009). By internalizing the policy, 
subsidiaries become committed to it and more willing to actually implement corresponding 
practices (Björkman et al., 2011; Kostova & Roth, 2002).  
A key condition for the internalization of a policy is its consistency with the 
subsidiaries’ own values (Mowday, Steers & Porter, 1979; Kostova & Roth, 2002). The 
values of a subsidiary correspond to shared norms and beliefs of what is appropriate for the 
subsidiary. “They provide the decision rules for interpreting the complex and numerous 
signals within the organizational environment” (Bansal, 2005:517), so that value consistency 
affects the subsidiaries’ ability to implement practices (Choi & Price, 2005; Klein & Sorra, 
1996). Thus, Ansari, Fiss & Zajac propose that “cultural fit” - which they define as the 
“degree to which the characteristics of a diffusing practice are compatible with the cultural 
values, beliefs, and practices of potential adopters” (2010: 78) - influences the diffusion of 
practices. In his study of a post-Communist government agency, Tilcsik (2011) also stresses 
the importance of beliefs and values for conformity, looking at the impact of the ideological 
shift from the ‘Old Guard’ to the ‘Reformers’ on the implementation of financing practices. 
The new employees –the ‘Reformers’- “saw algorithmic budgeting as a useful tool and were 
committed to putting it into practice” (2010:1484) - they “believed” in the system. A CSR 
issue that is consistent with a subsidiary’s values is perceived as strategic by the subsidiaries’ 
managers so that the subsidiary implements practices to tackle the issue at stake (Bansal, 
2003). 
Thus, internally shared representations, beliefs and values affect the extent of 
conformity via an internalization mechanism, so we can posit: 
Hypothesis 3. The more a subsidiary internalizes a CSR policy, the more it conforms 
to it. 
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But the policy internalization also interacts with the compliance process. We proposed 
that subsidiaries complied with internal policies because they sought internal legitimacy and 
were under scrutiny from the headquarters. Thus, subsidiaries implement practices that are 
legitimate in the eyes of the headquarters, given the corporate policy. However, when a 
subsidiary highly internalizes the CSR policy, it needs this external legitimization less as it is 
already convinced of the value of implementing the policy. In addition, scrutiny by the 
headquarters is more instrumental in subsidiaries’ implementation of practices when the 
subsidiaries are not committed to the policy. Overall, we expect that internalization substitutes 
for the compliance motivation and we hypothesize the following negative moderation: 
Hypothesis 4. The effect of headquarters’ pressure on a subsidiary’s conformity 
regarding a CSR issue is negatively moderated by the subsidiary’s internalization of 
the CSR policy. 
Consistent with prior literature, we argued that subsidiaries imitated their peers as a 
way to fight the ambiguity of the CSR policy. However, part of the uncertainty about the 
policy that needs to be resolved stems from its lack of alignment with the subsidiary’s values. 
The greater the mismatch a subsidiary perceives between the policy and its own values, the 
more it will tend to look to its peers to gain greater assurances about the importance of 
implementing the policy and identify readily available practices that were already 
implemented elsewhere. Conversely, if the policy is perceived as consistent with the 
subsidiary’s values, part of the uncertainty about the value of implementing it is assuaged 
(Rao et al., 2001) and subsidiaries in which the internalization of the policy is greater have a 
better sense of what practices should be implemented in their case, and to what extent. For 
those subsidiaries, imitating peers is less necessary. Hence, when consistency between the 
policy and the subsidiaries’ values is high, the influence of peers is reduced and we can 
expect a negative moderation effect: 
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Hypothesis 5. The effect of peers’ implementation of practices on a subsidiary’s 
conformity regarding a CSR issue is negatively moderated by the subsidiary’s 
internalization of the CSR policy. 
Figure 5 below summarizes our hypotheses. 
Figure 5 : Essay 2 - A model of subsidiary conformity 
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Methods 
Sample 
Our field of inquiry is an MNE headquartered in France that operates in 70 countries 
worldwide in the gas and electricity production and supply industries, as well as in 
infrastructure development and energy and environmental services. It is a leader in its 
industries, listed on the French stock exchange without interruption since 2005, and generated 
a turnover of Billion Euros 80 in 2013. In 2011 the MNE defined and announced ten group-
wide quantitative and qualitative CSR objectives covering human resources (employee 
diversity, training and shareholding), safety management, and the environment (biodiversity 
and renewable energy). Internal communication on those objectives was release through 
2011-2012, so that we picked 2012-2013 as our observation period. To test our hypotheses, 
we focused on the objectives related to the proportion of female managers, occupational 
health and safety and biodiversity, issues which are of particular interest because 1) they are 
meaningful for all the Group’s facilities, regardless of the industries they operate in, 2) its 
operating units can easily translate them into concrete actions, and 3) they are linked to three 
different CSR domains: social, safety management and environmental issues. These 
objectives are clearly stated in the Group CSR policy, and communicated to all its business 
units, via their activity branches. The three issues are currently at different institutionalization 
stages (Tolbert & Zucker, 1996) at the corporate level. However¸ this does not mean that 
subsidiaries did not implement practices related to less institutionalized issues on their own 
initiative, so we can expect to observe considerable variance in conformity levels across 
issues, and across subsidiaries. In this MNE, given its industries, safety has been a central 
concern for decades, so that it is a mature CSR issue, with action plans, procedures, rules and 
monthly performance measures. By contrast, the group policies regarding the employment of 
female managers and environmental biodiversity can be considered as more ambiguous as 
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they do not include a formalization of the practices to be implemented and local norms might 
vary on those two issues. In addition, in the case of environmental biodiversity, the set 
objectives are more qualitative.
15
 
We conducted two on-line surveys in October 2012 and October 2013 at 104 of the 
MNE’s units which were randomly selected from a full list of the Group’s subsidiaries via 
systematic cluster sampling. The questionnaires were sent to a total of 475 respondents, up to 
six managers with functional responsibilities at each unit (i.e. general directors, finance 
directors, operating directors, human resource managers, communication directors and sales 
directors).  
The surveys’ content was validated via 10 interviews with experts from the Group’s 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) department, and pre-tested in two subsidiaries during 
June - July 2012. An exhaustive list of practices corresponding to the three issues was 
developed and improved during meetings with Group experts. The modifications that 
followed the pretest were mostly clarifications and a slight reduction of the length of the 
questionnaire. The respondents were invited to comment on their responses on each of the 
three issues, so they could mention other actions they implemented, but while a few 
commented on their subsidiary’s overall performance, none reported on any additional actions 
undertaken. The survey was available in four languages: English, French, Spanish and 
Portuguese. 
After several reminders we received complete answers to the 2012 survey from 314 
respondents in 101 subsidiaries, a 66% response rate, and 270 complete answers from 100 
subsidiaries to the 2013 survey, a 57% response rate. In all, we received answers to both 
                                                          
15
 We asked respondents whether they thought identifying and implementing practices related to the three issues 
was difficult. The answers to these questionnaire items are very much consistent with our understanding of the 
policies’ maturity level: on average, respondents disagreed with the statement that identifying safety practices 
was difficult and were neutral for the other two issues –which means many respondents actually agreed. 
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surveys from 99 of the 104 subsidiaries, so that our final sample comprises those 99 
subsidiaries, whose 100,300 employees represent 46% of the Group’s workforce. These 
subsidiaries are located in 34 countries worldwide (55 operating in 12 European countries, 9 
in 7 Asian countries, 12 in 6 South American countries, 7 in 4 Middle East countries and 
Morocco, 9 in 3 North American countries and 7 in Australia). We checked whether non-
respondents to the two surveys had different functional responsibilities from respondents, as 
that could have biased our results, but found the distributions of respondents and non-
respondents were fairly similar across functions. In the 2012 survey, CEOs and HR managers 
tended to respond rather more than the average (71% response rate for both categories), and 
marketing and sales managers slightly less (63% response rate). In contrast, communication 
and HR managers tended to respond rather more than average to the 2013 survey (64% and 
62% response rates respectively), and CEOs and COOs slightly less (44% and 48% 
respectively). 
In order to limit common method variance, given that part of the dependent variable 
and two independent variables were collected via the 2012 survey, we split our sample into 
two groups of respondents per unit, using one to generate the dependent variable and the other 
to generate the independent variables. When available in 2012 and 2013, responses from 
human resources and operations managers - who are more aware of subsidiaries’ practices - 
were used to generate the dependent variable, and those from the other respondents were used 
for the independent variables and the controls based on the questionnaire
16
. In the cases of 17 
units, only one manager responded in 2012, so that we had to use her answers to generate the 
independent variables as well as the 2012 component of the dependent variable. For these 17 
                                                          
16
 113 respondents only answered the 2012 survey so that their responses were used for the independent 
variables and 82 respondents answered only the 2013 survey so that their responses were used for the dependent 
variables. Whenever there was a limited number of respondents who answered both rounds (1 or 2), their 
responses were used in priority for the dependent variable. For 17 entities, there was only one respondent in 
2012 whose answers were used to generate both the 2012 component of the dependent variable and the 
independent variables. 
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cases, there is a potential issue of common method variance, but we tried to minimize this 
problem in our instrument design. First, we guaranteed the anonymity and confidentiality of 
the study to our multiple respondents, and encouraged them to provide genuine answers and 
to comment on them. Second, we constructed the survey in a way that minimized common 
method bias: items related to the implementation of the practices appeared before those 
related to the independent variables, items for each question were randomized, and the survey 
was very long and complex, with many questions separating those relating to the two sets of 
variables, making implicit theorizing unlikely. In particular, as the dependent variable was 
calculated using data from two different surveys, we believe implicit theorizing matching our 
hypotheses was impossible. The format of the scales also differed (for instance, there was a 
neutral point at 3 for the implementation level, but at 4 for value consistency and perceived 
beneficial outcomes). Third, we ensured maximum data validity, by using multiple 
respondents with good inter-respondent agreement (e.g. 0.87 for the 2012 implementation 
level and 0.88 for the 2013 one), and thanks to the fact that the questions about the 
implementation of practices were quite objective, and followed an objective performance item 
related to the CSR issue in the questionnaire. Fourth, to further confirm the low probability of 
common method bias, we performed two Harman’s one factor tests that confirmed that (1) 
conformity and peers’ influence loaded onto two factors and (2) conformity and value 
consistency loaded onto two factors. 
Measures and Model 
Dependent variable. The dependent variable, subsidiary conformity was proxied by 
the standardized increase in the implementation of 25 practices related to safety management, 
the employment of female managers and environmental biodiversity over our observation 
period, i.e. between 2012 and 2013 in each MNE subsidiary. Thus, for the practice iЄ[1;25] in 
subsidiary jЄ[1;99] that had k respondents, 
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Conformityi,j = Implementation 2013i,j – implementation 2012i,j 
where the implementation components (implementation2012 i,j and implementation2013i,j) 
were captured through measures in the 2012 and 2013 surveys. Among the 25 practices listed 
in cooperation with experts in the MNE, 8 related to occupational health and safety 
management, 8 to the employment of female managers and 9 to environmental biodiversity. 
Respondents were asked to assess the level of their unit’s implementation of each practice on 
a 7-point Likert scale ranging from “0: not at all” to “7: to a very great extent”. (The list of 25 
practices is presented in appendix A.) 
For a subsidiary j with k respondents, the unique yearly implementation level was 
generated for each practice by averaging the responses to the corresponding questionnaire 
item
17
: 
Implementation 2012i,j= 1/k *       implementation2012i,j,k 
Implementation 2013i,j= 1/k *      implementation2013i,j,k 
 (Alternative operationalizations of conformity are presented in the robustness tests section of 
this paper.) 
Given our dependent variable is survey-based,  it could suffer from social desirability. 
However, this risk of social desirability affecting conformity is actually very low since its 
operationalization as the difference between the 2013 and 2012 reported implementations by 
the same respondents would cancel potential biases. Indeed, the respondents would increase 
their subsidiary’s level of practices’ implementation in their answers in both surveys so as to 
appear as conform as possible. In addition, we limited the risk of social desirability by 
ensuring the anonymity of the surveys, including objective performance measures
18
 before 
                                                          
17
 The average inter-respondent agreement was 0.87 for the 2012 survey and 0.88 for the 2013 survey. 
18
 For safety practices: frequency and severity rates of work accidents; for the employment of female managers: 
percentage of women in managerial positions. 
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asking about the practices’ implementation, allowing respondents to comment on their 
answers and report their level of confidence. As a result, the respondents gave answers that 
ranged from 0 to 6 and 90% of the both the 2012 and the 2013 questionnaires included some 
low implementation scores (0, 1 or 2 on a scale of 6), so social desirability seems limited. 
Independent variables. To test Hypothesis 1, we derived the variable headquarters’ 
pressure from 6 items in our 2012 survey, 2 per CSR issue. Respondents had to grade the 
influence of the corporate and branch headquarters had regarding each CSR issue on a 7-point 
Linkert scale ranging from “0: No influence” to “6: Very strong influence”. We are confident 
that the two items per CSR issue (branch and corporate headquarters) reflect the same 
construct as the Chronbach Alpha equals 0.94. So, for each CSR issue, we average all the 
responses from each subsidiary to obtain our variable at the subsidiary level. 
To model the implementation by peers’ influence in Hypothesis 2, we used for each of 
the 25 practices the average level of implementation by the subsidiary’s peers during 2012. 
Subsidiaries were considered as peers if they belonged to the same operating branch of the 
MNE
19
 as the focal subsidiary (See appendix A for the detail of the practices).  
Finally, to test Hypothesis 3, we generated perceived value consistency based on 6 
items in the 2012 survey
20
 . - 2 for each of the three CSR issues covered by our study: safety 
management, the employment of female managers and environmental biodiversity. A 
principal component analysis allowed us to confirm that the 2 reflective items for each of 
these three issues loaded onto one factor, and to generate a value for perceived value 
                                                          
19
 The Group is composed of 6 operating ‘branches’ which all relate to one of the Group’s core businesses 
(Environmental Services, Gas, Energy, etc). 
20
 The items used here, adapted from Choi and Price (2005), were ‘Employing female managers is congruent 
with the values of our subsidiary’, ‘By employing female managers, we do what our subsidiary believes 
important.’, ‘Biodiversity preservation is congruent with the values of our subsidiary’, ‘By preserving 
biodiversity, we do what our subsidiary believes important’, ‘Health and safety management is congruent with 
the values of our subsidiary’ and ‘By preserving health and safety, we do what our subsidiary believes 
important’. The respondents were asked to answer on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1: ‘Strongly disagree’ 
to ‘7: Strongly agree’, with 4 being ‘Neutral’. 
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consistency at the respondent level. To generate a unique value per issue at the subsidiary 
level, we then averaged the values obtained for all the respondents from that unit.  
We standardized the three independent variables, as suited to study interactions. 
Controls. We controlled for the subsidiary’s level of prior implementation, to be able 
to neutralize the initial level of implementation, which is independent from the policy, so that 
our models really explain conformity following the formalization of the policy. We generated 
this variable in the same way as the dependent variable, but using the 2012 answers of 
different respondents- the ones selected for the independent variables. 
The national legal context was proxied via data on national legislation related to the 
three focal CSR issues. For safety management, we used the number of laws related to health 
and safety in the focal country in 2012, provided by the International Labor Organization. For 
gender diversity, we used the number of the country’s laws related to non-discrimination in 
2012, again provided by the International Labor Organization. For biodiversity, we are not 
aware of any database listing laws related to biodiversity worldwide, and even at the national 
level most countries do not communicate this information. So we used the national 
percentages of terrestrial and marine areas that were protected in 2010, as provided by the 
Worldbank. Since each country defines and declares these protection areas, they can be 
considered to reflect the importance the government attaches to biodiversity. By combining 
the three sources, we obtained a unique measure for each issue*country. Given the diverse 
ranges of values for the three issues, we standardized the variable per issue to obtain the 
national legal context variable.21 
We controlled for external peers’ pressures based on competitors’ rating is Thompson 
Reuters ASSET4, the world’s largest Environmental, Social & Governance rating database 
                                                          
21
 We chose to create this specific variable rather than rely on existing general CSR or governance indexes as it 
allows us to focus specifically on the legislation relative to the three CSR issues we are observing, and to include 
the 34 countries covered by our sample. 
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(Chatterji, Durand, Levine & Touboul, 2015; Cheng, Ioannou & Serafeim, 2014). More 
specifically, we use the rankings of the 125 companies in the same industries as our MNE
22
, 
and calculated based on their scores on various items reflecting the 3 CSR issues (see 
appendix B for the full list of items) and the relative size of their subsidiaries, a weighted 
average performance for each country in which the MNE has subsidiaries. 
We also controlled for the headquarters’ overall structural influence in terms of the 
closeness of its relationships with its subsidiaries, beyond CSR issues. We expect that close 
relationships between headquarters and subsidiaries can increase conformity, so that more 
autonomous subsidiaries, those whose levels of integration in the Group are lower, and/or 
have only more recently been part of the Group will tend display less conformity than those 
which are less autonomous, more integrated and share a longer history in the Group. The level 
of a subsidiary’s autonomy was captured through a question in the survey addressed to unit 
managers, adapted from Bouquet and Birkinshaw’s (2008) work
23
. In terms of integration, 
ownership represents the degree of the Group’s control over the subsidiary, and takes the 
value of 1 when the percentage of ownership of the MNE over the focal unit is less than 50% 
(minority), 2 when it’s between 50% and 99% (majority) and 3 when it’s over 99% (full 
control). And history corresponds to the time the subsidiary had been part of the Group by 
2012, and takes the value of 1 for less than 10 years, 2 for less than 20 years, and 3 otherwise. 
As bigger organizations have been shown to adopt practices more quickly (e.g. Burns 
                                                          
22
 Companies sorted as ‘utilities’ in gas, electricity, water or ’multiline’ or as ‘industrial services’ in waste, 
water, environment or energy that employed more than 1,000 people. 
23
 The question was: ‘In the following propositions, please select the answers that best describe the decision-
making process in your subsidiary’, on five items: ‘To discontinue a major existing product/service or 
product/service line’, ‘To invest in major plant or equipment to expand production capacity’, ‘To formulate and 
approve your entity's annual budgets’, ‘To increase (beyond budget) expenditures for research and 
development’, ‘To subcontract out large portions of the production’. The respondents chose from 5 potential 
answers: ‘the entity's opinion is not asked; decision is explained to the entity by the Branch’, ‘proposal by the 
Branch, but the entity's opinion carries little weight’, ‘proposal by the Branch, and the entity's opinion carries a 
lot of weight’, ‘proposal by the entity, decision made by the Branch’, and ‘decision made by the entity without 
much consultation with the Branch’. (α = 0.74). The final variable is the average of the 5 scores. 
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& Wholey, 1993), we expect that bigger subsidiaries will display higher levels of conformity. 
Therefore, we controlled for subsidiary size, i.e. its number of employees as of 30.09.12: we 
logged this variable as there was considerable disparity between unit sizes. 
Finally, for the model including all practices, safety and biodiversity practices were 
two binary variables that took the value of 1 when the issue was safety or biodiversity 
respectively, and zero otherwise. We introduced these controls given that we expect the levels 
of conformity of the practices to differ across the three issues. 
Models. We tested the relationships hypothesized using OLS regression models with 
standard errors clustered by practices, given the nature of the dependent variable and the 
shape of its distribution
24
. We ran models including all our observations, and models by issue 
that allow us to distinguish between different levels of policy ambiguity. The variables 
reflecting implementation by peers, value consistency and headquarters’ pressure were 
standardized for each sample (the whole sample and the three samples corresponding to each 
issue) before running the corresponding models as is recommended when variables are 
interacted. 
 
Results 
Table 4 shows acceptable levels of correlations. The rather high level of correlation 
between value consistency and implementation by peers (0.61) can be mostly explained by 
their correlation with safety, respectively 0.86 and 0.68. Indeed, for safety practices, both 
variables tend to be higher than for practices related to women in management or 
environmental biodiversity. Given the maturity of the health and safety issue in the Group, 
this is not surprising. However, the variance inflation factors (VIF) are all below 5, as shown 
                                                          
24
 A QQ plot test supported the normality of subsidiary conformity. 
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in Table 5, so the analysis of the interaction between value consistency and implementation 
by peers is still informative. 
  
103 
 
Table 4: Essay 2 - Descriptive statistics and correlations – all observations 
 
  
   Variable Mean S.d. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Subsidiary conformity 0 1 -4,13 4,19 1 
          
  
2 HQs' pressure 0 1 -1,95 1,98 0,03 1 
         
  
3 Implementation by peers 0 1 -2,85 1,63 0,03 0,31 1 
        
  
4 Value consistency 0 1 -3,87 1,42 0,02 0,39 0,61 1 
       
  
5 Prior implementation 4,92 1,89 1 7 -0,31 0,24 0,64 0,43 1 
      
  
6 External peers' pressure 0,73 0,18 0 1 0,08 -0,06 0,13 0,04 0,07 1 
     
  
7 Local legislation 0,45 0,28 0 1 0,00 0,07 0,24 0,26 0,15 0,18 1 
    
  
8 Autonomy 4,36 0,60 2 6 0,01 -0,08 -0,03 -0,09 -0,11 0,02 -0,07 1 
   
  
9 Size 73,71 28,72 0 100 -0,02 -0,09 -0,07 0,00 -0,06 0,10 0,08 0,14 1 
  
  
10 Ownership 12,53 13,74 0 107 0,06 -0,07 -0,02 -0,03 -0,04 0,10 0,13 -0,20 0,05 1 
 
  
11 History 5,66 1,56 3,00 9,64 0,04 -0,03 -0,06 -0,04 0,01 0,08 0,04 -0,08 0,03 0,40 1   
12 Biodiversity 0,36 0,48 0 1 -0,01 -0,07 -0,46 -0,66 -0,32 -0,02 -0,17 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1  
13 Safety 0,32 0,47 0 1 0,00 0,30 0,86 0,68 0,61 0,16 0,28 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 -0,51 1 
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Table 5: Essay 2 - Variance inflation factors – all observations 
Variable  VIF  
Safety  4.92 
Implementation by peers  4.44 
Value consistency 2.94 
Biodiversity 1.99 
Prior implementation  1.76 
HQs' pressure 1.33 
History 1.27 
Size 1.21 
Local legislation  1.15 
Autonomy  1.12 
External peers' pressure  1.09 
Integration 1.06 
Mean VIF  2.02 
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Table 6: Essay 2 - Linear regressions estimating the effect of headquarters’ pressure, peers and value consistency on subsidiary 
conformity
a
 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
HQ’s pressure 
  
0.07*** (0.016) 
    
0.05** (0.019) 0.06*** (0.017) 
  
0.05*** (0.017) 
Implementation by peers 
    
0.37*** (0.037) 
  
0.36*** (0.037) 
  
0.35*** (0.039) 0.34*** (0.040) 
Value consistency 
      
0.08** (0.030) 0.04 (0.035) 0.03 (0.035) 0.06* (0.031) 0.03 (0.035) 
Value consistency* HQ’s 
pressure 
          
-0.05*** (0.013) 
  
-0.03* (0.014) 
Value consistency* 
Implementation by peers 
            
-0.04* (0.023) -0.03 (0.025) 
Prior implementation -0.27*** (0.023) -0.27*** (0.023) -0.30*** (0.015) -0.27*** (0.023) -0.30*** (0.015) -0.27*** (0.023) -0.30*** (0.015) -0.30*** (0.015) 
Pressure from external peers 0.44*** (0.140) 0.48*** (0.146) 0.42*** (0.144) 0.46*** (0.141) 0.46*** (0.147) 0.48*** (0.146) 0.43*** (0.145) 0.45*** (0.148) 
National legislation -0.11 (0.077) -0.11 (0.078) -0.11 (0.082) -0.13 (0.077) -0.12 (0.081) -0.10 (0.075) -0.12 (0.079) -0.11 (0.079) 
Autonomy -0.06** (0.027) -0.05* (0.027) -0.06** (0.026) -0.05* (0.027) -0.05* (0.026) -0.04 (0.027) -0.05* (0.026) -0.04 (0.026) 
Ownership -0.00* (0.001) -0.00 (0.001) -0.00 (0.001) -0.00* (0.001) -0.00 (0.001) -0.00* (0.001) -0.00 (0.001) -0.00 (0.001) 
History 0.00 (0.001) 0.00 (0.001) 0.00 (0.001) 0.00 (0.001) 0.00 (0.001) 0.00 (0.001) 0.00 (0.001) 0.00 (0.001) 
Size 0.02* (0.012) 0.02* (0.012) 0.04*** (0.012) 0.02* (0.012) 0.04*** (0.012) 0.02* (0.012) 0.04*** (0.012) 0.04*** (0.012) 
Biodiversity -0.05 (0.101) -0.07 (0.101) -0.04 (0.054) 0.01 (0.111) -0.02 (0.068) -0.03 (0.113) 0.03 (0.065) -0.01 (0.070) 
Safety 0.61*** (0.104) 0.56*** (0.100) 0.02 (0.071) 0.53*** (0.103) -0.04 (0.071) 0.54*** (0.102) 0.05 (0.096) 0.04 (0.096) 
Constant 1.13*** (0.261) 1.08*** (0.262) 1.36*** (0.210) 1.06*** (0.265) 1.28*** (0.214) 1.04*** (0.265) 1.26*** (0.211) 1.26*** (0.211) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.164 0.168 0.194 0.166 0.197 0.170 0.196 0.198 
a
 Robust standard errors are in parentheses; n = 2,475 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
106 
 
General models 
Table 6 shows the regression models for all observations, clustered by practices as we 
expect each practice to display a specific implementation and conformity pattern. However, 
again, we added dummy variables to control for the CSR issue as we expect conformity to be 
higher for health and safety practices. We further explore subsidiary conformity on each issue 
separately in the next section.  
In model 1, several of our controls appear to have a significant effect on subsidiary 
conformity. First, as expected, the prior implementation of the practices has a positive and 
significant effect on conformity. Second, the performance of local peers has a positive and 
significant influence on subsidiary conformity, supporting the influence of the local 
environment on a subsidiary’s behavior. Third, the structural influence of the headquarters 
beyond CSR seems limited. In fact, on the one hand, the survey reports autonomy as negative 
and significant; but on the other hand, the coefficient of level of ownership of subsidiaries by 
the group is negative and significant, and history has no significant impact on levels of 
conformity. Forth, conformity tends to be higher in bigger subsidiaries, as shown by the 
positive and significant impact of subsidiary size, but the national legal context is found to 
have no effect on conformity. Finally, conformity is higher for safety practices than other 
practices, but there is no significant difference between conformity levels for practices related 
to women in management and to environmental biodiversity, as suggested by the non-
significance of the coefficient for biodiversity. 
In model 2, the positive and significant coefficient of headquarters’ pressure provides 
support for Hypothesis 1: subsidiaries conform to the CSR policy with compliance motives. 
In model, 3, the positive and significant coefficient of implementation by peers is consistent 
with Hypothesis 2 according to which peers’ implementation of CSR practices acts as a social 
proof and increases subsidiaries’ conformity. The influence of headquarters and the influence 
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of peers remain both significant in model 5, when all three independent variables are 
introduced simultaneously. As expected by Hypothesis 3, value consistency has a positive 
impact on conformity. However, while the positive coefficient of value consistency is 
significant in model 4, it loses significance in model 5 in the presence of the variables 
capturing headquarters’ and peers’ influence. Hypothesis 3 is only partially supported by our 
data. 
In Models 6 to 8, we test Hypotheses 4 and 5, which relate to the moderation by value 
consistency of the effects of headquarters’ pressure and implementation by peer subsidiaries. 
In model 6, the coefficient of the interaction between headquarters’ influence and value 
consistency is negative and significant, as proposed in Hypothesis 4. It remains negative and 
significant in Model 8, when the two interactions are introduced simultaneously. Since the 
interpretation of interactions coefficients should be handled with caution, we supplemented 
our regression results with a graphical analysis that provides further understanding of the 
interaction mechanisms in Model 8, by focusing on specific ranges of perceived value 
consistency. Consistent with Hypothesis 4, Figure 6 shows that headquarters’ pressure has a 
greater impact on conformity when value consistency is low, as the slope of the line is steeper 
for low value consistency levels (<mean - 1/2 standard deviation – full line) than for high 
levels (>mean + 1/2 standard deviation – dashed line). The influence of headquarters is 
actually cancelled out –if not slightly destructive- when value consistency is high, as 
suggested by the horizontal line representing the relationship between headquarters’ pressure 
and conformity when value consistency is high. Thus our graphical analysis provides further 
support for Hypothesis 4. 
In models 7 and 8, the coefficient of the interaction between implementation by peers 
and value consistency is negative as suggested by Hypothesis 3, but only significant in model 
7. To provide further support for Hypothesis 3, we again performed a graphical analysis to be 
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better able to observe the interaction effect in model 8. Figure 7 shows crossing lines, 
suggesting that the marginal impact of the implementation by peers on conformity in model 8 
is greater when value consistency is low (<mean-1/2 standard deviation – full line) than when 
it is high (>mean+1/2 standard deviation – dashed line). In other words, high levels of value 
consistency almost completely cancel out the effect of peers’ pressures. 
In sum, our data provide support for our predictions, confirming that headquarters’ 
pressure and peers’ implementation increase a subsidiary’s level of conformity, but only when 
the level of consistency of the policy considered with its values is low. When value 
consistency is high, pressures by either headquarters or peers lose their impact on a 
subsidiary’s conformity. 
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Figure 6: Essay 2 - Influence of headquarters’ pressure on conformity when value 
consistency is low vs. high – all observations 
Figure 7: Essay 2 - Influence of implementation of peers on conformity when value 
consistency is low vs. high – all observations 
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Models by issue 
Although we clustered our regression models by practice, we wanted to further 
investigate whether our general theory held across the three issues we studied, as they vary in 
terms of ambiguity and maturity in the Group, as explained in the method section of this 
paper. The regression results are presented in three separate tables: Table 7 (Models 9 to 16) 
for health and safety practices, table 8 (models 17 to 24) for the preservation of biodiversity 
and table 9 (models 25 to 32) for the employment of female managers. 
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Table 7: Essay 2 - Linear regressions estimating the effect of headquarters, peers and value consistency on subsidiary conformity 
regarding safety
b 
VARIABLES Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
HQ’s pressure 
  
-0.01 (0.028) 
    
-0.04 (0.028) -0.05 (0.029) 
  
-0.05 (0.027) 
Implementation by peers 
    
0.04 (0.028) 
  
0.03 (0.031) 
  
0.04 (0.033) 0.04 (0.032) 
Value consistency 
      
0.10*** (0.020) 0.11*** (0.020) 0.10*** (0.020) 0.10*** (0.018) 0.09*** (0.017) 
Value consistency* HQ’s pressure 
          
-0.04 (0.029) 
  
-0.04 (0.030) 
Value consistency* Implementation by 
peers 
            
-0.04 (0.028) -0.04 (0.028) 
Prior implementation -0.34*** (0.043) -0.34*** (0.043) -0.34*** (0.044) -0.35*** (0.043) -0.34*** (0.043) -0.35*** (0.043) -0.34*** (0.043) -0.34*** (0.043) 
Pressure from external peers 0.52* (0.254) 0.51* (0.256) 0.52* (0.255) 0.57* (0.256) 0.54* (0.259) 0.51* (0.256) 0.57* (0.261) 0.51* (0.261) 
National legislation 0.19 (0.111) 0.19 (0.111) 0.20 (0.111) 0.13 (0.112) 0.12 (0.110) 0.12 (0.110) 0.13 (0.113) 0.13 (0.111) 
Autonomy -0.09* (0.043) -0.09* (0.042) -0.09* (0.042) -0.09* (0.043) -0.09* (0.041) -0.08* (0.044) -0.09* (0.042) -0.09* (0.044) 
Ownership 0.00 (0.001) 0.00 (0.001) 0.00 (0.001) 0.00 (0.001) 0.00 (0.001) 0.00 (0.001) 0.00 (0.001) 0.00 (0.001) 
History 0.00 (0.003) 0.00 (0.003) 0.00 (0.003) 0.00 (0.003) 0.00 (0.003) 0.00 (0.003) 0.00 (0.003) 0.00 (0.003) 
Size 0.05* (0.028) 0.05 (0.030) 0.05* (0.029) 0.06* (0.029) 0.06 (0.030) 0.05 (0.031) 0.06* (0.029) 0.05 (0.031) 
Constant 1.72*** (0.484) 1.74*** (0.485) 1.72*** (0.489) 1.71*** (0.483) 1.78*** (0.482) 1.83*** (0.481) 1.70** (0.485) 1.82*** (0.482) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.102 0.102 0.102 0.110 0.111 0.111 0.110 0.111 
b
 Robust standard errors are in parentheses; n = 792 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8: Essay 2 - Linear regressions estimating the effect of headquarters, peers and value consistency on subsidiary conformity 
regarding biodiversity
c
 
VARIABLES Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 
HQ’s pressure 
  
0.12*** (0.015) 
    
0.08*** (0.018) 0.12*** (0.018) 
  
0.09*** (0.019) 
Implementation by peers 
    
0.19*** (0.026) 
  
0.17*** (0.027) 
  
0.18*** (0.029) 0.16*** (0.031) 
Value consistency 
      
0.03 (0.031) -0.01 (0.033) -0.01 (0.034) 0.04 (0.029) 0.01 (0.032) 
Value consistency* HQ’s pressure 
          
-0.00 (0.019) 
  
0.02 (0.016) 
Value consistency* Implementation by 
peers 
            
-0.11** (0.035) -0.12*** (0.035) 
Prior implementation -0.26*** (0.014) -0.27*** (0.015) -0.27*** (0.017) -0.26*** (0.014) -0.28*** (0.016) -0.27*** (0.013) -0.27*** (0.016) -0.28*** (0.016) 
Pressure from external peers 0.90*** (0.193) 1.02*** (0.200) 0.87*** (0.206) 0.92*** (0.196) 0.95*** (0.214) 1.02*** (0.199) 0.88*** (0.210) 0.97*** (0.217) 
National legislation -0.69*** (0.120) -0.65*** (0.122) -0.73*** (0.122) -0.69*** (0.120) -0.70*** (0.127) -0.65*** (0.134) -0.66*** (0.130) -0.65*** (0.143) 
Autonomy -0.09* (0.041) -0.09* (0.041) -0.07 (0.040) -0.07* (0.038) -0.08* (0.035) -0.09** (0.039) -0.05 (0.037) -0.07* (0.037) 
Ownership -0.01*** (0.001) -0.01*** (0.001) -0.01*** (0.001) -0.01*** (0.001) -0.01*** (0.001) -0.01*** (0.001) -0.00*** (0.001) -0.00*** (0.001) 
History 0.00 (0.002) 0.00 (0.002) 0.00 (0.002) 0.00 (0.002) 0.00 (0.002) 0.00 (0.002) 0.00 (0.002) 0.00 (0.002) 
Size -0.02 (0.015) -0.02 (0.015) 0.01 (0.016) -0.02 (0.015) 0.01 (0.016) -0.02 (0.015) 0.01 (0.017) 0.00 (0.017) 
Constant 1.59*** (0.314) 1.52*** (0.318) 1.39*** (0.306) 1.52*** (0.304) 1.39*** (0.288) 1.55*** (0.309) 1.26*** (0.297) 1.33*** (0.294) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.243 0.255 0.273 0.243 0.277 0.253 0.279 0.284 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses; n = 891 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9: Essay 2 - Linear regressions estimating the effect of headquarters, peers and value consistency on subsidiary conformity 
regarding the employment of female managers
d
 
VARIABLES 
Model 25 Model 26 Model 27 Model 28 Model 29 Model 30 Model 31 Model 32 
HQ’s pressure 
  
0.06** (0.027) 
    
0.05 (0.037) 0.05 (0.036) 
  
0.05 (0.041) 
Implementation by peers 
    
0.22*** (0.033) 
  
0.22*** (0.034) 
  
0.22*** (0.033) 0.22*** (0.033) 
Value consistency 
      
0.05 (0.033) 0.03 (0.039) 0.04 (0.038) 0.05 (0.031) 0.03 (0.038) 
Value consistency* HQ’s pressure 
          
0.01 (0.028) 
  
0.01 (0.027) 
Value consistency* Implementation by 
peers 
            
-0.01 (0.012) -0.01 (0.013) 
Prior implementation -0.23*** (0.045) -0.23*** (0.045) -0.28*** (0.025) -0.23*** (0.045) -0.28*** (0.025) -0.23*** (0.045) -0.28*** (0.026) -0.28*** (0.026) 
Pressure from external peers 0.02 (0.123) 0.03 (0.122) -0.02 (0.128) 0.02 (0.123) -0.02 (0.126) 0.03 (0.122) -0.02 (0.126) -0.01 (0.125) 
National legislation -0.11 (0.124) -0.14 (0.128) -0.11 (0.137) -0.13 (0.125) -0.14 (0.142) -0.16 (0.108) -0.13 (0.138) -0.16 (0.122) 
Autonomy -0.05 (0.055) -0.03 (0.056) -0.06 (0.055) -0.04 (0.059) -0.04 (0.058) -0.03 (0.059) -0.05 (0.059) -0.04 (0.059) 
Ownership 0.00 (0.001) 0.00 (0.001) 0.00** (0.001) 0.00 (0.001) 0.00** (0.001) 0.00 (0.001) 0.00** (0.001) 0.00** (0.001) 
History -0.00 (0.002) -0.00 (0.002) -0.00 (0.002) -0.00 (0.002) -0.00 (0.002) -0.00 (0.002) -0.00 (0.002) -0.00 (0.002) 
Size 0.05* (0.021) 0.04* (0.020) 0.06** (0.022) 0.05* (0.022) 0.06** (0.021) 0.05* (0.020) 0.06** (0.023) 0.06** (0.021) 
Constant 0.82* (0.419) 0.75 (0.423) 0.94** (0.367) 0.74 (0.449) 0.85* (0.390) 0.72 (0.447) 0.87* (0.393) 0.86* (0.392) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.151 0.154 0.189 0.153 0.191 0.153 0.189 0.189 
d
 Robust standard errors are in parentheses; n = 792 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Models 9, 17 and 25 show the influence of our control variables on conformity 
regarding safety practices, biodiversity practices and practices related the employment of 
female managers. Prior implementation again decreases the level of conformity in all three 
models, as one could expect. The CSR performance of local peers has a positive and 
significant influence on conformity for safety practices in model 9 and biodiversity practices 
in model 17, but not for practices related to the employment of female managers in model 25. 
The coefficient of size is significant for practices related to safety and the employment of 
female managers but not for biodiversity practices. The negative coefficient of integration is 
only significant for biodiversity practices and the negative coefficient of autonomy is 
significant for both biodiversity and safety practices. Surprisingly, we find a negative 
influence of national legislation on conformity regarding biodiversity practices. But, as 
discussed in the methods section of this paper, legislation regarding the preservation of 
biodiversity is still in its infancy. It might be that in countries that are more advanced in their 
consideration for biodiversity, companies are actually left with fewer responsibilities as public 
actors are more directly involved in the preservation of biodiversity. 
Comparing the second to fourth models in each of the tables 7, 8 and 9 allows us to 
see that the role of headquarters and peers is more prevalent for biodiversity practices (models 
18 and 19) and practices supporting female leadership (models 26 and 27) than for safety 
practices (models 10 and 11) while the reverse is true for internalization (models 12, 20 and 
28). Indeed, for safety practices, in table 7, the influence of headquarters’ pressures in models 
10 and 13 and peers’ implementation in models 11 and 13 is not significant. By contrast, 
value consistency has a positive and significant effect on consistency in models 12 through 
16. The main effect of the three independent variables on conformity regarding the 
preservation of biodiversity are displayed in table 8: contrary to the effects obtained for safety 
practices, headquarters’ pressures and peers’ implementation have a positive and significant 
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effect on conformity in all models in which they are present and value consistency in none. 
Finally, in table 9, the effect of pressures from the headquarters on conformity regarding 
practices that favor the employment of female managers is positive but only significant in 
model 26, while the effect of peers’ implementation is always positive and significant and the 
effect of value consistency never so. 
Overall, this interesting finding suggests that subsidiary’s conformity is explained by 
either (1) headquarters’ pressure and implementation by other subsidiaries simultaneously, or 
(2) internalization depending on the practice considered. In addition, as explained in the 
method section of this paper, in the context of the MNE we study, safety practices can be 
considered as less ambiguous than practices that relate to the employment of female managers 
and biodiversity preservation. Thus, these findings are consistent with our claim that the 
impact of implementation by peers and headquarters’ pressure on subsidiary conformity is 
related to the policy’s ambiguity.  
Regarding the moderations predicted by hypotheses 4 and 5, the interaction 
coefficients that were negative and significant for the general model loose significance in the 
models by issues for safety practices (models 14 to 16) and practices related to the 
employment of female managers (models 30 to 32). For biodiversity practices, the interaction 
between value consistency and peers’ implementation is negative and significant as predicted 
in both model 23 and model 24, but the interaction between value consistency and 
headquarters’ pressure is not significant in either model 22 or model 24. Again, a lack of 
significance does not mean that there is no moderation. To better compare the influence of 
headquarters and peers at low vs. high levels of value consistency, we supplemented our 
statistical analysis with a graphical representation of the interaction effects in the full models 
16, 24 and 32.  
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Figure 8: Essay 2 - Influence of pressure from the 
headquarters on conformity when value consistency is 
low vs. high - safety 
 
Figure 9: Essay 2 - Influence of implementation of 
peers on conformity when value consistency is low vs. 
high – safety 
 
Figure 10: Essay 2 - Influence of pressure from the 
headquarters on conformity when value consistency is 
low vs. high - biodiversity 
 
Figure 11: Essay 2 - Influence of implementation of 
peers on conformity when value consistency is low vs. 
high – biodiversity 
 
Figure 12: Essay 2 - Influence of pressure from the 
headquarters on conformity when value consistency is 
low vs. high – women in management 
 
Figure 13: Essay 2 - Influence of implementation of 
peers on conformity when value consistency is low vs. 
high – women in management 
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For safety practices, Figure 8 shows that the pressure from the headquarters has at best 
a neutral role when value consistency is low (full line) and reduces the level of conformity 
when value consistency is high (dashed line), so that it is clearly counter-productive and badly 
perceived by subsidiaries. Implementation by peers, on Figure 9, increase the level of 
conformity mostly when value consistency is low (full line) and have a rather limited effect 
when value consistency is high (dashed line). The graphical interpretation of our regression 
results is thus consistent with both hypothesis 4 and hypothesis 5. 
For biodiversity practices, figures 10 and 11 representing the effect of headquarters’ 
pressure and peers’ implementation on subsidiary conformity for low and high levels of value 
consistency suggest similar effects: when value consistency is low, the influence of 
headquarters and peers have a positive influence on conformity as shown by the positive 
slopes of the two full lines, and when value consistency is high, their influence is negative, as 
shown by the negative slopes of the two dashed lines. Again, this is consistent with 
hypotheses 4 and 5, although we did not go as far as suggesting that the influence of 
headquarters and peers could become negative in a situation of high value consistency. 
Finally, when it comes to practices favoring the employment of female managers, 
pressures from headquarters and implementation by peers have a positive impact on 
conformity at both low and high levels of value consistency as suggested by figures 12 and 
13. The steeper slope in the case of low value consistency echoes our prediction in hypothesis 
4. But we find that the influence of peers’ implementation is greater when value consistency 
is high than when it is low, in contradiction with hypothesis 5. When value consistency is 
low, the influence of peers’ pressures seems to be almost zero, while it is very high when 
value consistency is high. In that case, peers’ implementation does not act as an alternative 
proof of the policy’s value as we proposed and as it seems to be the case for the other 
practices. 
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In summary, the models by issues suggest that, depending on the issue considered, 
subsidiary conformity can be explained either by the internalization of the policy or by the 
simultaneous influence of headquarters’ pressure and peers’ implementation. In addition, in 
all three cases, our analysis regarding the interaction of headquarters’ pressure and value 
consistency was consistent with the results of the main models: internalization reduces the 
effect of headquarters’ pressure. And in two cases out of three, we found that internalization 
reduced the need for the social proof that peers represent. 
Robustness Tests 
We conducted a series of robustness tests, based on alternative operationalizations of 
conformity and the use of corresponding models as well as alternative operationalizations of 
peers’ implementation.  
First, we wanted to check whether our results would hold if we focused on the positive 
values of conformity, so we replaced our dependent variable by a variable taking the value of 
0 when coupling was <=0, 1 when coupling was <=1, 2 when coupling was <=2, 3 when it 
was <=3, 4 when it was <=4, 5 when it was <=5, and 6 otherwise, and then ran a Tobit model 
using these values. Indeed, zooming in on the observations that corresponded to a realignment 
of the practices might complement our initial analysis in a revealing way. However, we did 
not expect to obtain different results by doing so, as we believe our explanatory variables 
influence conformity and decoupling in symmetrical ways: and indeed, the regression results 
we obtained were similar to those of the OLS regression. 
Second, we replaced the dependent variable by the average level of implementation of 
practices in 2013. Although we were more interested in the change over the 2012-2013 period 
as it better matches our conceptualization of conformity, we wished to ensure that a simpler 
operationalization would provide consistent results. We found very similar results to those of 
our main analysis, except of course that the influence of 2012 implementation was significant 
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and positive instead of negative. The signs and significance of main effects and interaction 
effects remained identical. 
Finally, we ran models with alternative measures of internal peers’ implementation. 
Indeed, we wanted to ensure that the subsidiaries were actually aware of their peers’ level of 
implementation to better support our mimetic mechanism. To do so, we operationalized peers’ 
implementation as the perceived influence of subsidiaries in the same industry, based on 3 
items in the 2012 survey (1 per CSR issue). The directions and significance of the coefficients 
for our independent variables and interaction effects remained the same as in our main 
analysis. 
Altogether, these tests provide us with confidence in the robustness of our results. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Bridging arguments from the international management literature and neo-institutional 
arguments, we propose a model of subsidiary conformity to a policy: the extent of conformity 
of an MNE’s subsidiary depends on the dual influence of its headquarters and internal peers, 
as well as on its own internalization of the CSR policy considered. Our results support our 
view that these three dimensions matter for conformity and further suggest that the prevalence 
of the influence of headquarters’ pressure and peers’ implementation depends on the level of 
consistency of the policy with the subsidiary’s values. When value consistency is high, the 
influence of headquarters and peers is more limited, and when value consistency is low, the 
influence of headquarters and peers is greater. Moreover, depending on the practice 
considered, conformity is driven either primarily by policy internalization –for safety 
practices- or by the influence of both the headquarters and peers –for biodiversity practices 
and practices that favor the employment of women in managerial positions. We discuss below 
the implication of our findings for research on conformity, subsidiary strategies and CSR. 
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This paper speaks to institutional theory and research on conformity. As mentioned in 
the introduction of this paper, prior works have mostly considered conformity as a reified 
concept at the organizational level, although some authors underline its strategic nature (e.g. 
Durand & Jourdan, 2012; Joseph et al., 2014; Philippe & Durand, 2011). In this paper, we 
define conformity as intra-organizational matter which allows us to conceptualize it as 
dynamic and focus on the processes at play within an MNE. First, we show that 
organizational sub-units play a key role in an MNE’s conformity as conformity varies among 
subsidiaries, in particular depending on their level of internalization of the policy. And we 
find that, once we control for the influence of local rivals, subsidiaries strongly influence each 
others’ implementation of practices, thereby isolating a mechanism of intra-organizational 
imitation. Second, our model for conformity goes beyond isomorphism and our results show 
that MNE units do not always blindly imitate their peers as internalization reduces the need 
for social proof. 
Our paper also contributes to international management literature by focusing on intra-
organizational conformity dynamics and looking at the subsidiaries’ behavior. First, it 
advances our understanding of the relative influence on a subsidiary’s conformity of the 
MNE’s headquarters and other subsidiaries of the MNE. Previous works articulated the 
influence on practice adoption of internal pressures from the headquarters and external 
pressures from the subsidiary’s local constituents (e.g. Hillman & Wan, 2005; Kostova & 
Roth, 2002). But not enough attention was paid to the role of internal peers regarding the 
implementation of corporate policies. Second, we contribute to research on subsidiary 
strategy by showing that the subsidiaries’ internalization of the policy influences their 
conformity both directly, and through a reduction of headquarters’ and peers’ influence. We 
thus depart from previous studies that have explained internalization of policies by an MNE’s 
subsidiaries (Björkman et al., 2011; Kostova & Roth, 2002) but not studied its consequences 
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for conformity. 
This paper has implications for research on the implementation of CSR. CSR is now 
widely perceived as an integrated part of firm performance, but independent of its financial 
performance, so understanding the mechanisms that increase CSR conformity is in itself 
strategically important as acknowledged by a growing number of scholars (e.g. Gao & Bansal 
2013; Margolis & Walsh, 2003). Previous work identified three types of motives for CSR 
implementation (Aguilera et al., 2007; Bansal & Roth, 2000): an instrumental one, a moral 
one and a social one. In our study, the implementation by peers constitutes a social motive for 
CSR conformity and the consistency of CSR policies with the subsidiaries’ values echoes the 
notion of moral motive for conformity. Thus, our paper shows that subsidiaries do conform to 
the CSR policy based on these motives and improves our understanding of their articulation. 
Of particular interest for CSR scholars is the finding that single motives (social or moral) led 
to greater implementation than mixed motives (social and moral). In addition, our findings 
stress the need to differentiate between issues when studying CSR conformity, as in our case 
different explanations prevail depending on the issue considered. 
Finally, this study suggests ways in which top managers of complex organizations can 
increase their subsidiaries’ level of CSR conformity. It is crucial for an MNE’ top managers 
to understand the way CSR is perceived in its subsidiaries (given their location, industry, etc), 
so that they can seek primarily to influence subsidiaries who perceive a disconnect between 
the policy and their values. Indeed, for subsidiaries that internalize the policy, putting 
additional pressure for compliance could back-fire. Through a tailored enforcement not only 
based on conformity level but also on internalization level, MNEs’ headquarters can thus 
reduce heterogeneity in implementation. 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
The main limitation of this work is that our empirical analysis is based on the study of 
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a single case. We believe it is representative of the utilities sector as one of its worldwide 
leader. In addition, the subsidiaries vary greatly in their size, date of creation or integration in 
the Group, geographic location, ownership structure and industry. Therefore, we believe our 
results would hold in different settings. However, the generalization should be performed with 
caution, in particular in the contexts of firms operating in global industries, in which the 
compliance dimension may be more stringent, and less dependent on the level of subsidiaries’ 
internalization of the policy. Similarly, CSR practices are quite specific, and may be more 
value-infused and less strongly enforced than other kinds of practices (for example, in 
accounting or process management), so that the role of internalization might be exalted and 
the role of the headquarters underestimated. Indeed, our models by CSR issue suggest that the 
relative influence of pressures from headquarters and peers on the one hand, and 
internalization on the other hand vary across issues. Still, the overall structure of the model 
and the interaction effects hold across issues. 
Moreover, we relied strongly on survey measures that can be subject to social 
desirability and common method variance - but we took steps to minimize the risk of them 
occurring in how we designed our survey and analyzed the data, as explained in the methods’ 
section of the paper. 
Our analysis and results suggest several avenues for future research. First, we need to 
understand to what extent the model we defined would apply to other complex organizations 
than MNEs, within which sub-entities, departments or groups are similarly influenced by both 
the top-management of the organization and other intra-organizational actors. Second, we 
found somewhat contrasting results for the three CSR issues we studied. While we believe 
this is primarily related to the degree of maturity of the issue in the organization, future 
research is needed on the actual characteristics of the policies that can favor or hinder their 
conformity. Third, our results support the idea that the intra-organizational field is very 
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influential, as Kostova and colleagues (2008) have suggested. Future research could focus on 
this finding and further investigate the power relationships that exist within intra-
organizational networks and their influence on conformity. Fourth, there is a need for studies 
on policy-practice (de)coupling within MNEs that more precisely match specific practices to 
specific corporate requirements. 
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CHAPTER 4: ESSAY 3 - CSR POLICY-PRACTICES (DE)COUPLING WITHIN 
MNES: PATHS TO WALKING THE TALK 
Policy-practice coupling (PPC) is a central concern for multinational enterprises 
(MNEs), as the complexity of these organizations leads to a heterogeneous implementation of 
practices (Maritan & Brush, 2003) and this is particularly true for corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) which is seen as easily “decouplable” (e.g. Weaver, Trevino & Cochran, 
1999) and under particular scrutiny. Within MNEs, policy-practices decoupling (PPD) is not 
necessarily an intended organizational strategic response to inefficient rules as institutional 
scholars suggest (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991; Fiss & Zajac, 2006). It can occur 
between the CSR policy defined by the headquarters and the practices implemented by the 
subsidiaries (Crilly, Zollo & Hansen, 2012). I define PPC in MNEs as the reduction over time 
of the gap that exists between the organization’s formal policy and the actual organizational 
practices. And PPD corresponds as an increase of this gap over time. I suggest that there might 
be multiple paths to the implementation of a policy designed to address a specific CSR issue 
and that coupling is a complex and dynamic process, depending on various characteristics of 
the CSR issue considered. 
First, some characteristics of the practices influence their implementation by the 
subsidiaries of an MNE. Second, subsidiaries are embedded in several internal and external 
institutional fields in which the CSR issue can be more or less institutionalized: the MNE, the 
industry and the country of the subsidiary. I wish to identify among these factors the core 
determinants that combine to lead to PPC or PPD and changes over time. I do not assume that 
these are symmetrical and I expect several and complex combinations to coexist in the same 
MNE. Therefore, I conduct a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) on 3 CSR issues and 25 
CSR practices in 48 subsidiaries of an MNE (Crilly, 2011; Fiss, 2007; Ragin 2000, 2008) over 
two time periods (2012-2013 and 2013-2014). I find that (1) PPC and PPD periods more often 
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alternate than endure, (2) the institutionalization of an issue in both the subsidiary’s country 
and its industry is key for sustained PPC, and (3) practices’ lack of value compatibility is the 
main driver of sustained PPD. Thus this paper advances our understanding of conformity 
dynamics within MNEs and contributes to discussions on the heterogeneous institutional 
pressures an MNE’s subsidiaries undergo. 
Theory background 
Policy-practice coupling and policy-practice decoupling as processes 
Early neo-institutional scholars introduced the concept of decoupling, which 
corresponds to organizations’ adoption of formal structures that are disconnected from their 
technical activities (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). More recently, decoupling studies have focused 
on the strategic maintenance of a gap between a formal policy and concrete organizational 
practices (e.g. Fiss & Zajac, 2004, 2006; Westphal & Zajac, 1994, 1998, 2001). However, 
these studies consider decoupling as an organizational-level strategy, while in the case of 
MNEs policy-practice coupling and decoupling can emerge from the distance between the 
headquarters that define the policy and the subsidiaries that implement the practices (Crilly et 
al. 2012). I call PPC (respectively PPD) the reduction (respectively increase) over time of the 
gap that exists between the MNE’s formal policy and the actual practices implemented by its 
subsidiaries. 
More specifically concerned about intra-organizational processes, studies on coupling 
still fall short of explaining the dynamic coupling processes within MNEs. Indeed, they 
consider small organizations such as schools (Hallet, 2010; Sauder & Espeland, 2011) or 
governmental agencies (Tilcsik, 2010) and see coupling as a unidirectional process limited in 
time. I expect that in the case of MNEs coupling is not attained once and for all. Coupling and 
decoupling phases can alternate over time because subsidiaries implement a series of practices 
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simultaneously in a complex institutional environment that may at times favor coupling 
behaviors, and at other times decoupling behaviors. 
This dynamic nature of PPC and PPD depends as much on the attributes of the 
practices themselves as on the subsidiaries’ strategies. Indeed, a single subsidiary can 
simultaneously couple and decouple different practices, or the same practice at different 
points in time. 
CSR issues vary in their perceived attributes 
First, coupling and decoupling of CSR practices vary from one issue
25
 to the other, as 
there is a lot of heterogeneity among CSR issues, some being more “decouplable” than others 
(Sauder & Espeland, 2009). Environmental matters and social ones are often unrelated and 
even sometimes conflicting when specific initiatives are considered. 
This heterogeneity in issues has been quite overlooked in the CSR literature, but works 
on the diffusion of innovations have long established that the level of implementation of 
practices depends on their characteristics. More specifically, innovations are adopted more 
promptly in complex organizations when they are compatible with the existing practices and 
values, when they represent a relative advantage compared to alternative practices, and when 
they are not too complex (Lin & Ho, 2011; Rogers, 1962 - 4th edition 2005; Tornatzky & 
Klein, 1982). Based on those works, Ansari, Fiss and Zajac (2010) suggest that some 
affordances of practices make them more or less likely to be adopted and adapted, 
independent of the adopters or adapters, so that it is crucial to look at differences in 
implementation across practices rather than only focus on the adopters’ characteristics. More 
specifically focusing on the CSR context, Lin and Ho (2011) found a positive impact of 
relative advantage and compatibility and a negative impact of complexity on the adoption of 
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 A CSR issue is a domain of CSR that brings together a set of practices that all aim at tackling the same 
problem and all contribute to the same CSR objective. Examples include climate change, diversity, child labor, 
etc. 
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five energy saving practices by Chinese logistics companies. Therefore, consistent with prior 
literature, I expect that practices’ perceived complexity, compatibility and performance 
advantage influence their adoption by an MNE’s subsidiaries. However, these three attributes 
need to be further adapted to the CSR context, because CSR practices are not always 
technology-based. Thus, concepts developed in the context of innovations might not be 
strictly transferable to the CSR context. 
First, while for innovations, complexity refers to the use of the technology (Lin & Ho, 
2011; Tornatzky & Klein, 1982), for CSR issues, complexity stems from the more or less 
difficult identification of relevant practices and from the more or less complex 
implementation of those practices. 
Second, performance advantage of innovations is relative to alternative technologies 
(Lin & Ho, 2011; Tornatzky & Klein, 1982). In the CSR context, some new practices can 
indeed replace former ones –in particular green innovations-, but it is not always the case. 
Some CSR practices are also implemented in a standalone manner, independent from other 
activities. For instance, safety rules, anti-discrimination rules or environmental screening of 
investments are additional practices and procedures. Thus, what matters is their perceived 
performance advantage in absolute rather than relative to alternatives. In addition, the impact 
of CSR practices on performance should be envisioned in a large sense, including not only 
financial results, but also potential benefits in terms of image, employee satisfaction, and 
relationships with suppliers and local communities. Indeed, social and environmental 
practices can represent business opportunities (Crilly et al., 2012), help improve the 
profitability of the subsidiaries (Bansal &Roth, 2000) or their relationships with their 
stakeholders (Bansal & Roth, 2000). 
And third, the compatibility of CSR practices is primarily related to values rather than 
technical features. Compatibility with values makes internalization by adopters easier and 
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understanding quicker, so that commitment and implementation are favored (Klein, K. J. & 
Sorra, J. S. 1996; Ansari, Fiss & Zajac, 2010, Lin & Ho, 2011). 
Thus, I expect that the complexity, performance advantage and value compatibility of 
CSR issues affect their implementation by an MNE’s subsidiaries
26
 and their potential for 
PPC and PPD. 
CSR issues are diversely institutionalized 
Next to the perceived inner attributes of the CSR issues, I expect their 
institutionalization level to be a key driver of their coupling by subsidiaries. The process of 
institutionalization of practices was first largely defined by Tolbert and Zucker (1996), who 
identified three sub-processes in the context of one given organization: habitualization -
generation of new arrangements and definition of policies and procedures-, objectification, 
and sedimentation -spread across groups and time periods. As the institutional process 
unfolds, CSR issues get more widely implemented. This definition suggests that a certain 
amount of discourse is produced throughout the institutionalization process. Accordingly, 
previous works have emphasized the central role of language and discourse in 
institutionalization processes. They show that the institutionalization of practices does not 
depend on their diffusion but on the discourse that is built in support of these practices and the 
structure and coherence of the discourse (Phillips Lawrence & Hardy, 2004), on the type of 
pleas used (Green, 2004), on the vocabularies and theorizations of change mobilized in the 
discourse (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005), and on the structure of the arguments (Green, Li & 
Nohria, 2009). And part of the institutionalizing role of discourse relates to the legitimation of 
practices, as reflected in the work of Vaara and colleagues (Vaara, 2002; Vaara & Tienari, 
2011; Varra, Tienari & Laurila, 2006) on global merger and acquisitions and industry 
                                                          
26
 See robustness test and appendix G for an empirical investigation of the causal relationship between practices’ 
characteristics and PPC. 
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restructuring. They find that discursive legitimation strategies are used in the public discourse 
(Vaara & Tienari, 2011; Vaara et al., 2006) and by MNEs to legitimize their actions (Vaara & 
Tienari, 2008; 2011). 
In international contexts, several institutionalization processes take place 
simultaneously and MNEs’ subsidiaries are embedded in several institutional fields (Kostova, 
Roth & Dacin, 2008) and exposed to legitimizing discourses from different sources: the intra-
organizational field, the industry and the country, in which the degree of institutionalization 
of practices may vary. 
First, a subsidiary is part of an MNE whose headquarters promote the 
institutionalization of practices through various discursive means: newsletters, internal 
magazines, annual reports, roadmaps, action plans, etc. The level of institutionalization in the 
MNE that results from this discourse varies from one CSR issue to the next. Second, a 
subsidiary is part of an industry in which the institutionalization level of CSR also depends on 
the issue considered. In the industry field, industry associations play a prominent 
institutionalization role as they produce communications about key issues and the way to 
address them for their members. And third, a subsidiary is located in a country, with a specific 
institutional profile relative to each issue (Kostova, 1997). Thus, CSR issues are more or less 
institutionalized at the country level, in particular through regulatory means. 
In sum, I expect the level of institutionalization of CSR issues in a subsidiary’s parent 
MNE, country and industry to influence their potential for PPC and PPD. 
Based on prior work, I thus identified six conditions that will affect PPC and PPD of 
CSR issues in an MNE: three related to their perceived characteristics and three related to 
their level of institutionalization. I expect several combinations of these conditions to be 
equifinal configurations of PPC and several of them to be equifinal configurations of PPD, so 
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that I chose to perform a fuzzy set QCA analysis to identify relevant configurations in the 
data. 
Data and method 
My field of inquiry is an MNE present in 70 countries worldwide and operating in 
energy production and services as well as environmental services. I focused on CSR practices 
related to three topics among the Group’s objectives: women in management, environmental 
biodiversity and occupational health and safety. These issues are linked to three different 
domains and I suspect them to display varying complexity, compatibility and performance 
advantage and institutionalization levels. 
I conducted three on-line surveys among the managers of this MNE’s subsidiaries in 
2012, 2013 and 2014. I selected 104 subsidiaries as my initial sample, through systematic 
cluster sampling. They together represented 46% of the Group’s workforce in 2012. Before 
the last survey, the structure of the organization changed, so that part of the company’s 
activities had become independent. Thus, the sample for the 2014 survey was of 79 
subsidiaries. For the 2012 survey, I received complete answers from 314 respondents (66% 
response rate), for the second survey, I received 270 complete answers (57% response rate)  
and I received 176 answers for the last survey round (43% response rate). 67 subsidiaries 
were covered by the three surveys but my final sample comprises 48 subsidiaries in 12 
countries (Argentina, Autralia, Belgium, Brazil, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Saudi 
Arabia, Spain, Thaïland, the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom) as I dropped 
subsidiaries that were the only subsidiary of my sample in their country
27
. I designed the 
questionnaire so as to minimize common method variance and I split my sample into two 
groups of respondents per entity: one that was used to generate outcome measures and the 
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 Because it allows me to disentangle real country effects from unobserved subsidiary effects and to reduce the 
number of countries covered to a more manageable amount. 
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other for conditioning measures. The number of observations of my empirical investigation is 
thus 144 (48 subsidiaries*3 issues). 
The PPC extent in period 1 was calculated as the difference between 2012 and 2013 
average implementation levels of 25 practices on the three CSR issue (biodiversity, safety and 
the employment of female managers)
28
. These implementation levels were captured through 
survey items elaborated in collaboration with experts of the Group and presented in Appendix 
A. The PPD extent in period 1 is the opposite of the coupling extent. Similarly, the PPC and 
PPD extents in period 2 are the difference between the 2013 and 2014 average 
implementation levels per CSR issue and its inverse. 
The complexity, the performance advantage and the value compatibility were 
measured thanks to items in the 2012 survey adapted from existing scales, as detailed in 
Appendix F. PCA confirmed that the items reflecting each construct loaded onto one factor. 
However, I used the average scores for my analysis rather than the ones generated by the PCA 
in order to be able to calibrate them in a meaningful way. 
The country institutionalization level is a count of the number of laws related to safety 
and the employment of female managers in 2012 (source: ILO) as well as the national 
percentages of terrestrial and marine area that was protected in 2010 (source: Worldbank) that 
reflect the importance placed on the three issues by the national government. 
Regarding the institutionalization of issues in the company and the industry, I rely on 
the existing discourse in the three fields as it is a central component of institutionalization, as 
explained in the front end of this paper. 
The company institutionalization level corresponds to the proportion of issues of the 
internal magazine than mention the topic (20 issues from 2009 to 2013), as the most used 
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 I did not perform PCA on the 8 or 9 items per issue as they are formative of the measure, not reflective. 
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mainstream internal communication tool. Safety is mentioned in 90% of the issues, gender 
diversity in 75% of the issues and biodiversity in 65% of the issues. I use frequency of 
occurrence rather than length of the discourse as the amount of discourse can actually be more 
limited for practices that are more taken-for-granted, i.e. institutionalized (Green, 2004). For 
instance, mentions of safety practices will mostly take the form of communication on 
achievements and results (e.g. “In 2010 and 2011, the plant received a Gold Award from the 
UK’s Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents (ROPSA) for its sustained efforts in 
health and safety performance.”), while mentions of biodiversity involve more pedagogy and 
be put into the context of larger projects (e.g. “Biodiversity is more than just a matter of 
survival for a handful of endangered species. It is a whole series of interactions between 
animals, plant life and their environments that are essential to life on earth. Now an 
international cause, 2010 has been designated the year of biodiversity, marked by events 
worldwide. [XYZ] magazine asked two experts for their views.”). 
The industry institutionalization level corresponds to the proportion of newsletters and 
magazines produced by international industry associations that mention the topic (IEA and 
WEC for energy, OGP and IGU for gas, IWA for water and ISWA for waste – approximately 
200 documents overall). Again, I measure frequency rather than amount as it is a better proxy 
for institutionalization. 
I also included the prior implementation level in the analysis, which corresponds to the 
average level of implementation of the practices related to the focal topic in 2012, for the first 
period and 2013 for the second period as reported in the surveys (see Appendix A for the list 
of items). 
I used the latest available version of the fs/QCA software (2.5). In order to perform the 
analysis, I calibrated the measures (Fiss, 2011; Ragin, 2008). The measures generated via the 
survey were calibrated according to the scale of the corresponding items in the survey and 
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company and industry institutionalization according to the percentage of outlets mentioning 
the topic, as summarized in table 10 below. Regarding the institutionalization in the company 
and the industry, the topic was calibrated as full member of the condition if it was cited in at 
least 90% of the documents studied and non-member if it was cited in 10% of the documents 
or less. Practices were considered as full members of the coupling (respectively decoupling) 
outcome whenever their PPC extent (respectively PPD) was equal or greater than 2, meaning 
the implementation increased (respectively decreased) by 2 or more on the survey scale. 
Indeed, given the way the scale is constructed
29
, an increase by 1 only might reflect a different 
subjective appreciation of the extent of implementation, rather than a real increase in 
implementation level, whereas I believe an increase by 2 really reflects PPC. 
 
  
                                                          
29
 The scale used was: 0: Not at all, 1, 2, 3: To a certain extent, 4, 5, 6: To a very great extent. 
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Table 10 - Essay 3: Calibration of the measures 
Variable Calibration 
Non-membership Cut-off Full membership 
PPC extent <=-2 0 >=2 
PPD extent  <=-2 0 >=2 
Complexity 
Performance advantage  
Value compatibility  
<=2 4 >=6 
Company institutionalization  <=0.1 0.5 >=0.9 
Country institutionalization  Already centered 
Industry institutionalization  <=0.1 0.5 >=0.9 
Prior implementation  <=2 4 >=6 
 
For each situation in period 1 and period 2, I then constructed a truth table and reduced 
its rows to solutions with a consistency over a certain threshold. For instance, I used a 
minimum consistency of 88% for PPC and PPD in period 1 given it represented a clear gap 
between cases for both analyses. The software uses an algorithm based on a counterfactual 
analysis of causal conditions to reduce the number of cases to simple combinations. A 
comparison of the parsimonious and intermediate solutions allowed me to distinguish 
between core and peripheral conditions (Fiss, 2011, Ragin, 2008). 
For the second period, I split the sample into two groups: practices that were coupled 
in the first period (66 out of 144) and practices that were decoupled in the first period (62 out 
of 144). The 16 remaining observations had a score of zero for PPC and PPD in the first 
period (neither PPC nor PPD). For each of two groups, I looked at PPC and PPD 
configurations in the second period. 
Figure 14 on page 135 summarizes the distributions of cases. 
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Figure 14: Essay 3 - Distribution of practices along the coupling paths 
 
 
First, for very few issues are practices neither coupled nor decoupled by subsidiaries 
over a period of time (16 between 2012 and 2013 and 11 more between 2013 and 2014), 
which means that coupling and decoupling are indeed processes that unfold gradually over 
time. In addition, the spread of practices over the various paths show that, while PPC and 
PPD statistically occur with similar frequency, if one looks at the dynamics of PPC and PPD, 
PPD following PPC is three times more frequent than continued PPC and PPC following PPD 
is three times more frequent than continued PPD. This intriguing observation suggests that 
coupling and decoupling processes are not unidirectional but alternatively follow each other 
over time. Neither tight coupling nor decoupling are enduring states and subsidiaries focus 
their conformity efforts on different practices over time. 
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Results 
First period 
Coupling configurations 
As shown on table 11 below, I obtained 6 configurations that explain 65% of the 
membership in the outcome -a satisfying coverage for a sample of 144 cases- and the overall 
consistency of the solution is very high (87%). This means that the 6 configurations together 
explain two cases of PPC out of three in a very reliable manner. None of the conditions can 
by itself explain high PPC since no condition is ever present or absent alone. Actually, all 
configurations include a large number of conditions and/or absence of conditions.  
Institutionalization in the Group is present in all 6 combinations, but never as a core 
condition. 
We can notice that is three configurations (1a, 1b and 4) practices were not much 
implemented in 2012, but in the other 3 configurations (1a, 2b and 3), PPC occurs 
independently of the initial level of implementation, i.e. also for practices that were already 
well implemented in 2012. 
In configurations 1a and 1b, the low initial level of implementation is a core condition 
for PPC. In configuration 1a, the practices display a lack of complexity and a high level of 
institutionalization in the country as additional core conditions. And in configuration 1b, 
practices are highly compatible but also complex and lack institutionalization in the 
subsidiary’s country. These last two unfavorable conditions may seem surprising in a PPC 
configuration, but they can actually explain the initial low implementation. 
 
Table 11: Essay 3 - Configurations leading to PPC in period 1 
  
Practices with a low 
initial 
implementation 
Institutionalized 
in the industry 
Favorable 
characteristics but 
mixed 
Practices with low 
performance 
advantage 
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level institutionalization 
  1a 1b 2a 2b 3 4 
Practices 
characteristics       
Complexity ø ● Ø ● ø  
Performance 
advantage   
● ● ● Ø 
Value compatibility 
 
● ø ● ● ● 
Institutionalization 
      
In the country ● ø ø ● ● 
 
In the Group ● ● ● ● ● ● 
In the industry 
  
● ● ø  
Other 
      Prior implementation 
level ø ø    
Ø 
Consistency 0.86 0.87 0.90 0.89 0.90 0.88 
Raw Coverage 0.34 0.26 0.10 0.18 0.51 0.28 
Unique Coverage 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.13 0.01 
Overall Solution 
Consistency 
     
0.83 
Overall Solution 
Coverage           0.65 
Note: In tables 11 to 16, each combination is a complete explanation for cases in which the level of coupling 
belongs to the set of high coupling (>=2). Large circles represent core conditions; small circles represent 
peripheral ones. ● represents presence of a condition; ø absence of a condition. 
 
 
Configurations 2a and 2b correspond to PPC of practices that are highly 
institutionalized in the subsidiary’s industry. They also display less favorable conditions: low 
compatibility and low level of institutionalization in the subsidiary’s country in 2a and 
complexity in 2b. But altogether, these adverse conditions seem to be counterbalanced by the 
institutionalization in the industry as well as peripheral characteristics- low complexity and 
performance advantage for 2a and performance advantage and compatibility in 2b. 
Practices in the PPC configuration 3 are highly compatible and enjoy a low level of 
complexity but their institutionalization is incomplete: while they are highly institutionalized 
in the subsidiary’s country, they are not institutionalized in their industry.  
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PPC configuration 4 is quite surprising as it corresponds to practices that lack 
performance advantage as a core condition. This unexpected core condition is surrounded by 
three more favorable peripheral conditions: high compatibility and institutionalization in the 
Group together with a low initial level of implementation. The fact that they are peripheral 
means that they are not all characterizing all practices in configuration 4, but that they vary 
from one practice to the next. However, the different combinations of those three conditions 
that exist for the practices in configuration 4 can compensate for the absence of performance 
advantage. 
More generally, for practices to be highly coupled, a favorable characteristic and a 
high level of institutionalization can be complements (as in configurations 1a and 3) or 
compensate for each other (as in configurations 1b, 2a and 2b). And in only one configuration 
(2a) does PPC occur for practices with only one favorable core condition (institutionalization 
in the subsidiary’s industry). PPC thus mostly occurs as the result of a combination of 
allowing factors at the practice level. In addition, we can notice that high institutionalization 
levels in the subsidiary’s country and industry are alternatively but never simultaneously core 
conditions for coupling. In 1b, country institutionalization is core, but industry 
institutionalization is not. In 2, the reverse is true. And in configurations 2a and 3, 
institutionalization in one of the two fields counterbalances the lack of institutionalization in 
the other field. 
Decoupling configurations 
I obtained 4 configurations with a coverage of 73% and a satisfying consistency of 
71% overall, as shown in table 12 below. In all configurations, a high initial implementation 
level is a core condition for decoupling, as it leaves room for it. Two characteristics (lack of 
compatibility in configuration 6 and high complexity in configuration 7) and one low level of 
institutionalization in the industry (in configuration 5) appear as alternative core conditions 
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for PPD. This suggests that conformity is fragile as a single condition can reduce the level of 
implementation when it is initially high. 
 
Table 12: Essay 3 -Configurations leading to PPD in period 1 
 
Non institutionalized 
in the industry 
Non compatible Complex 
 
5 6 7 
Practices characteristics 
   
Complexity 
  ● 
Performance advantage 
   
Value compatibility 
 ø   
Institutionalization 
   
In the country 
   
In the Group 
   
In the industry ø  
  
Other 
   Prior implementation 
level ● ● ● 
Consistency 0.80 0.88 0.82 
Raw Coverage 0.68 0.28 0.41 
Unique Coverage 0.22 0.01 0.01 
Overall Solution 
Consistency   
0.78 
Overall Solution 
Coverage   
0.71 
 
Second period 
Enduring coupling configurations 
With a consistency threshold of 0.78, I obtained only one configuration for enduring 
coupling in period 2. It represents a 51% coverage and a solution consistency of 78%. Thus, it 
does not explain all cases of continued coupling, but it has a high consistency
30
.  
The practices studied here were coupled during both observation periods: from 2012 to 
2013 and again from 2013 to 2014. The configuration shows that these practices (or 51% of 
                                                          
30
 I used 0.78 as a threshold as it represented a clear gap in the consistencies of the possible combinations. 
Lowering the threshold to increase the coverage would imply going below the recommended minimum of 75%. 
(Ragin, 2006, 2008).  
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them) are highly institutionalized in both the subsidiary’s country and its industry as core 
conditions. These core conditions are surrounded by additional and substitutable peripheral 
conditions: high performance advantage, high value compatibility and high level of 
institutionalization in the Group. 
Table 13: Essay 3 -Configurations leading to continued PPC 
 
Institutionalized in the 
industry and the country 
 
8 
Practices characteristics 
 
Complexity 
 
Performance advantage ● 
Value compatibility ● 
Institutionalization 
 
In the country ● 
In the Group ● 
In the industry ● 
Other 
 Prior implementation 
level  
Consistency 0.78 
Coverage 0.51 
 
While many equifinal configurations of practices explained PPC in period 1, the fact 
that I obtained only one configuration for enduring PPC suggests that it is a much rarer 
situation, as there is only one path to enduring PPC. In particular, in several PPC 
configurations, the CSR issue lacked institutionalization in either the industry or the country. 
The results for enduring PPC mean that those issues did not enjoy PPC again in the second 
period. Figure 15 below shows the paths to continued PPC. The thin lines suggest that three 
out of the six configurations for PPC include issues that potentially can enjoy PPC again in 
period 2, but only if they display an additional condition.  
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Figure 15: Essay 3 - Paths to enduring PPC 
 
 
 
Decoupling following coupling configurations 
I set the consistency threshold at 0.86 as it corresponded to a clear gap in the data. I 
thus obtained four configurations that together explain 69% of the cases of PPD following 
PPC, with a very high overall consistency of 86%. The practices in these configurations were 
coupled in the first period before being decoupled in the second period. 
 
 
Table 14: Essay 3 -Configurations leading to PPD following PPC 
 
Non 
institutionalized 
in the country 
Non 
institutionalized 
in the industry 
Complex 
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9 10 11a 11b 
Practices characteristics 
    
Complexity 
  ● ● 
Performance advantage 
   
Ø 
Value compatibility 
 
ø  
  
Institutionalization 
    
In the country ø  
  
Ø 
In the Group 
    
In the industry 
 
ø 
 
Ø 
Other 
    Prior implementation 
level ● ● ●  
Consistency 0.87 0.88 0.85 0.94 
Raw Coverage 0.58 0.27 0.38 0.23 
Unique Coverage 0.23 0.02 0.07 0.01 
Overall Solution 
Consistency    
0.84 
Overall Solution 
Coverage    
0.69 
 
After a first coupling process occurred between 2012 and 2013, unsurprisingly, some 
practices were highly implemented in 2013. Therefore, high implementation is a core 
condition for the first two configurations, and a peripheral one for the third configuration. 
However, it is not enough to explain PPD for practices that were first coupled. Next to the 
implementation level, three conditions are each core in one or two configurations: lack 
institutionalization of the policy in the subsidiary’s industry (configuration 9), lack of 
institutionalization in its country (configuration 10) and complexity (configuration 11a and 
11b). In configuration 11b were the initial level of implementation is not a condition, several 
alternative peripheral conditions surround complexity, meaning that practices in this 
configuration simultaneously display complexity and a low performance advantage or 
complexity and a low level of institutionalization in the subsidiary’s country or industry.  
Comparing the configurations obtained in the first period with those obtained for the 
second period suggests that there are many paths that include an initial PPC followed by PPD, 
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as shown by figure 16 below. In addition, for several configurations of PPC in period 1, PPD 
in period 2 seems unavoidable, as the core conditions are already present in the first period, as 
shown by the thicker arrows. 
Figure 16: Essay 3 - Paths to PPD following PPC 
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Coupling following decoupling configurations 
I chose 90% as a consistency threshold as it represented a significant gap in the 
configurations’ consistency levels. I thus obtained very consistent configurations (overall 
configuration of 89%) with a very good coverage still (74% of cases). 
 
Table 15: Essay 3 -Configurations leading to PPC following PPD 
 
Practices with a 
low initial 
implementation 
level 
Practices with 
low performance 
advantage 
Non 
institutionalized 
in the industry 
Complex 
practices 
 
12a 12b 13 14 15 
Practices characteristics 
     
Complexity ø 
   ● 
Performance advantage 
 
● ø ● ● 
Value compatibility 
 
ø ● ● ● 
Institutionalization 
     
In the country ● 
    
In the Group ● ● ● ● ● 
In the industry 
   
Ø 
 
Other 
     Prior implementation 
level ø ø ø ●  
Consistency 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.91 0.90 
Raw Coverage 0.33 0.35 0.27 0.43 0.45 
Unique Coverage 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.09 0.06 
Overall Solution 
Consistency     
0.89 
Overall Solution 
Coverage     
0.74 
 
For the practices in these configurations, one or several favorable conditions 
counterbalance the unfavorable conditions that explain the occurrence of PPD in the first 
period and allow PPC to happen in the second period. In most configurations the unfavorable 
conditions are still core: lack of compatibility in 12b, limited performance advantage in 13, 
low institutionalization in the subsidiary’s industry in 14 and complexity in 15. In 
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configuration 12a, practices were implemented to a limited extent because of their previous 
decoupling and institutionalized in the country as core conditions, resulting in PPC in the 
second period. 
Figure 17 below shows the various paths for PPC following PPD. One can see that all 
PPD configurations in period 1 are compatible with all PPC configurations in period 2, which 
suggests that the potential for practices to be “recoupled” after a first decoupling process is 
quite high. In particular, the core conditions of the PPD configurations in period 1 are each 
core in on configuration of period 2. 
Figure 17- Essay 3: Paths leading to PPC following PPD 
 
 
Enduring decoupling configurations 
The consistency threshold of this analysis is of 80% as it corresponded to a clear gap 
in the configurations’ consistencies. It left me with configurations representing 60% of cases 
and an overall consistency of 76%. 
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First and most of all, the practices that are decoupled again in the second period were 
still highly implemented in 2013 as a core condition, so that there was room for further 
decoupling. In configuration 16, the practices are also non compatible as a core condition. By 
contrast, practices in configurations 17 and 18 display two core favorable conditions. These 
explain that the practices were only slightly decoupled over the first period, and it was 
probably again the case in the second period. Both configurations have institutionalization in 
the subsidiary’s country as a core condition. In addition, lack of complexity and 
institutionalization in the subsidiary’s industry are respectively core in configurations 17 and 
18.  
Table 16: Essay 3 -Configurations leading to enduring PPD 
 
Non 
compatible 
Non complex 
and 
institutionalized 
in the country 
Institutionalized in 
country and industry 
 
16 17 18 
Practices characteristics 
   
Complexity 
 ø  
Performance advantage 
   
Value compatibility ø   
Institutionalization 
   
In the country 
 ● ● 
In the Group 
   
In the industry 
  
● 
Other 
   Prior implementation 
level ● ● ● 
Consistency 0.75 0.75 0.80 
Raw Coverage 0.30 0.50 0.38 
Unique Coverage 0.08 0.08 0.03 
Overall Solution 
Consistency   
0.73 
Overall Solution 
Coverage   
0.60 
  
On figure 18 below, only one configuration of PPD in period 1 is further decoupled in 
period 2: the set of non-compatible practices. Practices in the other two configurations of PPD 
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in period 1 need one or two additional conditions to be decoupled in the second period. And 
comparing results from enduring PPD and PPD followed by PPC allows suggesting that non-
compatible practices are decoupled up to a certain extent only, as when implementation in 
2013 is low, PPC occurs in the second period and when implementation in 2013 is high, PPD 
occurs again in the second period. 
 
Figure 18: Essay 3 - Paths leading to enduring PPD 
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Summary of results 
Table 17 below summarized the main results of the fuzzy set QCA. 
Table 17: Essay 3 - Summary of the FsQCA results 
  
PPC in period 1 PPD in period 1 
PPC in period 2 
Only practices that are 
institutionalized in both the 
country and the industry 
Practices that lack 
institutionalization in either the 
country or the industry 
Complex practices 
PPD in period 2 
Practices that lack 
institutionalization in the industry 
Practices that are complex or non 
compatible 
Mostly practices that lack 
compatibility 
 
 
Overall, while PPC lasts only when practices are institutionalized in their industry and 
their country simultaneously and PPD can only last for incompatible practices over a limited 
period of time, short PPC and PPD periods follow each other in a dynamic way for most 
practices. 
Robustness tests 
In order to check the robustness of my results, I ran a traditional OLS regression to 
verify the reliability of the data. The three practices’ characteristics and their 
institutionalization levels were all found to have significant effects on the level of coupling 
(negative for complexity and positive for the other 5 variables), as shown by table 23 in 
appendix G. This finding, consistent with prior literature, in not surprising but gives me 
confidence that the operationalization reflects my conceptualization of the characteristics and 
institutionalization levels. In addition, I performed additional FsQCA with different 
consistency thresholds. Higher thresholds provided similar although fewer configurations and 
lower thresholds increased coverage by providing additional configurations but they produced 
less robust results as the overall consistency of the solutions dropped. 
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Discussion and conclusion 
This paper suggests that PPC and PPD are dynamic rather than unidirectional 
processes, as in most cases they follow each other over two periods of time. In addition, the 
fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis shows that (1) the institutionalization of an issue in 
the subsidiary’s country and industry is key for enduring PPC, (2) and practices’ lack of value 
compatibility is the main driver of enduring PPD, although even for those, decoupling seems 
to be limited in time. Indeed, PPD lasts only as long as the resulting level of implementation 
remains high and reverses back to PPC when the implementation level becomes too low. For 
practices that lack institutionalization in either the subsidiary’s country or its industry and 
practices that are complex, PPC and PPD follow each other over time. 
This work contributes to neo-institutional theory and conformity literature by showing 
that policy-practice decoupling and coupling are dynamic processes that not only unfold over 
time but also alternate. This contrasts with previous works that conceptualized decoupling as 
an enduring state and coupling as a unidirectional process limited in time. In addition, it 
answers the call to focus on the role of practices’ attributes in conformity (e.g. Ansari et al., 
2010) and suggests that for complex CSR issues, practices are sequentially coupled and 
decoupled from the corporate policy overtime and that for non-compatible CSR issues, 
practices are decoupled from the corporate policy until they reach a minimum level of 
implementation from which they get “recoupled”. 
This paper also speaks to research on institutional pressures exerted on an MNE’s 
subsidiaries (e.g. Delmas & Toffel, 2010; Kostova & Roth, 2002: Kostova & Zaheer, 1999) as 
it shows that the subsidiaries’ industry and country highly influence their implementation of 
practices. In particular, for PPC to last, institutionalization in both fields is necessary and 
when institutionalization in either one of the two fields is low, phases of PPC and PPD 
alternate. 
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This essay also includes a potential managerial contribution, in so far as it points to 
discursive institutionalization work as a means to reduce variability in practice adoption, 
which is crucial in a large organization. Institutionalization of a CSR issue in the Group is 
necessary for coupling, but never as a core condition. Communication should therefore 
convey whenever possible the importance of practices not only for the Group but also from 
the perspective of its subsidiaries’ industries and local stakeholders. Next to the discourse 
dimension, managers should seek to select practices and implement adoption processes so as 
to maximize value compatibility and minimize complexity of the practices if they aim to 
diffuse them widely in the organization. 
Limitations and directions for future research 
This paper suffers from four limitations that offer directions for future research. 
First, institutionalization is a process based on discourse and previous works showed 
that the content of discourse is central to the legitimation of change (Vaara & Tenari, 2008, 
2011). Therefore, one could argue that the frequency of occurrence of CSR issues in the 
MNE’s and the industry associations’ communications is not exactly capturing 
institutionalization. While I believe my operationalization is still capturing the importance of 
the three issues in the Group and in the subsidiaries’ industries, future works could code the 
content of discourse in the three relevant fields: the communication from the Group and its 
subsidiaries’ industries and the media coverage of the issues in the subsidiaries’ countries. For 
instance, the coding could rely on Tolbert and Zucker’s description of the three 
institutionalization stages: pre-, semi- and full institutionalization (1996). 
Second, the observation windows for this paper are relatively short periods. This work 
would have certainly benefitted from more numerous and longer time periods. However, even 
in this context, I found that PPC and PPD alternated in many cases. Future work should look 
at PPC and PPD patterns over longer periods of time to comfort these first findings. 
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Third, CSR practices have been shown to be easily “decouplable”. More work is 
needed to generalize my findings to other types of practices such as accounting or quality 
management practices for which conformity levels might be more stable over time. 
And fourth, this paper conceptualizes PPC and PPD as occurring at the CSR issue 
level (i.e. safety, environmental biodiversity and the employment of female managers). 
However, some characteristics of the practices might be really practice-specific rather than 
issue-related. Some safety practices are more compatible than others, some gender diversity 
practices more complex than others, etc. In addition, within issues, some practices could be 
closer to each other than others in terms of attributes, PPC, and PPD. Future research should 
therefore investigate the fine-grained influence of practices’ attributes on their conformity.  
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CONCLUSION 
The research question studied in this dissertation was “Why do the subsidiaries of an 
MNE display heterogeneity in their conformity to the corporate policy?” Previous works on 
conformity do not allow tackling this question fully because they did not consider three key 
points: (1) subsidiaries undergo heterogeneous conformity pressures from inside and outside 
the MNE, (2) conformity is an intra-organizational matter, and (3) coupling and decoupling 
are dynamic processes that unfold over time. 
Addressing these three gaps, the essays of this dissertation contribute to the 
explanation of heterogeneous conformity in MNEs in complementary ways. They together 
suggest that this heterogeneity is not only related to the various environments in which the 
subsidiaries are embedded but also to (1) the varying levels of attention they pay to the 
demands of the MNE’s headquarters and to the demands of their external constituents, (2) to 
their internalization of the corporate policy which is a central component of subsidiary 
conformity and (3) to the varying ways in which similar practices are perceived and 
institutionalized. 
In particular, the first essay in chapter 2 suggests that the different levels of the 
subsidiaries’ attention to the normative demands of their internal or external constituents leads 
to varying degrees of practices’ implementation. And the attention level itself depends on the 
norm-conforming behavior of its internal and external peers. Thus, the subsidiaries do not 
blindly imitate their peers, but rather increase their attention to certain demands –sometimes 
at the expense of others- in response to their peers’ conformity. 
In the second essay (chapter 3), I show that the subsidiaries’ conformity to the 
corporate policy depends on the pressure exerted by the MNE’s headquarters as per the 
international management literature tenets and on the implementation of conforming practices 
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by their peer subsidiaries, applying the arguments of the neo-institutional theory to the intra-
organizational field. But these effects vary as a function of the level of internalization of the 
policy by the subsidiaries. More specifically, high internalization limits the influence of 
headquarters and peers on a subsidiary’s conformity. At the issue level, I found that 
subsidiary conformity was primarily driven by internalization for safety practices, and by 
headquarters’ pressure and implementation by peers for practices favoring the employment of 
women in managerial positions and the preservation of biodiversity. 
And in chapter 4, I found that policy-practice coupling (PPC) and policy-practice 
decoupling (PPD) were dynamic rather than unidirectional processes, as in most cases they 
follow each other over two periods of time. In addition, my analysis showed that PPC 
occurred only when CSR issues were institutionalized in both the subsidiary’s country and its 
industry and that practices’ lack of value compatibility was the main driver of sustained PPD, 
but only down to a minimal implementation level. 
In the following concluding paragraphs, I highlight how this dissertation can 
contribute to various literatures –the neo-institutional theory, the international management 
literature and the CSR literature-, I propose managerial implication for my findings, I stress 
my work’s limitations and point to potential related future research projects. 
Contribution to the neo-institutional theory 
By applying neo-institutional arguments to the MNE context, I define some concepts 
more precisely and refine some social mechanisms at play in the implementation of practices.  
Heterogeneous pressures on subsidiaries and strategic conformity 
Following Kostova and colleagues request (2008), I consider the MNE’s belonging to 
several fields simultaneously, which generates complex pressures for conformity. While 
previous works came a long way is showing how subsidiaries are exposed to different 
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pressures from their local environments (e.g. Delmas & Toffel, 2008; Kostova & Roth, 2002), 
little is known about the way they process and articulate those pressures. Essay 1 shows that a 
subsidiary’s implementation of CSR practices results from the interplay between the demands 
from its environmental constituents and the level of conformity of its peers. In addition, 
although it is considered as the source of great influences (Kostova et al., 2008), the intra-
organizational field has not received much specific attention (Garcia-Pont et al., 2009). Essay 
2 sheds light on the dual intra-organizational pressures subsidiaries undergo: from the MNE’s 
headquarters and from other subsidiaries. Finally, contrasting with previous works, essay 3 
studies how the three fields in which subsidiaries are embedded -the industry, the country and 
the MNE- influence practices’ coupling and decoupling patterns. 
In this complex setting, I argue that subsidiaries answer demands in a strategic 
manner. Indeed, my essays suggest that institutional demands go through a strategic attention 
process within organizations (subsidiaries in my case) and that peers are not always blindly 
imitated, even within organizations. This dissertation further advances the understanding of 
conformity as a strategic choice. In essay 1, subsidiaries react to peers’ behavior by adapting 
their level of attention to certain demands. My findings contradict the assumption that 
attention is necessarily limited, which has implications for the way organizations deal with 
plural and conflicting institutional logics. And in essay 2, the influence of headquarters’ and 
peers on a subsidiary’s level of conformity reduces as its internalization of the policy 
increases. Further, in essay 3, my analysis suggests that the role of the practices’ 
institutionalization in the subsidiaries’ country and industry is central to enduring coupling 
processes within MNEs.  
Intra-organizational (de)coupling processes 
This dissertation contributes to the understanding of policy-practice (de)coupling by 
showing how it can take place between different organizational units that are for some in 
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charge of elaborating the policy and for some others responsible for the implementation of 
corresponding practices. This conceptual refinement is consistent with Crilly, Zollo and 
Hansen’s findings that decoupling in MNEs can be “emergent” (2012: 1441) but departs from 
most works on policy-practice decoupling that see it as an organization-level strategy (e.g. 
Fiss & Zajac, 2004, 2006; Westphal & Zajac, 1994, 1998, 2001). Depicting (de)coupling as 
occurring without a unique strategic intent on the part of the top management allows for intra-
organizational heterogeneity in conformity levels that was not sufficiently considered by 
previous works. Thus, essay 2 proposes a model of intra-organizational conformity that 
accounts for internal dynamics and varying subsidiaries’ behaviors. 
In addition, in essay 3, I consider decoupling and coupling as dynamic processes and I 
study how they unfold over time, contrasting with previous works that conceptualized 
decoupling as a state (e.g. Fiss & Zajac, 2004, 2006; Westphal & Zajac, 1994, 1998, 2001) 
and coupling as a unidirectional process (e.g. Hallet, 2010; Tilcsik, 2010). My findings 
support this dynamic dimension of conformity processes as in most cases periods of policy-
practice coupling and decoupling follow each other over time. 
Contribution to the international management literature 
Previous works underlined the unique situation of MNE’s subsidiaries that have to 
address demands from their headquarters and from their local environment simultaneously 
(Doz & Prahalad, 1991; Rosenzweig & Sinh, 1991; Westney, 1993; Hillman & Wan, 2005; 
Kostova & Roth, 2002). But their responses are often depicted as passive (e.g. Delmas & 
Toffel, 2008). In this dissertation, I argue that subsidiaries conform to corporate policies in a 
strategic way. Thus, this dissertation contributes to research on subsidiaries’ strategies by 
defining concepts such as subsidiaries’ attention, conformity and internalization. 
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Subsidiary attention to demands 
In the international management context, the role of attention (Ocasio, 1997, 2011) has 
mostly been study at the headquarters’ level: international attention (Bouquet et al., 2009), 
attention to the subsidiaries (Ambos et al., 2010; Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008). In the first 
essay of this dissertation, I shift the focus from headquarters’ attention to the subsidiaries’ 
attention as a strategic process which is instrumental in the implementation of corporate 
policies within MNEs. I define subsidiaries’ attention to demands as comprising their noticing 
of these demands, their focusing of time and effort on understanding them, and their 
elaborating a response strategy. Thus, I advance our understanding of how subsidiaries 
strategically address their dual embeddedness in the MNE and in their local environment. 
Subsidiary conformity 
Most recent works on organizational conformity present it as a strategic behavior 
(Durand & Jourdan, 2012; Durand & Kremp, 2015; Philippe & Durand, 2011) but the 
potential for an MNE’s subsidiaries to strategically define their conformity to corporate policy 
has received little attention so far. In the second essay of this dissertation, I propose a model 
for subsidiary conformity defined as the extent to which the subsidiary increases its level of 
implementation of practices that are consistent with the policy. This definition emphasizes the 
strategic role the subsidiaries play in MNEs’ conformity. In addition, my findings suggest that 
subsidiary conformity does not solely depend on the demands from the headquarters, but also 
on the behavior of their peers and on the subsidiary’s perception of the policy.  
Subsidiary policy internalization 
Previous works in the international management context studied policy internalization 
as an outcome (Björkman et al., 2011; Kostova & Roth, 2002) and defined typologies of 
subsidiaries based on their level of policy internalization and implementation (Kostova & 
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Roth, 2002). The second essay contributes to this body of literature by looking at the complex 
relationship between internalization and conformity. I define subsidiaries’ internalization of a 
policy as that mechanism through which the subsidiaries get committed to the policy because 
of its consistency with their values. My results show that internalization is core to the 
understanding of intra-organizational conformity as it not only increases subsidiaries’ 
conformity but also influences the way they process intra-organizational pressures. 
Subsidiaries’ perceptions of practices’ attributes 
 In the third essay of this dissertation, I find that policy-practice coupling and 
decoupling depend on (1) the level of institutionalization of the practices in the MNE, the 
subsidiaries’ industry and their country and (2) the way the subsidiaries perceived the 
practices. The findings of this essay therefore talk to research on the diffusion of innovations 
in MNEs (e.g. Lin &Ho, 2011). Previous work focuses on technological innovations and on 
the innovations’ attributes that favored their adoption. My third essay shows that, for 
normative innovations, the inner attributes of the practices are not the sole explanation for 
their adoption as their institutionalization levels also matter. 
Contribution to the CSR literature 
Thanks to the unique data I collected on the implementation of CSR in one MNE, my 
dissertation can nurture the research on the motives for CSR implementation. 
Motives for CSR implementation 
CSR scholars have proposed that there were three types of motives for CSR 
implementation: an instrumental one, a social one and a moral one (Aguilera et al., 2007), but 
we miss empirical evidence of the way these motives combine in explaining organizations’ 
conformity to the CSR norm. The results of the second essay support the co-existence of 
distinct motives for CSR implementation in an MNE’s subsidiaries. And they unexpectedly 
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suggest that having mixed motives for CSR implementation does not necessarily lead to the 
highest possible level of conformity. In particular, I find that socially-based motives related to 
peers’ prior implementation of CSR practices and moral motives related to the consistency of 
the CSR practices with the subsidiaries’ values have stronger effects on conformity separately 
than when combined. In addition, studying specific practices in more detail allowed me to 
observe that CSR practices might primarily be implemented based on one main type of 
motives rather than several types -social or moral rather than both in this case. 
CSR dynamics within MNEs 
This dissertation speaks to recent works focusing on the intra-organizational dynamics 
of CSR implementation (Basu & Palazzo, 2012; Crilly et al., 2012). In particular, Crilly and 
colleagues (2012) found that managerial consensus about CSR priorities within MNEs was 
crucial for CSR conformity. But little attention was paid to the way subsidiaries influence 
each other when implementing CSR. In the first essay, I find that internal peers’ 
implementation of CSR leads an MNE’s subsidiaries to attend to the demands of both their 
internal and external constituents in terms of CSR and eventually increase their own level of 
implementation. And in the second essay, the imitation of other subsidiaries appears as a 
central component of a subsidiary’s conforming behavior. 
CSR as a heterogeneous domain 
Finally, my dissertation shows that there is a need to distinguish between different 
CSR issues as their institutionalization stage and the perceptions organizations have of their 
complexity, performance advantage and value compatibility vary greatly (see essays 2 and 3). 
In particular, essay 3 suggests that complexity and a lack of value-compatibility of CSR 
issues both favor policy-practice decoupling. In addition, my second essay suggests that the 
main motive for CSR implementation depends on the CSR issue considered: subsidiaries of 
mostly conform to the MNE’s safety policy because they internalize it and they mostly 
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conform to the biodiversity and gender equality policies because of their headquarters’ and 
peers’ influences. Thus, CSR scholars should beware of considering CSR as a homogeneous 
whole, as it brings together somewhat unrelated and sometimes conflicting issues and 
conformity mechanisms vary across issues. 
Contribution to management practice 
My dissertation also has practical managerial implications as it helps MNE’s 
headquarters understand why conformity levels vary across the MNE’s subsidiaries and how 
they evolve over time. 
More specifically, my work suggests that subsidiary conformity –which is desirable 
for the MNE’s top managers - is not achieved through top down enforcement of policies only. 
The CSR example shows that the initiatives that emerge locally from the demands of external 
constituents can improve the subsidiaries’ conformity and thus the MNE’s conformity. This 
means that such initiatives should be encouraged and the MNE as a whole could benefit from 
the experience and knowledge accumulated locally by its subsidiaries, should it be shared. 
In addition, the pressure headquarters put on their subsidiaries might prove counter-
productive in certain situations as it has limited or even negative impact on conformity for 
subsidiaries that internalize the policy. MNE’s managers should consider granting 
subsidiaries some leeway in the implementation of CSR practices, depending on how much 
they internalize the policy. Communication and monitoring efforts should be concentrated 
towards subsidiaries that do not perceive the policy favorably. 
Moreover, intra-organizational emulation appears as favorable for the implementation 
of practices (see essay 1) and subsidiaries’ conformity (see essay 2). Managing the 
subsidiaries’ conformity strategies through a strategic allocation of resources should therefore 
be a major concern for the headquarters’ when attempting to diffuse a new policy. A few 
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central subsidiaries in each industry or country could act as champions of the corporate policy 
and foster its diffusion among their network of peer subsidiaries. 
However, this dissertation also suggests that CSR policy-practice coupling and 
decoupling come and go very quickly (see essay 3). The top managers of MNEs should 
therefore watch their non-financial reporting very carefully on a regular basis and combine 
performance indicators with indicators that track the implementation of desired practices. 
Finally, as far as subsidiaries’ managers are concerned, they can take away that CSR 
conformity through the faithful implementation of group policies as well as implementation of 
unique and innovative initiatives can help them gain attention from the headquarters and 
power vis-à-vis their counterparts, probably beyond CSR issues. 
Limitations 
I discuss hereafter the main limitations of my dissertation, that relate to boundary 
conditions and generalizability as well as the data collection process. 
First, I focus on the context of MNEs, and collect data in one organization, which 
limits the generalizability of the results. It would be interesting to better understand whether 
my finding about conformity dynamics in MNEs apply to other settings in which 
organizations face institutional complexity -for instance academia, healthcare and 
professional services firms. Even in the international management context, my results might 
not generalize to all MNEs. Indeed, in more globally integrated MNEs, the results might 
differ a little bit, with a greater role of the headquarters and a smaller strategic freedom of the 
subsidiaries.  
Second, consistent with previous work, I argued that subsidiaries had to face 
heterogeneous demands for conformity from inside and outside the MNE. But I studied 
subsidiaries’ responses to demands that all point towards increased CSR conformity. 
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Therefore, although I believe subsidiaries still prioritize certain demands over others, in my 
setting, they do not have to face real trade-offs between demands. Studying conflicting 
demands –i.e. some in favor of conformity and some against- would probably provide more 
contrasting results. 
Third, although it is crucial to study conformity for CSR practices as it is a central 
issue for MNEs, one could wonder whether the arguments and findings of this dissertation 
would apply to other norms or practices. I believe the theoretical arguments I offer would 
apply in other settings as well. Still, further investigation is needed to generalize my findings 
beyond the three CSR practices I study. 
Fifth, I define coupling and decoupling as dynamic processes and therefore observe 
subsidiaries’ implementation of practices over 3 time periods of a one-year duration. My work 
would probably have benefited from more numerous and longer observation windows. 
However, the fact that I observed variations in implementation and consistent explanations for 
them suggests that coupling and decoupling processes do unfold over time in a very dynamic 
way. 
Finally, regarding the validity of my findings, my data is exposed to a risk of social 
desirability and a risk of common method bias as a large part of it is survey-based. As detailed 
in chapters 2 to 4, I took steps to minimize these risks in the design of the survey instrument 
as well as in the analysis and I statistically checked that they were limited. 
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Ideas for a research agenda 
I detail hereafter some additional research ideas that emerged from this work and that 
would heavily draw on the data I collected for this dissertation. 
Conformity as standard behavior in the MNE context 
In this dissertation, I considered conformity as the alignment of the subsidiaries’ 
practices with the prescriptions of the corporate policy. But conformity has also been more 
narrowly defined as extent to which an organization’s behavior resembles the standard 
behavior adopted by its peers in a mimetic way (Deephouse, 1996; Durand & Kremp, 2015; 
Raffaelli & Glynn, 2014). In future work, I would like to advance our understanding of this 
kind of conformity in the MNE context. For instance, I could apply the two types of 
conformity defined at the organizational and individual levels of analysis by Durand & 
Kremp (2015) – alignment and conventionality – to an MNE’s subsidiaries and see what 
drives their adoption of intra-organizational vs. external alignment and/or conventionality. 
The data I collected for my first essay will allow me to study this question.  
A network approach to subsidiaries’ mutual influences 
This dissertation stresses the role intra-organizational peers play in MNE conformity. 
To better understand the dynamics at play, I would like to focus on the role the subsidiaries’ 
network structure has on their conformity. I will look at the relative positions of the 
subsidiaries in the network (embedded, peripheral, etc) and see how that affects their own 
level of conformity and their influence on other subsidiaries’ conformity. To do so, I will use 
some items in one of my surveys measuring the links that exist between the subsidiaries in my 
sample in order to draw the network of subsidiaries. 
 
 
162 
 
Understanding conformity at the practice level 
This dissertation suggests that there is a need to study specific CSR practices as many 
of them are implemented independently from each other by MNEs’ subsidiaries, although 
they might be part of a common unique policy at the corporate level. I studied 25 practices 
related to 3 CSR issues. But conformity might not solely be issue-based as considered in my 
third essay. My data do suggest that there is a lot of heterogeneity in a given subsidiary’ 
implementation level of practices related to a specific CSR issue. I would like to study this 
phenomenon further and understand whether there are core vs. peripheral practices or some 
more easily decoupled than others and why. 
The role of subsidiaries’ managers in conformity 
Previous works on coupling within organizations point to the role individuals in 
organizational conformity (e.g. Hallet, 2010; Tilcsik, 2010). In the MNE context, the 
subsidiaries’ managers are key decision-makers in charge of implementing conform practices 
in their unit. But the role they play in subsidiary conformity remains to be studied. In this 
dissertation, I used subsidiary*practice or subsidiary*topic as a unit of analysis. But most of 
my data is actually at the individual level as I collected it through survey instruments, so that I 
could study conformity at the individual level of analysis. In addition, I included items in my 
questionnaire to capture individual characteristics such as tenure and profession. Based on my 
data, I will be able to further examine the role of individual characteristics in their perception 
of CSR and in the implementation of CSR practices. For instance, I expect that background 
and responsibilities of subsidiaries’ managers are antecedents of their internalization of the 
CSR corporate policy. 
I will also study the specific role of CSR managers in conformity. I suspect that they 
have a role of boundary spanners within the MNE (Kostova & Roth, 2003) and I will test that 
assumption and look at what it means in terms of the way they work and for organizational 
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conformity. I included in one of my surveys some items about the relationships of the 
respondents with the CSR, environmental, HR and health and safety managers of their entity. 
 
 
 
Overall, my dissertation suggests that studying subsidiary conformity in terms of CSR 
contributes to larger central debates in neo-institutional theory, the international management 
literature and the CSR literature. In addition, CSR conformity is a crucial issue for MNEs’ top 
managers who face mounting global demands regarding sustainability and for society. But it 
is still understudied and offers great perspectives for a lot of impactful research. I hope my 
personal research will modestly advance our theoretical understanding of this critical issue 
and help MNEs walk the CSR talk as much as possible as I believe they play a central role in 
meeting the social and environmental challenges ahead. 
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APPENDIX A: IMPLEMENTATION OF CSR PRACTICES – LIST OF SURVEY 
ITEMS 
Safety items:  
1. “We have a safety management system” 
2. “Our entity designated a health and safety coordinator” 
3. “We systematically use protecting equipment (helmets, gloves, safety shoes, etc)” 
4. “Our entity has a policy that sets our ambition in terms of health and safety and define 
progress paths” 
5. “There is a communication on health and safety towards employees in our entity (written 
information, poster campaign, events, etc)”  
6. “Some training to work safety is compulsory for employees in our entity” 
7. “Our entity has quantitative objectives for health and safety” 
8. “In our entity, there is a health and safety action plan that sets improvement objectives 
regarding prevention and protection.”  
Women in management items:  
1. “We implement practices to favor gender equity in the recruitment of managers” 
2. “We implement practices to favor gender equity during annual performance interviews” 
3. “The equal pay between men and women is observed in our entity” 
4. “Our entity has quantitative objectives regarding the recruitment and employment of women 
among managers” 
5. “In our entity, the work-life balance is favored (adapted working time, telecommuting, child 
day care)” 
6. “Some awareness and communication campaigns to prevent gender discrimination take place 
in our entity” 
7. “We favor the access of our female employees to trainings dedicated to leadership” 
8. “There is an internal women network in our entity”.  
Biodiversity items: 
1. “Our environmental management system includes measures to preserve biodiversity” 
2. “Biodiversity threats are analyzed when we screen new investment opportunities” 
3. “There is a communication on biodiversity towards employees in our entity” 
4. “We engage in projects to limit the impact of our activities on biodiversity” 
5. “We measure the impact of our activities on biodiversity” 
6. “Our entity has measurable objectives for biodiversity preservation” 
7. “We collaborate with environmental organizations on biodiversity preservation and 
restoration” 
8. “Financial means are dedicated to the management of our impact on biodiversity” 
9. “We perform a regulatory watch on biodiversity issues”.  
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APPENDIX B: EXTERNAL PEERS’ CONFORMITY – LIST OF ASSET4 ITEMS 
The ASSET4 items capturing peers’ safety performance were:  
1. “Does the company have a policy to improve employee health & safety within the 
company and its supply chain?” 
2. “Does the company describe the implementation of its employee health & safety 
policy through a public commitment from a senior management or board member or 
the establishment of an employee health & safety team? AND Does the company 
describe the implementation of its employee health & safety policy through the 
processes in place?” 
3. “Does the company monitor or measure its performance on employee health & 
safety?” 
4. “Does the company set specific objectives to be achieved on employee health & 
safety? AND Does the company comment on the results of previously set objectives?” 
5. “Does the company report on policies or programs on HIV/AIDS for the workplace or 
beyond?” 
6. “Is the company under the spotlight of the media because of a controversy linked to 
workforce health and safety?” 
The seven ASSET4 items capturing peers’ gender diversity performance were:  
1. “Does the company have a work-life balance policy? AND Does the company have a 
diversity and equal opportunity policy?” 
2. “Does the company describe the implementation of its diversity and opportunity 
policy?” 
3. “Does the company monitor the diversity and equal opportunities in its workforce?” 
4. “Does the company set specific objectives to be achieved on diversity and equal 
opportunity?” 
5. “Does the company promote positive discrimination? OR Has the company won any 
prize or award relating to diversity or opportunity?” 
6. “Does the company claim to provide generous vacations, career breaks or sabbaticals? 
OR Does the company claim to provide flexible working hours or working hours that 
promote a work-life balance?” 
7. “Does the company claim to provide day care services for its employees? OR Does the 
company claim to provide generous maternity leave benefits? OR Has the company 
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won a family friendly prize like a "Working Mother Award"?”. 
The twelve ASSET4 items capturing peers’ environmental biodiversity performance were:  
1. “Does the company have a policy for reducing environmental emissions or its impacts 
on biodiversity? AND Does the company have a policy for maintaining an 
environmental management system?” 
2. “Does the company report on initiatives to protect, restore or reduce its impact on 
native ecosystems and species, biodiversity, protected and sensitive areas?”  
3. “Does the company report on partnerships or initiatives with specialized NGOs, 
industry organizations, governmental or supra-governmental organizations that focus 
on improving environmental issues?” 
4. “Does the company report or provide information on company-generated initiatives to 
restore the environment?” 
5. “Does the company report on initiatives to reduce the environmental impact of 
transportation of its products or its staff?” 
6. Is the company directly or indirectly (through a supplier) under the spotlight of the 
media because of a controversy linked to the spill of chemicals, oils and fuels, gases 
(flaring) or controversy relating to the overall impacts of the company on the 
environment?” 
7. “Does the company report on initiatives to reduce, avoid or minimize the effects of 
spills or other polluting events (crisis management system)?” 
8. “Does the company have a policy for reducing the use of natural resources? AND 
Does the company have a policy to lessen the environmental impact of its supply 
chain?” 
9. “Does the company describe the implementation of its resource efficiency policy 
through a public commitment from a senior management or board member? AND 
Does the company describe the implementation of its resource efficiency policy 
through the processes in place?” 
10. “Does the company have environmentally friendly or green sites or offices?” 
11. “Does the company report on initiatives to reuse or recycle water? OR Does the 
company report on initiatives to reduce the amount of water used?” 
12. “Does the company report on initiatives to reduce the environmental impact on land 
owned, leased or managed for production activities or extractive use?” 
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APPENDIX C: ESSAY 1 – LIST OF IDENTIFYING VARIABLES 
 
A subsidiary’s size is measured as its employee numbers as at 30.09.12, logged as 
there was great disparity between entities. 
Subsidiary autonomy was captured through a question in the survey addressed to 
managers (adapted from Bouquet & Birkinshaw, 2008) which read: “In the following 
propositions, please select the answers that best describe the decision-making process in your 
subsidiary”, on five items: ‘To discontinue a major existing product/service or product/service 
line’, ‘To invest in major plant or equipment to expand production capacity’, ‘To formulate 
and approve your entity's annual budgets’, ‘To increase (beyond budget) expenditures for 
research and development’, ‘To subcontract out large portions of the production’. The 
respondents were asked to choose between 6 potential answers: ‘the entity's opinion is not 
asked; decision is explained to the entity by the Branch’, ‘proposal by the Branch, but the 
entity's opinion carries little weight’, ‘proposal by the Branch, and the entity's opinion carries 
a lot of weight’, ‘proposal by the entity, decision made by the Branch’, ‘decision made by the 
entity without much consultation with the Branch’, and ‘Non applicable’. Since the various 
items reflect measures of the entity’s autonomy, we calculated a Cronbach alpha across the 
five items, which resulted in a coefficient of 0.74, thus the internal consistency of the scale 
was good. We therefore generated a single autonomy variable per respondent by averaging 
their scores across the five items (the few ‘non-applicable’ responses were replaced by the 
average response among all respondents who answered one of the five first items).  
The ownership variable represents the level of the Group’s control over the entity, and 
takes the value 1 when the MNE owns less than 50% of the focal entity (i.e., a minority 
stake), 2 when it is between 50% and 99% (a majority stake) and 3 for over 99% (i.e., full 
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control). 
The subsidiary’s Group history corresponds to the time the subsidiary had been part of 
the Group by 2012 – taking the values of 1 for less than 10 years, 2 for less than 20 years, and 
3 otherwise. 
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APPENDIX D: ESSAY 1 – MEDIATION ANALYSIS 
Tables 14 and 15 hereafter present the results of the linear regression models we used 
for our mediation analysis: we clustered the regressions by practice and country. 
Model 5 is the reference model, and includes all the control variables. To test the 
mediation role played by attention to different demands on the relationships between peer 
conformity and practice implementation, we follow the steps of Baron and Kenny’s (1986) 
approach to testing for mediation.. In model 6, the conformity of both types of peers (the 
independent variables) appears to have a positive and significant impact on the 
implementation of practices (the dependent variable), consistent with the first step of Baron 
and Kenny’s approach. In models 11 to 14, we complete the second step of the approach by 
looking at the impact of the independent variables on the mediators: conformity of external 
peers has a positive and significant impact on attention to the demands of external 
constituents in model 11, and a negative and significant impact on attention to headquarters’ 
demands in model 12; andconformity of internal peers has a positive and significant impact 
on attention to the demands of external constituents in model 13, and a positive and 
significant impact on attention to headquarters’ demands in model 14. Model 7 in Table 14 
allows us to complete the third step of this approach by showing that the mediators (attention 
to demands from external constituents and from headquarters) both significantly impact the 
dependent variable (level of implementation of CSR practices). Finally, we perform the fourth 
Baron and Kenny step in models 8 and 9, by introducing the independent variables and the 
mediators at the same time. In model 8, introducing attention to the demands of external 
constituents decreases the impact of the conformity of both types of peers. The effects of 
conformity of both types of peers on the implementation of practices are partly and 
simultaneously due to the related increased attention to the demands of external constituents.  
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Table 18: Appendix D: Clustered linear regressions estimating the effect of peers’ conformity and attention on CSR practices 
implementation 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Attention to external demands     0.30*** (0.03) 0.41*** (0.02)   0.28*** (0.03) 
Attention to HQs’ demands     0.17*** (0.03)   0.36*** (0.02) 0.18*** (0.03) 
Conformity of external peers   0.53*** (0.15)   0.30* (0.14) 0.61*** (0.14) 0.41** (0.14) 
Conformity of internal peers   0.61*** (0.12)   0.42*** (0.12) 0.44*** (0.12) 0.40*** (0.12) 
Subsidiary size 0.04* (0.02) 0.06** (0.02) 0.06*** (0.02) 0.08*** (0.02) 0.05** (0.02) 0.07*** (0.02) 
Autonomy -0.68*** (0.08) -0.70*** (0.08) -0.43*** (0.07) -0.54*** (0.07) -0.41*** (0.08) -0.45*** (0.08) 
Ownership -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) -0.00*** (0.00) -0.00*** (0.00) -0.00*** (0.00) -0.00*** (0.00) 
Group history -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 
National legal context 0.03 (0.10) -0.03 (0.10) -0.06 (0.10) -0.12 (0.10) -0.05 (0.10) -0.10 (0.10) 
Biodiversity -0.12 (0.23) -0.08 (0.23) -0.54* (0.23) -0.55* (0.23) -0.26 (0.23) -0.49* (0.23) 
Safety 2.40*** (0.24) 2.58*** (0.24) 1.62*** (0.24) 1.77*** (0.25) 2.07*** (0.25) 1.77*** (0.25) 
Environmental services -0.35*** (0.09) -0.35*** (0.09) -0.15† (0.09) -0.20* (0.09) -0.16† (0.09) -0.15† (0.09) 
Infrastructure 0.68*** (0.12) 0.48*** (0.12) 0.95*** (0.11) 0.72*** (0.12) 0.81*** (0.12) 0.81*** (0.12) 
(Constant) 7.14*** (0.36) 6.40*** (0.38) 4.26*** (0.38) 4.39*** (0.38) 3.90*** (0.40) 3.78*** (0.39) 
Wald Chi2 298.31 337.80 696.20 675.84 619.08 719.08 
Observations 2,525 2,525 2,525 2,525 2,525 2,525 
Number of groups 25 25 25 25 25 25 
Standard errors in parentheses. † if p < 0.10, * if p < 0.05; ** if p < 0.01; *** if p < 0.001 
The 2,525 observations correspond to the implementation of 25 practices in 101 subsidiaries of an MNE.  
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Table 19: Appendix D: Clustered linear regressions estimating the effect of peers’ conformity on attention to  
 demands related to CSR 
 
Model 11: Attention to 
external demands 
Model 12: Attention to 
HQs’ demands 
Model 13:Attention to 
external demands 
Model 14: Attention to 
HQs’ demands 
Conformity of external peers 0.56*** (0.12) -0.26* (0.12)     
Conformity of internal peers     0.37*** (0.10) 0.46*** (0.10) 
Subsidiary size -0.07*** (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) -0.05*** (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 
Autonomy -0.45*** (0.06) -0.85*** (0.07) -0.38*** (0.06) -0.85*** (0.06) 
Ownership -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) 
Group history -0.00* (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) -0.00* (0.00) -0.01*** (0.00) 
National legal context 0.24** (0.08) 0.06 (0.08) 0.26*** (0.08) 0.02 (0.08) 
Biodiversity 1.08*** (0.05) 0.44*** (0.05) 1.13*** (0.05) 0.47*** (0.05) 
Safety 1.78*** (0.05) 1.24*** (0.05) 1.95*** (0.06) 1.38*** (0.06) 
Environmental services -0.35*** (0.07) -0.56*** (0.08) -0.33*** (0.07) -0.56*** (0.08) 
Infrastructure -0.46*** (0.10) -0.82*** (0.10) -0.55*** (0.10) -0.97*** (0.11) 
(Constant) 5.44*** (0.26) 7.54*** (0.27) 5.19*** (0.28) 7.02*** (0.29) 
Wald Chi2 1635.26 998.12 1619.70 1018.96 
Observations 2,525 2,525 2,525 2,525 
Number of groups 25 25 25 25 
Standard errors in parentheses. † if p < 0.10, * if p < 0.05; ** if p < 0.01; *** if p < 0.001 
The 2,525 observations correspond to the implementation of 25 practices in 101 subsidiaries of an MNE. 
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In model 9, introducing attention to the demands of the headquarters decreases the 
impact of internal peers’ conformity, but increases the impact of external peers’ conformity. 
Model 10 is the full model. The coefficients of the two independent variables and the two 
moderators remain positive and significant when they are all introduced simultaneously. 
We  ran Sobel-Goodman mediation tests (Sobel, 1982) that confirmed the fit of the 
partial mediation models. For external peers’ conformity, the indirect effect through attention 
to external demands was significant, representing 43.71% of the total effect, while the indirect 
effect through attention to headquarters’ demands was also significant, representing -17.87% 
of the total effect. For internal peers’ conformity, both the indirect effects through attention to 
headquarters’ and to external demands were significant, representing 27.32% and 25.79% of 
the total effect. 
We also computed the indirect effects simultaneously, and calculated their standard 
error (thanks to a seemingly unrelated regression): while the percentages mediated in each 
case slightly decreased, the signs, ordering and significance of the effects remained very 
similar. 
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APPENDIX E: ESSAY 2 – VALUE-CONSISTENCY – LIST OF ITEMS AND 
PRINCIPAL COMPONENT ANALYSIS 
The scales measuring the value consistency of practices related to safety, female 
employment and biodiversity preservation were adapted from Choi and Price (2005). The 
authors were interested in the impact of person-innovation fit on implementation behaviors. In 
particular, to measure value fit, they asked respondents whether they agreed with two 
statements: ‘Cyber Culture is congruent with the work style that I prefer’ and ‘Through Cyber 
Culture, I can do what I believe important” (Choi and Price, 2005, page 89). The items used 
here were “Employing female managers is congruent with the values of our subsidiary”, “By 
employing female managers, we do what our subsidiary believes important.”, “Biodiversity 
preservation is congruent with the values of our subsidiary”, “By preserving biodiversity, we 
do what our subsidiary believes important”, “Health and safety management is congruent with 
the values of our subsidiary” and “By preserving health and safety, we do what our subsidiary 
believes important”. The respondents gave their answer on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 
1: Strongly disagree” to “7: Strongly agree”, 4 being “Neutral”. Since these items are 
reflective of the value consistency, we performed principal component analyses to verify they 
loaded on one unique underlying factor and to generate a variable representing this factor. The 
results of these analyses on each topic are presented below. 
Occupational health and safety 
The factor analysis clearly generates one factor among the two items. Indeed, in Table 
16 below, one factor explains 94% f the total variance. Given there are only two items, their 
loadings and unique variances are identical and equal to respectively 0.9133 and 0.1648. 
Similarly the regression coefficients generating the unique factor summarizing the two items 
are identical and equal to 0.54745. 
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Table 20: Appendix E - Value consistency of safety: Factor analysis 
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor1 1.87694 1.75389 0.9385 0.9385 
Factor2 0.12306 . 0.0615 1.0000 
LR test: independent vs. saturated:  chi2(1)  =  457.96 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
Employment of female managers 
The factor analysis clearly generates one factor among the two items. Indeed, in Table 
17, one factor explains 93% of the total variance. Given there are only two items, their 
loadings and unique variances are identical and equal to respectively 0.9516 and 0.0944. 
Similarly the regression coefficients generating the unique factor summarizing the two items 
are identical and equal to 0.52543. 
Table 21: Appendix E - Value consistency of the employment of female managers: 
Factor analysis 
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor1 1.86477 1.72953 0.9324 0.9324 
Factor2 0.13523 . 0.0676 1.0000 
LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(1)  =  430.50 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
Preservation of environmental biodiversity 
The factor analysis clearly generates one factor among the two items. Indeed, in Table 
18 below, one factor explains 96% of the total variance. Given there are only two items, their 
loadings and unique variances are identical and equal to respectively 0.9794 and 0.0407. 
Similarly the regression coefficients generating the unique factor summarizing the two items 
are identical and equal to 0.51050. 
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Table 22: Appendix E - Value consistency of biodiversity: Factor analysis 
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor1 1.94185 1.88370 0.9709 0.9709 
Factor2 0.05815 . 0.0291 1.0000 
LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(1)  =  681.60 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
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APPENDIX F: ESSAY 3 – PRACTICES’ CHARACTERISTICS – LIST OF ITEMS 
AND CALIBRATION 
Performance advantage. The perceived relative performance advantage of the practices is the 
average of the responses to five items in the questionnaire for each of the three topics:  
 “In our subsidiary, we believe that the impact of safety management/the employment 
of female managers/ the preservation of biodiversity on employee satisfaction is…” 
 “In our subsidiary, we believe that the impact of safety management/the employment 
of female managers/ the preservation of biodiversity on our image among our final 
customers is…” 
 “In our subsidiary, we believe that the impact of safety management/the employment 
of female managers/ the preservation of biodiversity on our relationship with local 
communities is…” 
 “In our subsidiary, we believe that the impact of safety management/the employment 
of female managers/ the preservation of biodiversity on our relationships with our 
suppliers is…” 
 “In our subsidiary, we believe that the impact of safety management/the employment 
of female managers/ the preservation of biodiversity on our margin/cost ratio is…” 
Respondents had to rate the impact on a scale going from 1: very negative to 7: very positive, 
with 4: neutral. We therefore chose to calibrate the topic’s performance advantage measure by 
defining full membership when it was superior or equal to 6 (i.e. clear positive impact), non 
membership when it was inferior or equal to 2 (i.e. clear negative impact), and using the 
neutral point, 4, as the cut-off. 
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Complexity. The perceived complexity of the practices is the average of the responses to two 
items in the questionnaire for each of the three topics: 
 Identifying health and safety management practices/ practices favoring the 
employment of female managers/ practices favoring biodiversity preservation 
is difficult. 
 Implementing health and safety management practices/ practices favoring the 
employment of female managers/ practices favoring biodiversity preservation 
is difficult. 
Respondents had to rate the impact on a scale going from 1: strongly disagree to 7: strongly 
agree, with 4: neutral. We therefore chose to calibrate the topic’s complexity measure by 
defining full membership when it was superior or equal to 6 (i.e. clear complexity), non 
membership when it was inferior or equal to 2 (i.e. clear lack of complexity), and using the 
neutral point, 4, as the cut-off. 
Value compatibility. The perceived value compatibility of the practices is the average of the 
responses to two items in the questionnaire for each of the three topics:  
 Health and safety management/Employing female managers/Biodiversity 
preservation is congruent with the priority objectives of our entity. 
 By preserving health and safety/By employing female managers/By preserving 
biodiversity, we do what our entity believes important. 
Respondents had to rate the impact on a scale going from 1: strongly disagree to 7: strongly 
agree, with 4: neutral. We therefore chose to calibrate the topic’s value compatibility measure 
by defining full membership when it was superior or equal to 6 (i.e. clear compatibility), non 
membership when it was inferior or equal to 2 (i.e. clear incompatibility), and using the 
neutral point, 4, as the cut-off. 
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APPENDIX G: ESSAY 3 – REGRESSION RESULTS 
Table 23: Regression of practices characteristics and institutionalization level on their coupling extent 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Complexity   -0.19*** (0.053)           -0.11** (0.057) 
Value compatibility     0.20*** (0.027)         0.09*** (0.032) 
Performance advantage       0.31*** (0.031)       0.15*** (0.045) 
Country institutionalization         0.30** (0.117)     0.06 (0.117) 
Group institutionalization           0.32*** (0.046)   0.18*** (0.052) 
Industry institutionalization             0.18*** (0.028) 0.11*** (0.029) 
Prior implementation -0.30*** (0.022) -0.31*** (0.022) -0.34*** (0.023) -0.39*** (0.025) -0.31*** (0.022) -0.36*** (0.025) -0.32*** (0.022) -0.42*** (0.026) 
Headquarters’ influence -0.23*** (0.034) -0.03 (0.066) -0.14*** (0.035) -0.11*** (0.033) -0.22*** (0.034) -0.18*** (0.034) -0.22*** (0.034) 0.01 (0.067) 
Autonomy -0.03 (0.046) -0.05 (0.046) -0.04 (0.045) -0.06 (0.045) -0.01 (0.047) -0.07 (0.047) -0.03 (0.045) -0.08* (0.046) 
Ownership level -0.00** (0.001) -0.00** (0.001) -0.00** (0.001) -0.00* (0.001) -0.00** (0.001) -0.00** (0.001) -0.00 (0.001) -0.00* (0.001) 
Time in the Group 0.00 (0.002) 0.00 (0.002) 0.00 (0.002) 0.00 (0.002) 0.00 (0.002) 0.00 (0.002) 0.00 (0.002) 0.00 (0.002) 
Size 0.03 (0.020) 0.03* (0.020) 0.04* (0.020) 0.02 (0.020) 0.03 (0.020) 0.03 (0.020) 0.03* (0.020) 0.04** (0.020) 
Constant 2.26*** (0.303) 2.40*** (0.303) 1.18*** (0.324) 0.62* (0.315) 2.06*** (0.312) 1.97*** (0.302) 2.07*** (0.300) 0.72** (0.335) 
R-squared 0.130  0.137  0.159  0.179  0.133  0.151  0.149  0.196  
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Heterogeneous implementation of CSR in an MNE: the role of subsidiaries’ 
institutional contexts and behaviors 
 
Abstract. The main objective of this dissertation is to explain heterogeneity in 
conformity within multinational enterprises (MNEs). More specifically, I focus on 
what makes an MNE’s subsidiaries implement practices that are consistent with the 
policy designed by the MNE’s headquarters. Given the increasing normative 
pressures on MNEs, managing conformity within them is of strategic importance. 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is an example of such mounting norms. My 
work relies on a unique set of data (including surveys, archival data and interviews) I 
collected on CSR practices in one MNE between 2012 and 2014. Overall, the findings 
of my three essays show that heterogeneous conformity within MNEs stems not only 
from diverse internal and external pressures exerted on subsidiaries, but also from (1) 
the subsidiaries’ varying levels of attention to normative demands that depend on 
peers’ behaviors, (2) their heterogeneous internalization of the Group policy which 
reduces peers’ and headquarters’ influence and (3) the specific characteristics and 
institutionalization levels of different practices. 
 
Keywords. Organizational Conformity, Subsidiaries, CSR, Decoupling, Coupling 
Processes, Organizational Attention, Institutional Pressures 
 
 
 
Mise en œuvre hétérogène de la RSE dans une multinationale : le rôle des 
contextes institutionnels et des comportements des filiales 
 
Abstract. Cette thèse se donne pour objectif principal l’explication de l’hétérogénéité 
que l’on observe en matière de conformité au sein des multinationales. En particulier, 
je m’intéresse à ce qui pousse les filiales d’une multinationale à mettre en œuvre des 
pratiques conformes à la politique définie par le siège. Compte-tenu des pressions 
normatives croissantes exercées sur les multinationales, leur gestion de la conformité 
interne prend une importance stratégique. Et la responsabilité sociale d’entreprise 
(RSE) compte au nombre de ces normes émergentes. Mon travail repose sur des 
données uniques (dont des enquêtes, des données d’archive et des entretiens) sur la 
mise en œuvre de pratiques RSE que j’ai collectées de 2012 à 2014 au sein d’une 
multinationale. Dans l’ensemble, les résultats de mes trois essais démontrent que les 
niveaux hétérogènes de conformité que l’on observe au sein des multinationales 
résultent certes des différentes pressions internes et externes exercées sur leurs 
filiales, mais également (1) de leurs divers niveaux d’attention aux demandes 
normatives en fonction de la conformité de leurs pairs, (2) du fait que les filiales 
internalisent plus ou moins la politique groupe, ce qui limite l’influence du siège et de 
leurs pairs et (3) des caractéristiques spécifiques et des niveaux d’institutionnalisation 
des diverses pratiques. 
 
Keywords. Conformité Organisationnelle, Filiales, RSE, « Découplage », Processus 
de « Couplage », Attention Organisationnelle, Pressions Institutionnelles. 
